Another Realism: The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence
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Though Gandhi is often taken to be an exemplary moral idealist in politics, this article seeks to demonstrate that Gandhian nonviolence is premised upon a form of political realism, specifically a contextual, consequentialist, and moral-psychological analysis of a political world understood to be marked by inherent tendencies towards conflict, domination, and violence. By treating nonviolence as the essential analogue and correlative response to a realist theory of politics, one can better register the novelty of satyagraha (nonviolent action) as a practical orientation in politics as opposed to a moral proposition, ethical stance, or standard of judgment. The singularity of satyagraha lay in its self-limiting character, as a form of political action which sought to constrain the negative consequences of politics while working towards progressive social and political reform. The politics of nonviolence thereby points towards a transformational realism that need not begin and end in conservatism, moral equivocation, or pure instrumentalism.

I. Introduction

Political realism typically includes two interconnected claims: a view of politics in which power and conflict are taken to be constitutive and a suspicion of doctrines and theories that elide this fact as carelessly idealist or utopian. Realism is often equated with a kind of Machiavellianism, a hard-nosed insistence that norms of ordinary, individual, and/or legal morality have to be relaxed or superceded in the face of the contingency of political conflict or the intractability of ideological struggle. Here, realism reaches its denouement in the defense of power politics, reason of state, or Realpolitik as the optimal way to navigate the political world. However, alongside this more grimly celebratory realism – itself a kind of idealization of the efficacy of political power – lineages of other realisms can also been discerned in Thucydides and Hobbes, and especially in the eighteenth-century liberalism of Montesquieu, Hume, Madison, and Burke, thinkers who likewise provide sober assessments of the passions, vices, and enthusiasms that drive political conflict and competition but aim to restrain and moderate rather than extol them (Shklar 1984, 1989; Whelan 2004; Williams 2005b; Bourke 2007, 2009; Sabl 2002, 2011). That is,

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1 Though Machiavelli is the inevitable touchstone here, Lenin and Schmitt might also be seen as purveyors of this harder-edged political realism. In the latter cases, as well as in the broader range of Marxist realisms, idealist moralism is not only criticized for being ineffective (e.g. the case of utopian socialism) but also ideological and itself a justificatory discourse of and for power (i.e. the case of liberalism), to which a kind of revolutionary and radical Realpolitik is seen as the appropriate response (see Geuss 2008, 23-33; cf. Bolsinger 2001).
while both traditions of realism reject the search for ideal political institutions in favor of a science of politics that emphasizes the play of passions and interests over ideal motivation, moral education, and rational agreement, they do so for markedly different reasons. For the latter, the potential incompatibility between idealist moralism and practical politics concerns less the supposed inefficacy of strict moral codes in politics—what might be construed as the standard Machiavellian dilemma—than the ways in which absolutist ethics, ideological certitude, and utopian schemes can threaten political order and lead to unrestrained uses of power. This moderating realism therefore works through a broadly negative ethical horizon, orienting itself towards the prevention of civil breakdown, violence, cruelty, and domination over and against positive attempts to transform and/or perfect citizens or polities. Gandhi’s politics, the politics of nonviolence—in its theoretical understanding, practical orientation, and intended effects—converges with, but also points beyond, this tradition of moderating realism.

A new call for realism has recently emerged in political theory, one that more loosely and eclectically builds upon earlier Machiavellian, Marxist, and liberal realisms. It too raises the familiar charge of excessive idealism and moralism but the charge is directed against the methods and aims of dominant strains of contemporary political philosophy, especially liberal theories of justice (in the Rawlsian tradition) and, to a lesser extent, the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas. Raymond Geuss and Bernard Williams—two thinkers most closely identified with the call for a new political realism—have objected to the ways in which contemporary political philosophers treat political theory as a form of applied moral philosophy, in which a distinctive kind of normative theorizing takes precedence over all other forms of criticism, evaluation, and understanding. What they ask for, instead, is a bottom-up approach, in which political theory would begin from an understanding of the existing conditions and constraints of political life, rather than a top-down method in which theoretical resolutions to political conflict are sought prior to and in abstraction from the work of politics (Geuss 2008; Williams 2005a, 2005b).

For Williams, both contemporary utilitarians and contractarians embody a form of political moralism, in which the moral is given priority over the political. In the case of utilitarianism, politics comes into play as the means to secure antecedently established ethical principles and values, while in social contract models morality is meant to provide pre-political, structural constraints on the legitimate exercise of power (2005a, 1-2). In both cases, the sphere of political activity seems inessential and external to the nature of norms and their realization. Geuss’s understanding and worry about moralism is more...

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2 In twentieth-century political science, realism came to prominence as a field-defining approach to the study of international relations, one that privileged power and interest and, in the classic works of E.H. Carr (1946) and Hans Morgenthau (1948), emerged as a critique of liberal, utopian, and moralist approaches. Here, again, we might contrast Carr’s realist critique of the naiveté (and therefore catastrophic inefficacy) of the liberal idealism of the interwar years to Morgenthau’s realism which recommended a rational theory of national interest to avoid the excesses of ideologically-driven foreign policy. See Morgenthau’s critique of US action in Southeast Asia along these lines (1970). On the newer invocations of a realist political theory, see Galston’s overview (2010) in the special issue of European Journal of Political Theory devoted to the latest turn to political realism.
broad-ranging, for him the dominance of what he terms the “ethics-first” approach to politics and political theory may be part of a wider cultural-ideological condition in which academic moralism finds its real world analogues in the reckless absolutisms of a George Bush or Tony Blair (2008, 2010b). Ultimately, for Geuss, moralism stems from and contributes to a serious confusion about the task of political theory. When that task is primarily construed in terms of norm generation and justification, that is, in terms of a general ethical theory from which principles of conduct or institutional norms are deduced, this very orientation towards systematicity and universality necessarily works at a remove from the unstable, conflict-ridden, imperfect world of “real politics” (2008). Neither Geuss nor Williams eschew normativity altogether in favor of a pure inductive political science, but they seek to tie normativity more closely to empirical and historical contexts, to real constraints and real possibilities.3

In their concern about the unreality of political philosophy, Geuss and Williams join a larger chorus of critics who have likewise decried the tendency of academic political theory – especially so-called “high liberalism” – to ignore, misunderstand, or actively evade politics (Honig 1993; Mouffe 1993; Newey 2001; cf. Isaacs 1995; Dunn 2000; Shapiro 2005). Yet there is a lingering reticence about what the turn to realism actually entails. That is, realism’s main contributions seem negative, as perhaps a needed and blunt corrective, but as yet very far from offering a genuinely alternative mode of political theorizing. One important source for this reticence lies in a recurring objection to realism, in both its classical and more recent formulations. Critics worry that the rejection of normativity as traditionally conceived, namely the strict dichotomy between is and ought that is characteristic of Kantian and neo-Kantian thinking, undermines the possibility of normatively-driven criticism of existing political arrangements and, thereby, signals a bias in favor of the status quo (Honig and Stears 2011; Freeman 2009). Moderating realisms are perhaps especially susceptible to the charge of conservatism, given their traditional emphasis on questions of political stability, order, and moderation over and against, for example, justice and revolution.4

The anxiety can equally stem from exactly the kind of methodological correctives envisioned by Geuss and Williams: the turn to anti-ideal, bottom-up, or immanent theorizing, is seen to tether political possibilities too closely to the given coordinates of political life and thereby tending towards a naturally conservative, even pessimistic, outlook. Worst still, if politics is understood as determining, partly or

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3 As Honig and Stears (2011) have noted, Williams is much less suspicious of normative theory in general.

4 I use conservatism (and, later, progressive), not in the sense of political attitudes on a conventional right-left spectrum (though critics will often conflate the two) but to mark a philosophical orientation to the mechanisms of socio-political change. Here, conservatism refers to a skepticism towards transformative and revolutionary politics, the violence and upheaval they unleash as well as their sustaining dispositions, ideologies, and ontologies – a skepticism that can traverse the political spectrum. For instance, Hannah Arendt (1963) and Michael Oakeshott ([1962] 1991), despite divergent political affiliations, shared a critical-conservative stance towards particular forms of revolutionary politics. Also, the contrast with the immoderation of hard-edged realism is instructive; its adherents from both right and left tend to align themselves with radical-revolutionary politics.
wholly, its own internal standards of evaluation, it opens the door to harder-edged realisms which dispense with the category of morality altogether.

These are strong challenges and important worries, but as I hope to show, they can be met or at least displaced to make room for another realism, one that neither forsakes an agenda of reform nor sacrifices ethics at the altar of power politics. In this reconstruction of realism, I enlist a seemingly unlikely candidate – M.K. Gandhi. Gandhian nonviolence is often taken as an exemplar of pure conviction politics. Indeed, amongst both critics and defenders, there is a tendency to characterize Gandhi as a moral idealist or absolutist,5 as someone who rejected utilitarian/Machiavellian political thinking in which ends justify means and, instead, evoked strict ethical limits to legitimate political action. From this angle, Gandhi appears as primarily a political moralist – a moral critic of politics and an advocate of a severe political morality. This view, however, underplays the extent to which Gandhi’s politics were sustained not only by the strength of moral convictions but also by sharp political analysis and judgment. Indeed, I contend that Gandhi’s understanding of politics was fundamentally realist, and it is this underlying realism that renders nonviolence a plausible practical orientation in politics and not purely a moral proposition, ethical stance, or standard of judgment.

To think of Gandhi as a realist implies more than an acknowledgement of his skill as a political leader and strategist. To be sure, Gandhi was a much more pragmatic politician than is usually assumed in the popular image of the saint-as-politician (see Brown 1972, 1977; Rudolph and Rudolph 1967). But I invoke the term realism to register a theoretical coherence in Gandhi’s understanding of politics – an orientation and view of the political world that would place Gandhian politics squarely within the ambit of political realism. 6 Specifically, Gandhi’s political thinking involved a number of substantive theses about

5 Iyer (1973) is the classic statement of Gandhi as a moral idealist along Kantian lines. Recent work on Gandhi’s political thought, especially the work of Mehta (2010a, 2010b), Bilgrami (2003, 2009), Skaria (2002), Devji (2005, 2010), and Howes (2009), have been productively moving away from the more traditional assumption of Gandhi’s idealism. While some of this work has sought to render Gandhi’s originality in terms of ethical as opposed to straightforwardly political practice, the novel reconsideration of Gandhi’s critique of modern (liberal) politics and modern practices of judgment advanced by these scholars is especially cogent and important. In this article I hope to connect these insights to, and situate them within, and an older literature on the theory and practice of nonviolence, such as the seminal work of Gregg (1935), Shridharani (1939), Bondurant (1958), Horsburgh (1968), and Sharp (1973, 1979) in order to resignify the theoretical relevance of Gandhi’s politics and political thinking.

6 Terchek is alone in explicitly characterizing Gandhi as a political realist. While the realist angle is not explored in detail – it comes in the epilogue to a book that primarily focuses on Gandhi’s theory of autonomy in the face of modernity – Terchek suggestively notes that Gandhi’s “civic realism” took seriously the ways in which “power is unavoidable, seductive, and important” (1998, 232-234). Howes (2009) is the most sophisticated and extended attempt to recover the practical aspects of Gandhi’s philosophy along broadly realist lines (though he does not evoke the term realism in the same theoretical sense I do). Howes tries to de-emphasize what he takes to be moral and spiritual aspects of Gandhian nonviolence in order to formulate a more “credible pacifism” that is grounded in a realistic and theoretically nuanced analysis of political violence.
politics that resonate strikingly with, especially, the tradition of moderating realism referred to above. At the core of Gandhi’s realist theory of politics was a contextual, consequentialist, and moral-psychological analysis of a political world understood to be marked by inherent tendencies towards conflict, domination, and violence. Animated by a powerful negative horizon of violence, Gandhi was attuned to the unintended consequences of political action, especially the ways in which idealism and moralism – despite the best of intentions – could enable ideological escalation and violence. This understanding of the sources and legitimation of violence was tied to a moral psychology that emphasized the causal force of affect – of pride and egoism – over reason and rationality in political conflict. Thus, Gandhi’s open opposition to Machiavellian and utilitarian ethics, rather than signaling moral absolutism or idealism, in fact drew him closer to another kind of realism. But what distinguishes Gandhi’s realism from other moderating realisms is its ability to blend a negative, even conservative, orientation against violence with a progressive program of socio-political transformation. The novelty of Gandhian satyagraha (nonviolent action) lies in its self-limiting character; it is a form of action that seeks to both constrain the negative consequences of politics and work towards the reform of existing political relations and institutions.

The central contention of this article is that exploring the convergence between Gandhian politics and political realism offers key insights into both phenomena. First, we understand the nature and distinctiveness of Gandhian politics more deeply when placed in this tradition. The novelty of nonviolent action is put into sharp relief when viewed as the essential analogue and correlative response to a realist theory of politics. The article therefore begins by reconstructing the key components of Gandhi’s theory of politics, focusing on what Gandhi understood to be the sources and dynamics of violence and escalation in politics. The next section turns to the analysis of satyagraha and considers why and under what conditions nonviolent action, according to Gandhi, could counteract the tendencies towards coercion inherent in politics. In this, I specify two aspects of the politics of nonviolence: the general principles and the strategic-situational contexts that both define satyagraha and render it effective. In conclusion, I suggest that if we, with Gandhi, take political action, rather than the construction and legitimation of norms, as the starting point of politics and political theorizing, the realist call to attend closely to dynamics of power, conflict, and domination can be mobilized on behalf of principled and progressive politics. This reading of Gandhi thereby seeks to enable another realism that can navigate a way out of its traditional impasses, a transformational realism that need not begin and end in conservatism, moral equivocation, or pure instrumentalism.

II. Interaction and the Dynamics of Violence: Gandhi’s Theory of Politics

i. The problem of idealism

Gandhi famously claimed that he was “not a visionary” but rather a “practical idealist” ([1920e] 1999, 134). A practical orientation to politics, the putting of ideals into practice, was understood as one that turned fundamentally on the problem of political means. In politics, Gandhi contended, “means are after all everything” ([1924b] 1999, 310); means
not only shape the realization of political ends but are also implicated in the very nature of political conflict. The call to scrupulously attend to the question of means was, as is often recognized, a sharp rejection of the logic of expediency in politics. Gandhi considered modern politics to be saturated by a kind of instrumentalist, means-ends thinking, in which violence and coercion had become widely permissible and explicitly defended as legitimate. The rejection of instrumentalist calculation in politics, and more broadly the “doctrine of the sword…in this age of the rule of brute force” ([1920e] 1999, 133), was however not only directed at a kind of prosaic Machiavellianism. The risk of sliding into rationalizations of political violence was just as acute for political idealisms in which right or noble ends work to enable, justify, and/or redeem the use of dubious political means. It is important to keep in mind the extent to which Gandhi’s political thinking was animated and framed by a continual worry about the potential for violence given in the gamut of idealist enthusiasms – from anarchist nationalism, aggressive religious revivalism, to revolutionary Marxism – that shaped the ideological landscape of Indian anticolonial politics.

In Gandhian terms, the signature failing of political idealism is its focus on ends at the expense of means. This disjunction between means and ends is associated with two kinds of political hazards. Firstly, the commitment to ideals when detached from a specification of means is subject to a distinct form of moral erosion, namely it can have a morally disinhibiting effect on its proponents. “[T]o serve the noblest of causes,” political

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7 In the midst of an abstract discussion about whether killing could ever be conceived of as a duty (i.e. for the protection of others), Gandhi made this observation: “Few men are wantonly wicked. The most heinous and most cruel crimes of which history has record have been committed under cover of religion or equally other noble motive” ([1927] 1999, 184).

8 For Gandhi, idealism was a not term of abuse or criticism, though he often tried to signal its limitations and offered his own “intensely practical” idealism as an example of how principles ought to be given a definite, practical shape in political work and action. The interpretation here of Gandhi’s worry about idealism is pieced together from the manner in which he criticized and debated some of his main political rivals, namely, adherents of movements who seemed to combine a (misplaced) faith in the efficacy of violence with ostensibly “noble” political motives. I explore below some of the ways that Gandhi understood this coincidence or co-mingling of principle and violence to be a linked to corrupting forms of self-righteousness, vanity, and egoism.

9 Mehta (2010a) has made the most forceful case for viewing Gandhi’s political thinking and practice as premised on a stark rejection of the “inherent idealism” of modern politics. For Mehta, idealism is necessarily tied to a teleology that gives meaning to political action only in relation to its contribution to the realization of final ends such as progress, peace, and security, and thus renders all politics instrumental to those ends.

10 Following Horsburgh (1968, 41-53), I adopt the term moral erosion to signify the process through which increasing conflict loosens moral constraints. What is at issue is less the mere fact of positing ideals in politics than their disassociation from means of realization. Mehta tends to emphasize the former in his understanding of Gandhi’s anti-idealism, and therefore sees Gandhi as more starkly rejecting all politics oriented towards transformative ends. In these terms, Mehta provocatively asks us to consider Gandhi “not just as having a very different politics, but rather, in
idealism become susceptible to taking and legitimating “short-violent-cuts to success” ([1924c] 1999, 442). The temptation to use any and all available means for even small and/or temporary gains seemingly becomes greater in proportion to one’s belief in and attachment to ends. The dynamic may actually function in the reverse, that is, it might be precisely because the gains are small or nonexistent (or even negative and deleterious) that insisting on the rightness of principles becomes ever more politically urgent. In either case, the exaltation of ends becomes all too easily implicated in the justification of various forms of political coercion. Secondly, idealism can facilitate tendencies towards ideological entrenchment in politics. Where previously the strong attachment to principles papered over corrosive moral compromises, here the worry is that when political disagreements are framed as arguments over fundamental principles, the potential for political progress may dissipate in an atmosphere of increasing hostility and polarization. Consider Gandhi’s response to Nehru’s entreaty in 1933 to define more sharply the egalitarian goals of Congress’s future economic policy:

I know that though there is such an agreement between you and me in the enunciation of ideals, there are temperamental differences between us. Thus you have emphasized the necessity of a clear statement of the goal, but having once determined it, I have never attached importance to the repetition. The clearest possible definition of the goal and its appreciation would fail to take us there if we do not know and utilize the means of achieving it. I have, therefore, concerned myself principally with the conservation of the means and their progressive use. I know that if we can take care of them, attainment of the goal is assured. I feel too that our progress towards the goal will be in exact proportion to the purity of our means. If we can give an ocular demonstration of our uttermost truthfulness and non-violence, I am convinced that our statement of the national goal cannot long offend the interests which your letter would appear to attack. We know that the princes, the zamindars, and those who depend for their existence upon the exploitation of the masses, would cease to fear and distrust us, if we could but ensure the innocence of our methods. We do not seek to coerce any. We seek to convert them. This method may appear to be long, perhaps too long, but I am convinced that it is the shortest ([1933b] 1999, 393).

What Gandhi termed his “temperamental differences” with Nehru are couched in terms of a broader statement about why the clarification of goals “would fail take us there” without a serious consideration of effective means. More subtly, Gandhi implied that the manner in which ends are invoked, presented, and insisted upon can themselves engender resistance, that is, they may prove counterproductive to the process of converting natural opponents to the cause of reform. At the extreme, an uncompromising insistence on ideals may not only lead to the use of coercion but may well slide into a moralistic politics of conviction or ideological dogmatism which, for Gandhi, were especially liable to breed contempt and engender a logic of escalation.

some crucial sense, as being a deeply anti-political thinker” (2010a, 363).
Importantly, in both these scenarios, the actual *processes* of political interaction and contestation, especially the subjective-psychological investments and reactions they provoke, are seen to objectively threaten the attainability of ends advanced. The practical and moral hazards of political idealism – the moral erosion that leads to the use of coercive tactics and forms of contestation that produce an atmosphere of hostility – point to what Gandhi took to be acute dangers inherent in the very practice of politics. In other words, Gandhi’s insistent call to attend to “the conservation of the means and their progressive use” is closely tied to a view of politics as a realm marked by recalcitrance and given tendencies towards conflict and violence. Pointing to idealism’s indifference to political means is therefore another way of signaling its larger blindness to the internal dynamics of political life that shape the realization of ends.

Idealisms, old and new, have a difficult time thinking conceptually about the practical constraints of political activity. This is indeed one of the most insistent charges made by the new realists, namely that contemporary political philosophy does not dwell long enough on problems of implementation, especially political impediments to implementation (Geuss 2008, Williams 2005b). More often, political philosophy assumes or envisions apolitical or extra-political models of how ideal theory could be enacted in the world. For instance, when political conflict is understood as a contestation over rival conceptions of the good and/or the just, the search for consensus or agreement becomes the presumed solution to the problems of politics. Here, educative models take the place of politics, in which public reason through debate and discussion is thought to lead to the dissemination and transformation of political values. Alternatively, political theory speaks in the voice of the state or from a position of power, and concerns itself with outlining legislation or policy along proposed normative guidelines. As Williams has noted, the implied reader or “listener” – whether it is a Supreme Court Justice or high-level policy maker – is here akin to the omnipotent legislator or founder, that is, someone who functions with as few “purely political restrictions” as possible (2005b, 57-58). To critics, these assumptions are taken to exemplify political philosophy’s, and especially contemporary liberalism’s, tendency towards the evasion of politics. It can also be understood as an absence of a *theory* of politics in the sense that it lacks a theoretical account of political constraints, contestation, and resistance and of what to do in the face of recalcitrance (whether conceived in terms of party dynamics, entrenched interests, or ideological recalcitrance).

A realist theory of politics focuses on how political processes affect the realization of political goals, but also sees the dynamics of political interactions as radically reformulating political possibilities. The extent to which Gandhi had a clear and distinct theory of politics with strong realist undertones has, to my mind, been drastically undervalued. But it is the essential counterpart to a means-orientation in politics as well as the practical grounds of the politics of nonviolence. Gandhi’s theory of politics focused on the moral-psychological dimension of political interaction and contestation, especially the tensions and temptations that propelled modern politics in the direction of escalating

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11 For many critics, such as Mouffe (1993), Honig (1993), and Newey (2001), the rejection of politics is partly a symptom of a deeper liberal impulse that takes the overcoming or suppression of politics as its telos.
conflict and violence. My claim here is not that Gandhi’s understanding of these dynamics is convincing in every detail or that it is the only plausible realist theory available. Rather, exploring it reveals a great deal about what nonviolence entails as a practical political orientation and a set of strategic responses rather than simply an ethical stance or standard of moral judgment. The two interrelated aspects of Gandhi’s theory of politics to which I wish to draw attention are the origins and legitimation of violence and the dynamics of escalation. In sum, they represent the twin dangers of political life. Thus Gandhi’s challenge would be to demonstrate how satyagraha could appropriately respond to these dangers, that is, how it could work as a mode of effective political action that neither enabled escalation nor justified and re-enacted coercion.

ii. Cycles of violence

For Gandhi, at the metaphysical level, himsa or violence was an ever-present feature of life. In Jain, Hindu, and Buddhist thinking, himsa was understood as harm or injury to any living being. In what is usually considered the most radical interpretation of the doctrine, Jain monks would take care to only eat food prepared by others, clear walking paths of insects before treading, and filter water or wear masks to avoid destroying microscopic life. Gandhi similarly took the fact that basic bodily functions necessarily involved himsa of this kind as a sign of its ineradicability. One common ethical response to the problem of himsa was the renunciation of action, an imperative to make one’s footprint in the world as infinitesimal as possible and to practice a variety of forms of nonattachment to body and world. Gandhi, in contrast, held to a notion of renunciation that “should be sought for in and through action” ([1928b] 1999, 131). The answer was not a negative withdrawal from the world, but rather a form of detached or selfless action that aimed at actively minimizing harm and suffering (Gier 2004, 28-39; 51-65).

Gandhi’s turning of ahimsa outwards, as an imperative to relieve worldly suffering, signaled a much broader understanding of the sources and consequences of himsa. In translating the metaphysical doctrine into avowedly social and political terms, Gandhi effectively reinvented the theory of ahimsa in manner that often dismayed traditional adherents (see Parekh 1989b, 120-155). Gandhi was often piqued by dogmatic forms of ahimsa which “made non-killing a blind fetish” and were seemingly motivated more by the care of one’s soul than the suffering of others:

The current (and in my opinion, mistaken) view of ahimsa has drugged our conscience and rendered us insensible to a host of other and more insidious forms of himsa like harsh words, harsh judgments, ill-will, anger and spite and lust for cruelty; it has made us forget that there may be far more himsa in the slow torture of men and animals, the starvation and exploitation to which they are subjected out of selfish greed, the wanton humiliation and oppression of the weak and the killing of their self-respect that we witness all around us today…([1928a] 1999, 59).

With this more expansive understanding of himsa, Gandhi came to emphasize structural aspects of violence in a host of social, economic, and political institutions. He famously declared the modern state to represent “violence in a concentrated and organized form”
([1934] 1999, 318), exemplified both in its coercive capacity to enforce obedience and as well as in its tendency towards centralization and hierarchy (Mantena forthcoming). Likewise, industrial economies were seen as premised on institutional centralization, exploitation, and inequality.

What concerns us here, more than its structural aspects, is violence as a dynamic feature of political contestation. For Gandhi, political action – like all action – intervenes in a complex causal web. Action initiates irreversible chains of cause and effect, which in Gandhi’s view were understood to be so intricate as to be unknowable and therefore unmasterable and in any deep or final sense.¹² The political analogue of the metaphysical problem of *himsa* was therefore an understanding of politics as necessarily interactive and deeply consequentialist, where chains of intentionality and responsibility reverberate in unforeseen and unintended ways. One fundamental implication of this view is that individual will, intention, or motive alone cannot fully exhaust, master, or determine the outcomes of political action.¹³ To admit indeterminacy in the face of the interactive logic of politics, however, is not to foreclose attempts at shaping political trajectories. Here the analogy with Gandhi’s response to *himsa* assumes added force: rather than abjuring the consequentialism of politics and recommending withdrawal, Gandhi put forward a model of self-limiting action, action that could do as much as possible to internally constrain these negative effects and still work towards positive political goals.

Consequentialism¹⁴ of this kind demands attention to the mechanisms that interactively shape political outcomes, especially the recurring *entailments* of political action. By entailments, I mean effects and consequences of particular kinds of political action that may not be logically given in the nature of political ideals or intended by political actors but nevertheless regularly recur as their reactive outcome. For Gandhi, the problem of political entailment was especially acute in the case of violence, for in being an absolute, irreversible deed, violence initiates definite dynamics of resentment, retrenchment, and retaliation – a dynamic that is often prosaically referred to as the *cycle of violence*. Violence, even when taken for the sake of justice or a final peace, necessarily puts into motion chains of animus and dissension that ultimately result in instability. Overt violence was merely an extreme instance on what was, for Gandhi, a very expansive spectrum of

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¹² As he put it in *Satyagraha in South Africa*, “as every part has its place in a machine, every feature has its place in a movement of men, and as a machine is clogged by rust, dirt and the like, so is a movement hampered by a number of factors. We are merely instruments of the Almighty Will and are therefore often ignorant of what helps us forward and what acts as an impediment. We must rest satisfied with a knowledge only of the means, and if these are pure, we can fearlessly leave the end to take care of itself” ([1925c] 1999, 261).

¹³ Howes (2009), drawing on Arendt, also emphasizes the unpredictable nature of politics, and suggests that one of the realistic advantages of nonviolence is that it might be better equipped to respond to this challenge.

¹⁴ Here, I am using *consequentialism* in a non-technical sense, to refer to a view in which consequences are central to political analysis and calculation (rather than to specific moral theories, such as utilitarianism, which judge the moral status of an act based primarily upon the act’s consequential effect).
forms of force, domination, coercion, and imposition that themselves seemed definitive of modern politics. Even ostensibly mild forms of coercion – for example, when a democratic majority adopts legislation that is unpalatable to a minority – can initiate similar dynamics of antipathy and hostility which likewise lead to insecure and illegitimate outcomes.

The subjective – or moral-psychological dimension – of violence was equally important in the manner of its justification. Implicit in the turn to violence was a claim to infallibility; according to Gandhi, man, however, was “not capable of knowing the absolute truth and, therefore, not competent to punish” ([1921b] 1999, 451). Gandhi’s objection here is often construed as an epistemological critique of violence, founded upon a conception of truth as many-sided. But, for Gandhi, the posture of infallibility was also a moral-psychological one, a problem of pride and, at the same time, of weakness and cowardice. The extreme irreversibility of violence demands hubris in its undertaking and in its continued justification, a precarious subjective orientation that made acknowledging errors of judgment and policy reversals difficult and rare. For Gandhi, the fortitude that accompanies violence was a brittle posturing, a papering over of ego-driven investments. The militant Hindu “who will protect by force of arms a few cows but make away with the butcher” or the militant nationalist “who in order to do supposed good to his country does not mind killing off a few officials…are actuated by hatred, cowardice and fear. Here love of the cow or the country is a vague thing intended to satisfy one’s vanity or soothe a stinging conscience” ([1916] 1999, 253-254). Conviction here is motivated by a need to protect and project one’s self, betraying an egoism grounded in weakness rather than, in Gandhi’s terms, a genuine and detached commitment to truth.

Finally, Gandhi was concerned with the long-term, unintended consequences of violence, namely the ways in which violence attains moral and political legitimacy. For Gandhi, when coercion is deemed rightful conduct against recalcitrant opponents or enemies (again, this can apply to both the extreme case of war/revolution or everyday modes of democratic politics), the result is that everyone is more inclined to become power-seekers, either for protection or as emulators, and thus all become accustomed to, and accept, competitive domination as the preeminent mode of modern politics. Far worse than individual acts of violence or demonstrations of force was therefore the universal respect given to the capacity for imposition such that power and domination appear as markers of legitimate authority. This was the foundation of Gandhi’s exhortation in Hind Swaraj to Indians to find a mode of resisting British rule that did not at the same time emulate (and thereby legitimate) imperial claims to authority. Gandhi famously claimed that “the English have not taken India; we have given it to them. They are not in India because of their strength, but because we keep them” (261). For Gandhi, it was not the mere preponderance of force that brought or kept India under British rule but Indian weakness. Emulation and the turn

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15 Parekh (1989a, 142-170) is a classic statement, but see Bilgrami’s (2003) striking critique.

16 It is telling that when Gandhi extolled courage and fearlessness as “the most soldierly of a soldier’s virtues” they were associated with the willingness to die, to sacrifice one’s life, and not with the will or desire to kill, which, on the contrary, were thought to stem from cowardice and weakness ([1916] 1999, 252-253).
to violence were marks of this weakness; they demonstrated the continued acquiescence to
the logic of imperial conquest and legitimated material domination as an acceptable
foundation of political authority (see Nandy 1983).

iii. Affect and escalation

The second feature which was fundamental to Gandhi’s understanding of politics was the
inherent tendency towards escalation in conflict. The problem of escalation is closely tied
to an idea of political action that emphasizes its interactive effect in complex causal
sequences. Political conflict, confrontation, and antagonism characteristically proceed
through a dynamic logic of actions, reactions, counter-reactions. And again, here, for
Gandhi, these dynamics of contestation include moral-psychological elements that drive
them beyond mere conflicts of interest. The performative aspect of political interaction
transformed political actors’ motivations and subjective investments. Therefore to speak
of the ways in which violence (or coercion or contestation) expectedly leads to forms of
entrenchment, resentment, and mutual hostility is to call attention to the central role of
affect in political life. As we have seen, Gandhi was especially attuned to this particular
dimension and took passions such as pride and egotism – and their derivatives such as
anger, ambition, humiliation, insolence, revenge, retaliation, etc. – to be key forces for
understanding the structure and psychology of violence and escalation. Thus undercutting
or moderating these same passions would be central to the dispositional politics of
nonviolence. Humility and fearlessness must be cultivated to avoid the slide into the
egotism, hubris, and cowardice that engenders violent escalation.

To note the importance of our emotional and psychological attachment to belief is also to
recognize distinct limits to rational persuasion in politics. For Gandhi, political conflicts –
even when based in a rational conflict of interest, i.e. between landlord and peasant, upper
caste and lower caste – have a tendency, in and through contestation, to take on an
increasingly ideological character. The egoist’s passions in particular are activated and
heightened when beliefs are questioned and contested, as they inevitably are in the realm
of politics. In such situations rational argumentation and moral criticism would be
ineffectual or, worse still, counterproductive, for repeated attempts to demonstrate the
rightness of your position and correlative wrongness of your opponent’s elicits resistance.
As Bilgrami has provocatively argued, criticism for Gandhi can never be pure in motive
and moralizing criticism directed at others is easily susceptible to corruption (egoistic
investments) and has “the potential to generate other psychological attitudes (resentment,
hostility) which underlie inter-personal violence” (2003, 4136). Here contestation stirs the
passions which more often than not result in entrenchment and escalation rather than
moderation and agreement.

In *Hind Swaraj*, Gandhi offered the following parable to outline the manner in which a
response to injustice can easily lead to an escalation that undoes the conditions of a just
resolution. In this example, the dynamic of confrontation begins with a thief illegitimately
stealing your property. In response, you, full of anger, resolve to punish the thief who has
stolen from you, “not for your own sake, but for the good of your neighbours.” You
organize an armed band to counter-attack; the thief responds defiantly and “collects his
brother-robbers” and “pesters your neighbours,” who complain that the robber has only
resorted to open threats against them “after you declared hostilities against him.” You feel badly that you have exacerbated the situation but feel trapped. Knowing you will be “disgraced if you now leave the robber alone,” you instead distribute arms to all your neighbors “and so the battle grows…the result of wanting to take revenge upon the robber is that you have disturbed the peace; you are in perpetual fear of being robbed and assaulted; your courage has given place to cowardice” (288-289). One of the overt lessons of this story is that improper means chosen to respond to injustice can lead to unintended and deleterious consequences – more violence, injustice, and instability. The parable also shows how the investment in, and motivation for, seeking justice and redress is imbricated in the agent’s sense of self such that this investment itself becomes a vehicle for escalation and a barrier to reaching lasting and just resolution. The attachment to principle, perversely, becomes more important as the consequences become negative or less tangibly beneficial. And principled conviction functions as an alibi for a violence born of weakness.

III. Principles of Nonviolent Action

It was in response to this specific understanding of politics – one that emphasizes the dynamics of violence and its legitimation and the tendency towards escalation in political contestation – that Gandhi developed modes of intervening in politics that would constrain and counter the adverse consequences of politics. Gandhi was acutely aware that all political action, even ostensibly nonviolent action, held within itself tendencies towards escalation and latent violence. This was particularly true of collective action, not only when it threatens spontaneous or mob violence but also when the sheer strength of numbers does the work of compelling or coercing compliance. Gandhi’s challenge, therefore, was to create, define, and delineate the conditions through which nonviolent action, especially in its collective form, could mitigate these negative dynamics and repercussions. The term Gandhi invented for the forms of self-limiting political action he proposed and practiced was satyagraha. Satyagraha, Gandhi insisted, was not simply a species of pacifism, non-resistance, or passive resistance ([1925c] 1999, 94-98). Rather it was open, adversarial, and extra-institutional, a form of direct action that mobilized and refashioned techniques of collective protest to take the place of traditional methods of political violence, as nonviolent equivalents of war and revolution (Shridharani 1939; Horsburgh 1968). Civil disobedience, non-cooperation, the boycott, strike, and hartal (full work-stoppage) were reframed as viable forms of satyagraha but only when embedded within a robust politics of nonviolence.

Gandhian satyagraha, therefore, does not imply one set course of action or a static injunction to restrict action to nonviolence but, rather, the strategic interplay of nonviolent techniques, methods, stances, that in themselves had to be as various and dynamic as the nature of political conflict itself. In other words, satyagraha is best understood not as a norm but a practice; its “objective is not to assert propositions, but to create possibilities” (Bondurant 1958, vii). As a practice, satyagraha functions at two levels, one strategic and situational, and another, in terms of general principles and orientation (Bondurant 1958, 36-48, 102-104). Ultimately, what would prove to be effective nonviolent action – action that works by transforming the psychological valence of violence in the dynamics of
political conflict—turns out to be extremely context-dependent (an aspect I will explore more fully in the next section). Here I focus on what is arguably the most original aspect of Gandhi’s understanding of satyagraha as a form of action, namely its radically self-limiting character. I will outline the defining principles of satyagraha in terms of the orientation, mechanism, and dispositions that render it “a force containing within itself seeds of progressive self-restraint” (Gandhi [1925c] 1999, 174) and, thereby, the capacity to attenuate coercion and escalation in politics.

i. Means and ends

A primary tenet of Gandhi’s realism was his insistence on a means-orientation to politics. This orientation serves, on the one hand, as an antidote to the kinds of disjunctures between means and ends characteristic of political idealism as well as instrumentalism; on the other, it pointedly frames politics in terms of the problems and possibilities of political action. To prioritize means does not dispense with the question of ends but seeks to reformulate its reciprocal relationship to means. Gandhi’s understanding of means and ends to be, in his words, “convertible terms” ([1924d] 1999, 497) suggests two kinds of articulations. In its stronger version, convertibility would imply a very tight imbrication such that means would have to embody their ends. In *Hind Swaraj*, for example, Gandhi offered an organic metaphor which seemingly so intertwined means and ends that no end could function as such, or ever come to light, if it were not already given in the means utilized to attain that end; “there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree…We reap exactly as we sow” (287). In the strong version, then, means are ends-creative and action consistent with this view might take the form of exemplary or principled action (in the Arendtian sense), in which the principle or end is expressed and entailed in the act (Horsburgh 1968, 41-53). Gandhi’s understanding of swaraj or self-rule may be the clearest instance of an end that is constitutive of the act itself. As is well known, Gandhi repeatedly dissociated swaraj for India from the mere fact of political independence from Britain. Self-rule for Gandhi was premised on a fundamental moral-psychological transformation, an overcoming of fear, and, in this sense, an immanent achievement that could not be granted or given, as it were, by the British. Politically, swaraj was attained through individual and collective practices of self-rule that worked to make British rule irrelevant. In this, Gandhi contended that “the attempt to win *swaraj* was *swaraj* itself.”

The need for full convertibility between means and ends was especially urgent in the case of abstract ends such as swaraj. Abstract ends needed grounding in immediate, intimate, and precise practices as way to ward off the temptation to look for “short-violent-cuts”

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17 I refer to the efficacy or effectiveness of nonviolence to evoke what I take to be Gandhi’s theoretical emphasis on, and account of, the practical effects and dynamics involved in the politics of nonviolence. I do not explore in detail the empirical or historical truth of Gandhi’s claims on behalf of the intended effects and dynamics of this model.

18 In this vein, Devji discusses this idea of a temporal coincidence of means and ends in which the purposes of non-violent action “were achieved in the very moment of their expression” (Devji 2010, 374).

19 This is one way to situate Gandhi’s obsession with the charka (spinning wheel) and, more
for temporary but ultimately self-defeating gains. Gandhi therefore refused any abstraction or separation – temporal or conceptual – of ends from means, for it was that suspension which opens up the possibility of coercion, a point Mehta eloquently elaborates (2010a, 369). In a second sense, reciprocity between means and ends also implies a strategic vigilance in which it is crucial “to adopt means to fit each case” ([1909] 1999, 288) and creatively enact a variety of nonviolent methods and dispositions to overcome resistance to transformative action. For it is also in the gap between means and ends that projects of political reform and transformation run aground. And here, Gandhi’s varied agenda for social and economic reform are instructive illustrations of the idea that the means adopted determine the extent to which the goals of reform can be progressively realized. For the promotion of caste equality or Hindu-Muslim unity – two central components of Gandhi’s constructive program – means and ends come together in that the transformation of relations of mistrust, domination, and inequality is at once both the goal and mechanism of reform. But in reform – even in the collective goal of self-rule – political action takes place sequentially and in shifting contexts, within and through political engagements that are more interactive and iterative, and therefore necessarily more strategic.

ii. Discipline and suffering

If the prioritization of means defines the orientation of satyagraha, its substance lies in suffering. For Gandhi, “non-violence in its dynamic condition means conscious suffering” ([1920e] 1999, 135). Tapas/tapasya, usually translated by Gandhi as both self-suffering and self-discipline, was therefore the distinguishing feature of all modes of nonviolent action and key to their effectiveness. For Gandhi, suffering properly practiced was non-coercive, and its mode of operation forestalled and disrupted the escalating logic of politics. Moreover, the disposition towards sacrifice implied in suffering allowed for self-correction and self-examination, a disciplined humility that was performed and cultivated through detached action. In the disciplined suffering that nonviolent action seeks to dramatize, these aspects coalesce to enable a more lasting and just form of resolution, what Gandhi strikingly called a kind of political conversion.

The literal meaning of satyagraha is “truth-force” or the search for and insistence upon truth ([1921b] 1999, 451-2; [1925c] 1999, 64, 93; cf. Parekh 1989a, 143). Truth, for Gandhi, was absolute and universal; indeed it served as another name for God. At the same time, Gandhian truth lacked any positive, substantive definition; it was a name for an absolute that was in principle unknowable and inaccessible in any final or total sense. Thus, insistence upon it went hand in hand with a view of truth as necessarily many-sided (Bondurant 1958, 17). Each individual not only had their own path to truth, but their knowledge of it was only ever partial and always liable to be mistaken. To recognize fallibility was to accept that people’s (partial) views of justice will necessarily conflict; “for what appears to be truth to the one may appear to be error to the other” ([1920a] 1999, 206). And, this was, for Gandhi, “the main reason why violence is eliminated” in generally, the idea of constructive work. See also Mehta (2010b, 368-369).

20 “Real suffering bravely borne melts even a heart of stone. Such is the potency of suffering, or tapas. And there lies the key to Satyagraha” (Gandhi [1925c] 1999, 18).
The satyagrahi (the nonviolent actor), Gandhi continued, “gives his opponent the same right of independence and feelings of liberty that he reserves to himself, and he will fight by inflicting injuries on his own person” ([1920b] 1999, 217). By turning the onus of action – the responsibility for the consequences of action – inward and upon oneself in this manner, suffering was to be non-coercive in its outward effect. When this kind of truth-force turns out to have mistakenly used, i.e. in a cause that is unjust, then “only the person using it suffers.” The disciplined satyagrahi does not “make others suffer for his mistakes” ([1909] 1999, 293) and, instead, turns the consequences of failure inward, into acts of self-examination and correction. Most importantly suffering functions to interrupt the dynamic of escalation. As Niebuhr thoughtfully noted, by enduring “more suffering than it causes,” satyagraha “mitigates the resentment” of the political opponent, “resentments which violent conflict always create” (1932, 247).

While the charged language of self-suffering has the tendency to evoke heroic, even masochistic, feats of self-abnegation, with Niebuhr, it might be better described as disciplined action – free of personal resentments and ambitions – that demonstrates this detachment through action that involves the willingness to sacrifice. To suffer meant to fully bear the burden of acting; it demanded that acts of protest, resistance, and reform involved the sacrifice of something from which one benefits and the risking of severe consequences, from ostracism to violent reaction. In the context of non-cooperation with authority, whether in the form of a boycott of state institutions, civil disobedience, or labor strikes and work stoppages, the act would prove most efficacious, most demonstrative of conviction, when the satyagrahi visibly sacrificed tangible benefits (in terms of money and prestige) and bore adverse consequences (such as being jailed or fired) in a forthright and disciplined manner.

For Gandhi, the mitigation of resentment was only one side of what made conscious and deliberate suffering effective. Suffering, for Gandhi, “appeals not to the intellect, it pierces the heart;” it works not by persuading but converting political opponents ([1939] 1999, 196). Conversion was therefore associated with a kind of action that was more affective than intellectual in orientation and effect. While most directly opposed to coercion, conversion was also contrasted to persuasion and condemnation, where the latter implied modes of argumentation and criticism that inhibited moderation and bred hostility. For Gandhi, as was noted before, reason and rational argument had distinct limits in politics. Reason could easily cover over and engender obstinacy, self-righteousness, and dogmatism. Indeed Gandhi thought that deeply-held beliefs and principles were almost always less rational than they may appear, and the intellect worked hardest to supply arguments and proofs for beliefs that had their origins and grounding elsewhere. Suffering, however, enabled a different kind of reasoning:

Suffering is the law of human beings; war is the law of the jungle. But suffering is infinitely more powerful than the law of the jungle for converting the opponent and opening his ears, which are otherwise shut, to the voice of reason. Nobody has probably drawn up more petitions or espoused more forlorn causes than I, and I have come to this fundamental conclusion that, if you want something really important to be done, you must not merely satisfy the reason, you must move the heart also. The
appeal of reason is more to the head, but the penetration of the heart comes from suffering. It opens up the inner understanding in man ([1931] 1999, 48).

Dramatic displays of commitment – through acts of conscious and willed suffering – were thought to more effectively weaken entrenched positions. It was a way of triggering an opening and rethinking of commitments, it was a form of reason “strengthened by suffering” ([1925b] 1999, 382).

Gandhi was acutely aware that an unrestrained or egoistic politics of conviction was especially liable to engendering a logic of escalation. He therefore insisted that nonviolence could not be a movement of “brag, bluster, or bluff,” but one premised on the cultivation of “unobtrusive humility” ([1921a] 1999, 203). Not bravado or brinkmanship but the performance of self-effacing and self-sacrificing acts would do the political work of demonstrating firmly-held political convictions and compelling attention to them. Nonviolence avoids condemnation in the form of criticism and judgment of the actions of others, for “the more it speaks and argues, the less effective it becomes” ([1936] 1999, 402). Rather than enhancing its power through moralizing, the convincing action of the nonviolent agent grows most in his opponent when he least interposes his speech between his action and his opponent. Speech, especially when it is haughty, betrays want of confidence and it makes one’s opponent skeptical about the reality of the act. Humility therefore is the key to quick success ([1921a] 1999, 203).

Acts of suffering to be effective involved discipline, where discipline meant learning to detach the self from desire for the fruits of action and the egoistic investment in principles. The dispositional training for satyagraha therefore required a cultivation of humility and fearlessness, the willingness to sacrifice one’s life and an overcoming of the ego’s passions and attachments.

Gandhi’s repeated prescriptions to be pure and selfless in motive, coupled with his celebration of personal asceticism, have given great cause to view Gandhi as a moral absolutist or ethical purist in politics. Gandhi certainly extolled a model of moral perfection in which disciplined purity and self-abnegating humility were central modes and avowed aims. But, these moral virtues also functioned as distinctly political dispositions upon which the success (and not just the moral legitimacy) of nonviolent action depended. That is, the imperative for detached and disciplined action was not just a way to assert the legitimacy or authenticity of the political act nor a sign of the ethical purity of actor, but a key determinate of the anticipated efficacy of nonviolent action. Purity of motive implied removing all traces of anger and resentment towards one’s opponent, as well as personal vanity and ambition vis-à-vis the ends of action, so as not to invite bitterness and antipathy. Selfless suffering likewise was thought to demonstrate the strength of conviction in a non-dogmatic manner that interrupted the escalation of mutual hostilities. Therefore, in the context of the theory and practice of nonviolence, the formulation and defense of purity
and selflessness, as well as suffering, detachment, humility, discipline, was avowedly political.

IV. Contexts of Nonviolent Action

For Gandhian realism the fundamental questions about politics are taken to be questions about political action, about how given a particular context and set of practical constraints, one must seek the right means to enable a projected end. Thus far, I have focused on constraints in terms of recurring structures of resistance and endemic sources of violence in political contestation. But action takes place within determinate relationships and encounters, where individuals and groups confront and engage each other from a given standpoint. Political interactions have a different character and entail differential effects depending on where antagonists find and position themselves, for example, within relations of power, legacies of domination, forms of disagreement, and stages of polarization. Being responsive to these variations in situational standpoints is another reason why the politics of satyagraha had to be dynamic, strategic, and contextual.

A central contention of political realism is that context is an essential, even determinative, starting point of political action and judgment. The emphasis on context implies a view of politics as always historically and institutionally located and a sense that political decision-making – in the face of the brute contingencies and complexities of political life – has to be situational to be effective. In this vein, realists have taken political judgment to be less a theoretical science in which right conduct can be deduced from universal principles and more akin to a skill or art, a form of practical reason that is sensitive to particulars (Geuss 2010a, Galston 2010). One perennial worry with judgment conceived in these terms is that it often leads to the conclusion that politics requires making unpleasant moral choices or, indeed, a suspension of moral norms. Emphasizing flexibility and mutability can also make political judgment appear mystical or, worse still, a cover for plain decisionism. Gandhi’s understanding of satyagraha offers more defined parameters or precepts for determining the appropriate course of action in given contexts. It suggests that one can think more constructively about paradigmatic contexts of political conflicts and the kinds of political responses they demand and, thereby, help navigate the terrain between morally strict categorical imperatives and morally lax decisionism. Gandhian satyagraha was especially attuned to structural and historical relations of power and the sequences and stages of polarization which framed contestation between antagonists and potential allies.

There is a tendency to take civil disobedience, and the Indian anticcolonial campaign against British rule, as the exemplary instance of satyagraha, to which one would turn to tease out its conceptual underpinnings. While due mention is made to Gandhi’s other campaigns of the time, such as the campaigns against untouchability and for Hindu-Muslim unity, these are often viewed as indications of Gandhi’s progressive social views rather than as themselves theoretically significant examples of nonviolent politics in
action. Against this tendency, Skaria (2002) has reformulated the category of *ahimsa* as a set of broad-ranging practices of neighborliness, which seek to create, reform, and sustain political relationships in accordance with Gandhian notions of justice and equality. Skaria rightly conceptualizes *ahimsa* as less a static position than an ongoing activity, a “rigorous politics” which works through different and distinct modes of *tapasya* to produce the conditions of neighborliness (957). In this vein, Skaria offers a very suggestive typology for distinguishing forms of nonviolent action in terms of the structural relationship between political partners and/or antagonists. In his view, nonviolent action is differently enacted when it is practiced vis-à-vis political superiors, equals, or inferiors/subalterns. Against your dominators, or superiors, one would enact a politics of confrontation, resistance, and civil disobedience; with equals, one sought political friendship; with the subaltern, one would demonstrate service and seek atonement (957, 976-981). Here I connect this typology to Gandhi’s own two-fold differentiations between *destructive* and *constructive satyagraha* and the more abstract contrast he drew between relations with a tyrant versus a lover.

i. Destructive and constructive *satyagraha*

Destructive *satyagraha* revolves around the tactics of civil disobedience and non-cooperation. It is a mode of militant and direct political action against unjust laws or an unjust political order, an order with which you are in, or place yourself in, an antagonistic relationship. Constructive nonviolent action, by contrast, is driven less by an urgency to resist, withdraw, or undo existing political authority, but rather by the need to create political bonds and forms of association and authority on a voluntary and non-coercive basis. Constructive action can also function as a form of political judgment, linked to an ethics of effective leadership, of how to make alliances, coalitions, overcome divisions, and solve political disagreement. In constructive *satyagraha*, we see most clearly how nonviolence was not merely a negative recipe for resistance but the grounds for generative political action.

Nonviolent resistance in the form of mass civil disobedience and non-cooperation is the clearest example of Gandhi’s belief that political authority was ultimately based not on force alone but on some kind of consent, however minimal or unconscious. For Gandhi, the very machinery of modern government necessarily relied on the extensive cooperation of subjects; “every citizen silently but none-the-less certainly sustains the Government of the day in ways of which he has no knowledge. Every citizen renders himself responsible of every act of government” ([1920d] 1999, 94). Gandhi’s radical account of responsibility served to make visible the individual’s active (even if unwitting) collusion in the production of authority and thus their inherent power and liberty to reject and/or revise the conditions of consent. The fact that “less than a hundred thousand white men should

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21 The exemplary status of the nonviolent movement for *swaraj* also stems from its historic successes in contrast to the ambiguity and controversy over the impact of Gandhi’s other campaigns. Whereas Gandhi’s support of the abolition of untouchability is considered to have been important and consequential (exactly how consequential as well as the character of that influence is however subject to intense debate), the attempt at forging Hindu-Muslim solidarity is generally taken to have been a more striking failure.
be able to rule three hundred and fifty million Indians” ([1920g] 1999, 279-280) offered proof that British rule was unthinkable without Indian collaboration. It also attested to its inherent instability (and that of all political regimes) when the actions of government become corrupt, unjust, or otherwise intolerable. “In politics,” Gandhi insisted, the use of satyagraha “is based upon the immutable maxim, that government of the people is possible only so long as they consent either consciously or unconsciously to be governed” ([1914] 1999, 217). And therefore unjust laws and regimes can be radically destabilized by acts of withdrawal of that consent, through a politics of active non-cooperation with authority.

At one level, constructive satyagraha was the flipside of nonviolent resistance and non-cooperation; it consisted in the active creation of new modes of individual and collective self-rule to redeem and reconstitute the political space made available by withdrawal. For Gandhi, in the context of Indian anticlonial politics, the exemplary site for experimenting in constructive satyagraha was the platform of village reform and revitalization known as the Constructive Programme. The constructive program was a multifaceted program of social reform, which in its more radical turns, aimed at something like a nonviolent social revolution. This program came to enfold an expanding set of social, cultural, and economic reform campaigns – from the promotion of khadi [home-spun cloth] and cottage industry, the abolition of untouchability and the striving for communal harmony, to campaigns for sanitation, education, and prohibition ([1941] 1999). The constructive program was often criticized, especially from within the Congress, for being non-political. It was charged with distracting Gandhi and Congress politics from the goal of capturing state power, for being obscurantist and traditional (this was especially directed at the khadi campaign), and instigating social division when national unity was deemed most urgent (i.e. on the issue of untouchability). But for Gandhi, in this precise form – centered around village renewal and protection – constructive work was the necessary counterpart to the anticlonial demand. To attain swaraj, the strategy of non-cooperation had to be twinned with a positive program of constructing nonviolent forms of rule, authority, and association. In this sense, the constructive programfunctioned as political preparation for independence, as itself a series of experiments in self-rule.

Moreover, the forms of satyagraha envisioned in the constructive program were also meant to highlight the centrality of, and intimate a model for, the everyday practice of nonviolent politics. These campaigns explicitly eschewed state-action or legislation as the means for effecting radical social and economic reform; indeed this rejection is what rendered these campaigns nonviolent. If Gandhi was suspicious of the legitimacy and efficacy of state-directed legislation in general, the problem of coercive or imposed reform was thought to be most acute in the arena of social and economic life. It would not only produce reaction and resentment, but also threatened to induce a scale of polarization that

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22 In a 1938 speech to Ghaffar Khan’s Khudai Khidmatgars, the famous nonviolent movement of the Northwest Frontier Province, Gandhi reiterated the importance of ordinary forms of constructive satyagraha in the following terms: “Our civil disobedience or non-co-operation, by its very nature, was not meant to be practiced for all time. But the fight which we are today putting up through our constructive nonviolence has validity for all time; it is the real thing” ([1938] 1999, 146).
could instigate widespread civil conflict and even outright civil war. Gandhi’s proposed antidote to the potential escalating spiral of ideological conflict given in communal, inter-caste, and economic conflict was the radical localization of the arena of struggle for reform. The constructive program while national in scope was to be conducted as village-level campaigns. For Gandhi, entrenched forms of economic and social oppression (for example, stemming from land distribution and caste inequality) required engagement at an intimate scale, for intimacy set the conditions for conscious atonement and resisted the abstracting logic of ideological competition and stalemate. And, in a positive sense, localized constructive nonviolence taught satyagrahis to orient themselves towards the reform of that with which one was most intimate; that is, it was to insist that political action began from the situatedness of the self in its most intimate worlds.

One of the most striking examples of constructive satyagraha in the realm of political judgment and political leadership was Gandhi’s understanding of the conditions for forging Hindu-Muslim unity. Though the creation of greater Hindu-Muslim unity was a central plank of the constructive program, it was by all accounts a deep political failure both for Gandhi and Congress politics, evidenced in the polarizations that resulted in Partition. Yet, it was Gandhi’s involvement with the pan-Islamic Khilafat movement (1919-1924) that had initially elevated him to a position of national leadership in the first major mobilizations against British rule. As the Khilafat campaign eventually dovetailed with the Non-Cooperation movement (1920-1922), this period is often recounted as the heyday of Hindu-Muslim solidarity. Despite its later unraveling, the distinctive formula that Gandhi articulated in the period as the basis for Hindu-Muslim unity and friendship remains provocative. Skaria (2002) and Devji (2005) have both drawn attention to the novelty of Gandhi’s formulation of political friendship as one that is performed through unconditional acts of solidarity. Rather than a strategic alliance of interest, based on a kind of quid pro quo – in which, for instance, Hindu support for the Khilafat demand would be tied to Muslim acceptance of a ban on cow slaughter – Gandhi attempted to “win permanent friendship with Mussulmans” in “a spirit of love and sacrifice independent of expectation of any return” ([1920f] 1999, 119). What Gandhi proposed was not primarily an ideology (or national narrative) that could convince Hindus and Muslims that they shared political interests and goals (or that they already formed a single political community) but a mechanism that could disarm growing enmity and escalating distrust:

> When men become obstinate, it is a difficult thing. If I pull one way, my Moslem brother will pull another. If I put on superior airs, he will return the compliment. If I bow to him gently, he will do it much more so; and if, he does not, I shall not be considered to have done wrong in having bowed. When the Hindus became insistent, the killing of cows increased. In my opinion, cow-protection societies may be considered cow-killing societies ([1909] 1999, 272).

Here we see the central mechanisms of satyagraha, suffering and sacrifice, mobilized towards creating the conditions for mutual respect, trust, and equality. But the attempt to do so, required a sensitivity to the nature of the structural and historical relationship between Hindus and Muslims. Thus, the “heart unity” that Gandhi sought could not ignore or deny the difference in status and interests of each community, indeed it was premised
upon the heightened duty of the Hindu community as the majority community to “surrender out of strength to the Mussalman in every mundane matter” ([1925a] 1999, 159). Trying to create the conditions of unity – overcoming mutual distrust, feelings of superiority/inferiority or insecurity – was, for Gandhi, “essentially the work of Hindus” ([1921c] 1999, 18). For it was incumbent on those in positions of power, strength, and security to both accept its responsibility for enmity and actively seek its undoing.  

ii. Context and coercion

Thus, the techniques as well as dispositional politics of satyagraha had a different valence depending on the context of encounter. Even the most militant forms of resistance had to take a specific form in order to produce the right effect and transform structures of political conflict and political authority. As noted earlier, Gandhi saw proper acts of satyagraha as dramatizing self-suffering; resisters have to show that in acts of withdrawal they consciously sacrifice something from which they benefit and “voluntarily put up with the losses and inconveniences that arise from having to withdraw” ([1920c] 1999, 399). Though the aim and form of resistance was to break the machinery of government this was not to occur through instilling fear, intimidating, embarrassing, or otherwise humiliating the government into submission:

This battle of non-cooperation is a programme of propaganda by reducing profession to practice, not one of compelling others to yield obedience by violence direct or indirect. We must try patiently to convert our opponents. If we wish to evolve the spirit of democracy out of slavery, we must be scrupulously exact in our dealings with opponents. We may not replace the slavery of the Government by that of the non-co-operationists. We must concede to our opponents the freedom we claim for ourselves and for which we are fighting ([1920h] 1999, 66).

Gandhi insisted that if the price for acting was borne primarily by the satyagrahi, whatever coercion existed was internally directed, and thus not a form of violence against the opponent. To demonstrate this difference, Gandhi often invoked a distinction between forms of political boycott in which one legitimately withdrew support from an unjust institution (i.e. through disobeying or ignoring the laws of the village headman or district collector) and extreme forms of social boycott that would deny social services or otherwise

23 Gandhi’s formula for Hindu-Muslim friendship was most explicit and arguably most effective only during the Khilafat campaign. Though never renounced, it was also never again given such prominence nor practiced so publicly in Congress politics. There were however some meager attempts: consider Gandhi’s offer to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League and founder of Pakistan, the prime ministership as a way to ward off Partition in the eleventh hour. More interestingly, Rajagopalachari, one of Gandhi’s closest political associates, had argued for various forms of compromise on the question of Pakistan, from accepting the League resolution of 1940 to a lifelong campaign to resolve Kashmir despite. Rajagopalachari often formulated these various acts of reconciliation in Gandhian terms, as unilateral acts of friendship meant to dissolve suspicion and fear; his striking maxim for peace with Pakistan was “not peace at any cost but friendship at any price.” On this, see Srinivasan’s excellent study (2009, 9, 139-144, 163-174).
ostracize or intimidate these same officials. In satyagraha one did not punish the wrong-doer as such, rather one “must combat the wrong by ceasing to assist the wrong-doer” ([1920c] 1999, 399). Gandhi deemed punishment to be outright coercion and hence illegitimate. Moreover, in terming the act coercive Gandhi also considered it to be politically ineffective for it targeted individuals rather than institutions, and, importantly, accelerated the given dynamics of entrenchment.

There has always been a great deal of controversy about whether the logic of nonviolent protest, especially in its most confrontational moments, actually works in this way, or whether it necessarily succeeds on the back of another kind of coercion.\footnote{Though Gandhi was insistent that truly nonviolent action was non-coercive, even his defenders have questioned the plausibility of this claim. Bondurant (1958) explicitly and positively terms the moral force of satyagraha as working through “nonviolent coercion” (9-11). Howes (2009) argues that Gandhi underestimates the “intersubjective violence” that nonviolence necessarily effects (122). Here, I want to follow Gandhi’s understanding of why he thought nonviolence could in principle be non-coercive, without entering into the important question of whether in fact this has been in case in its actually enactment.}

Gandhi himself declared satyagraha to be a militant and not passive form of resistance, often invoking military metaphors to describe the tactics and discipline of his nonviolent army. It is also clear that in the context of opposing manifestly unjust regimes – i.e. when a regime is deemed incapable of internal reform as was the case, in Gandhi’s view, of British rule in India after the Amritsar massacre\footnote{The massacre at Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar, Punjab in April 1919 was a key catalyst of the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-1922), the first major mass nonviolent campaign calling for Indian self-rule.} – escalation would become a conscious strategy. At the same time, even in the context of the broadest calls for general non-cooperation, escalation took place in precise stages and had to be tied to specific demands, demands that could be reasonably negotiated or met by opponents. Pure escalation could never become a goal of its own. Thus, at every stage of confrontation, demands had to be publicly declared, justified, and circulated and avenues for negotiated settlements (including face-saving measures) had to be kept open (Bondurant, 40). Acts of disobedience and resistance, in addition to being disciplined and defined, thus were meant to work less through humiliating or triumphing over an enemy but by producing conditions for progressive and iterative resolutions.

Context mattered not only in the general sense that it shaped the aims and methods of political action, but also in the sense that any particular tactic or technique could be felt as coercive, depending on the specific structure and sequence of confrontation. Gandhi took great pains to establish and justify the precise conditions in which the deployment of nonviolent tactics could be undertaken without inducing escalation or enacting coercion. He devoted enormous energy to clarifying, calibrating, and outlining the exact conditions of disciplined satyagraha, indeed these searching examinations were a central feature of his voluminous writings (especially in his in-house journals, Young India and Harijan). These responses ranged very broadly, from detailing exacting rituals of daily self-discipline, differentiating retaliatory and productive forms of boycotts, strikes, and work-stoppages, to distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate grievances of satyagrahis in
prison. Despite Gandhi’s careful calibrations of the fine line between coercion and conversion, these often appeared to his critics to be little more than sophistries, and the charge that nonviolence necessarily works through moral coercion has continued to shadow it.

To gauge how complicated the issue of coercion was and how crucial the contexts of political conflict was, for Gandhi, in shaping it, I will refer briefly to perhaps the most controversial tactic in Gandhi’s political repertoire and one that most often was seen as morally coercive: the political fast or hunger strike. The majority of Gandhi’s fasts were personal acts of self-purification, penance, prayer, and remembrance. Even many of his political fasts can be construed as acts of self-purification after political failures, to atone for falling short of his own ideals and the lapses of his followers (i.e. when he felt responsible for outbreaks of violence) (Gandhi 2008, 827-831). He also fasted for straightforwardly political reasons, to influence the course of events, most famously as the prelude to the Poona Pact of 1932 and to quell communal riots at Partition. Gandhi was acutely aware that fasts could very easily be coercive and thus he elaborated precise and demanding rules in their undertaking. It was always to be a weapon of last resort, used only when all other avenues had been exhausted. To attest to how reluctant Gandhi was to carry out this tactic, it is worth remembering that Gandhi at no time fasted against the British government or British rule as such, and never in the name of an open-ended demand for independence. For Gandhi, fasting against a political antagonist or enemy functioned only to escalate bitterness and conflict, for your enemy would necessarily experience the fast as exhortative and coercive. One could not “fast against a tyrant” but only against those whose consciences could be stirred by your willingness to sacrifice your life ([1933a] 1999, 377). Only in the context of that kind of relationship – Gandhi called it a relationship of love – would fasting work as moral suasion and not as sheer blackmail. The categories of tyrant and lover had, for Gandhi, “a general application. The one who does injustice is styled ‘tyrant.’ The one who is in sympathy with you is the ‘lover.’” The true satyagraha fast “should be against the lover and for his reform, not for extorting rights from him” ([1924a] 1999, 323). This does not mean that in practice all of Gandhi’s fasts necessarily conformed to these strict criteria; indeed Gandhi himself admitted his own lapses in this regard. But it does vividly demonstrate the degree to which Gandhi was attuned to the ambiguities of moral coercion in nonviolent resistance, and more importantly, how for Gandhi the question of appropriate uses of nonviolent action in general was closely tied to an assessment of the contexts and dynamics of specific political confrontations.

V. Conclusion: From Norms To Action

At its core, realism asks us to confront the question of what is given – immutable and endemic – in politics. In the tradition of moderating or liberal realism, the given is often linked to aspects of human nature and psychology, passions and interests that are viewed as perhaps partially tamable but never wholly overcome. Montesquieu, Hume, and Madison based their political analyses on a motivational realism of this kind and thereby rejected the view that politics and political institutions ought to require or depend upon
great transformations of fundamental human passions. Such attempts to reshape, educate, or suppress human nature would either be foolhardy or dangerous. Instead, workable political institutions had to take into account and constrain (in indirect ways) the inevitable play of pride and self-interest in politics.

Gandhi’s politics were also premised on an understanding of the crucial role of passions such as pride and self-regard in politics, yet Gandhi was also straightforwardly a moral perfectionist. The key question here was not whether but how political passions could be constrained. Gandhi did not look to political institutions to check, harness, or moderate the most unstable and dangerous passions. Institutions were untrustworthy in this regard and more often than not effected reform and discipline through coercion. Rather, moderation was to be sought “in and through action,” in satyagraha as a distinct form of disciplined, self-limiting action. Ultimately, for Gandhian realism the question of the given is less about marking a line between what can and cannot be changed than the necessary starting point for the work of politics. In other words, Gandhi’s realism rests not in disavowing the transformative possibilities in and of politics but in insisting that political action has to begin from, and work outward from, the givens – the situated contexts and inherent dangers – of political life. And it is in this respect that Gandhian realism serves as an instructive example of exactly the kind of realist reversal in the directionality of political theorizing that scholars such as Geuss and Williams have recommended.

The key lies in Gandhi’s central focus on the question of action, and especially the manner in which the question of means is taken as the fundamental problem of and for politics. The Gandhian imperative to construct nonviolent means not only puts into sharp relief the ethical and practical dilemmas of political violence, it also prioritizes action and contexts of action in a manner that works to helpfully displace and reformulate realism’s normative bind. The traditional dilemma about normativity – about the relationship between is and ought – arises partly because of a prior framing and implicit assumption that political theorizing primarily concerns itself with the constitution, generation, and justification of norms. If that is the perspective from which one views the realism/idealism debate, then realism may well come up short. But if we were to shift the is/ought question from the domain of norms to that of action, the issue is no longer one of how normative guidelines (the ought) can be derived out from the web of existing beliefs and constraints (the is), an issue that can admittedly pose fundamental challenges for the practice of criticism. Rather, the question becomes one of interrogating the conditions and mechanisms by which we can move from the world as it is to the world as it ought to be. That is, from the standpoint of political action, the is/ought question is reconfigured as a means/ends question, one in which the tighter imbrication of the normative and the empirical that realism recommends can be enabling rather than constrictive. In Gandhi, we can see how tethering political potentiality to the given constraints of political life does not entail an a priori restriction on imaginative possibilities, it only insists on scrupulous attention to the means of working out from and through these constraints towards envisioned ends. In this form of realism, the ends and goals of political life may even be high-minded, demanding, and radical (as surely many of Gandhi’s were) but the means for the effectuation of norms cannot be left unspecified and, hence, unreal. In this manner, with Gandhi, political realism can perhaps be rescued from its association with amoral instrumentalism and status quo politics and
instead be viewed as offering an alternative way of thinking pointedly and precisely about the conditions for effective and principled political action.

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