Implementation of the Recursive Core for Partition Function Form Games

Chen-Ying Huang† Tomas Sjöström‡

April 6, 2005

Abstract

In partition function form games, the recursive core (r-core) is implemented by a modified version of Perry and Reny’s (1994) non-cooperative game. Specifically, every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE) outcome is an r-core outcome. With the additional assumption of total r-balancedness, every r-core outcome is an SSPNE outcome.

1 Introduction

The core is an important solution concept with intuitive appeal. It is an appropriate solution for situations where players have unhampered ability to sign binding agreements. Two lines of research have recently been prominent. The first line of research extends the core concept to situations with externalities across coalitions. The α- and r-cores are based on a partition function instead of a characteristic function. Important new solution concepts have been proposed by Ray and Vohra (1997) and Koczy (2003). The second line of research

*The comments of two anonymous referees have greatly improved the exposition. We also wish to thank seminar participants at the 2003 European Meeting of the Econometric Society for helpful comments. Financial support from the NSC Grant No. 90-2415-H-002-029 is gratefully acknowledged.
†Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan.
‡Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1248.
concerns non-cooperative implementation of the core for characteristic function form games. Important contributions to this literature include Kalai, Postlewaite and Roberts (1979), Chatterjee et. al. (1993), Moldovanu and Winter (1994, 1995), and Serrano and Vohra (1997). Non-cooperative games of coalition formation in the presence of externalities have been studied by Bloch (1995), Yi (1997), and Ray and Vohra (1997).

In non-cooperative games of coalition formation, the set of equilibrium payoffs often depends on the fine details of the bargaining protocol. Changing the order in which players make and accept proposals may change the distribution of bargaining power. This happens, for example, in the very natural game of Chatterjee et. al. (1993). To address this problem, Moldovanu and Winter (1995) look at outcomes that are equilibrium outcomes for any order of moves. This approach is interesting, but differs from the usual concept of implementation. Serrano and Vohra (1997) implement the core correspondence in economic environments using a two-stage game. In the first stage, each player proposes an outcome. In the second stage, a player may propose a coalition, which forms if all members accept. It is not clear how to generalize this game to the general partition function form games studied in our paper. At the very least, more stages would have to be added in order to address the key issue of how outsiders react when a coalition is formed.

Perry and Reny (1994) introduce a continuous-time game with no fixed protocol for making offers. Their game seems to capture the spirit of free competition underlying the core. The outcome does not depend on some arbitrarily specified order of moves. In their original paper, Perry and Reny did not allow externalities across coalitions. However, in their game outsiders can react to the formation of a coalition, so it seems well suited to handle externalities. After a coalition has “left” the Perry and Reny game, the remaining players enter a subgame which has the same structure as the original game. Since the original game implements the core, the subgame naturally implements the core of the “reduced game” consisting of the players who did not leave. Accordingly, when the original players leave, they will expect that the remaining players behave in
a way which is consistent with the core of the reduced game. The self-similar
structure of the Perry and Reny game suggests a connection with the recursive core (briefly, \textit{r-core}). The recursive core is a solution concept for partition function form games, where the worth of a coalition is calculated by recursively computing the cores of the “reduced societies.” The connection between the recursive core and Perry and Reny’s game when there are only three players was pointed out by Huang and Sjöström (2003). The current paper shows that Perry and Reny’s game, suitably modified to allow for externalities across coalitions, provides a non-cooperative implementation of the \textit{r-core}, with any number of players. Perry and Reny’s game needs to be modified mainly because, in the presence of externalities, bargaining cannot be directly over payoffs. In our game, players instead bargain over sharing rules. We believe these result sheds some light on how to define the core based on partition functions. Specifically, it suggests that the \textit{r-core} is a natural generalization of the core to games with externalities.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the definition of the \textit{r-core}. Section 3 provides an example which illuminates the issues that arise when the core is extended to allow for externalities. Section 4 describes the modified Perry and Reny (1994) game. We prove our two main theorems in the Section 5. Section 6 discusses the assumption of total \textit{r-balancedness}.

2 The recursive core

Let $N = \{1, 2, ..., n\}$ be the set of players. A coalition is a non-empty subset of $N$. A coalition structure is a partition of $N$. A transferable utility game in partition function form is denoted $<N, P>$, where $P$ is the partition function. The partition function form is the natural way to model externalities across coalitions. For any coalition structure $\mathcal{P}_N$ and for any coalition $S$ in $\mathcal{P}_N$, $P(S \mid \mathcal{P}_N) > 0$ is the value (or worth) of $S$ when players partition themselves according
to $\mathcal{P}_N$.\footnote{Allowing $P(S \mid \mathcal{P}_N) \leq 0$ would not change the results, but it would make the exposition slightly more awkward.} Thus, the worth of $S$ can depend on the coalitional structure formed by the players in $N \setminus S$. For any payoff vector $x \equiv (x_i)_{i \in N}$ and any coalition $S \subseteq N$, let $x(S) \equiv \sum_{i \in S} x_i$. A payoff vector $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is feasible under the partition $\mathcal{P}_N$ if for every coalition $S$ in $\mathcal{P}_N$, $x(S) = P(S \mid \mathcal{P}_N)$. If $S \in \mathcal{P}_N$, then we have $\mathcal{P}_N = (S, A_1, A_2, ..., A_k)$ for some coalitions $A_1, A_2, ..., A_k$. Notice that $\mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S} \equiv (A_1, A_2, ..., A_k)$ is a partition of $N \setminus S$. With a slight abuse of notation, we write $\mathcal{P}_N = (S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S})$ and $P(S \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S}) \equiv P(S \mid \mathcal{P}_N)$.

Now we can define the recursive core (r-core). Consider any coalition $S \subseteq N$, and suppose the players in $N \setminus S$ have partitioned themselves into $\mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S}$. The r-core for coalition $S$ given $\mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S}$, denoted $C(S \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S})$, is defined as follows. For a single-player society $S = \{i\}$, we define $C(\{i\} \mid \{i\}, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus \{i\}})$ to be the set of payoff vectors feasible under $\{(i), \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus \{i\}}\}$. Proceeding recursively, suppose the r-core has been defined for all coalitions with at least $s - 1$ members, and all partitions on players other than these $s - 1$ members. Now suppose coalition $S$ has $s$ members, and other players partition themselves according to $\mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S}$. For any coalition $T \subseteq S$, define

$$V(T \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S}) \equiv \begin{cases} P(S \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S}) & \text{if } T = S \\ \min\{x(T) : x \in C(S \setminus T \mid S \setminus T, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S})\} & \text{if } T \neq S \end{cases}$$

Now, $x \in C(S \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S})$ if and only if there exists some partition $\mathcal{P}_S$ of $S$ such that $x$ is feasible under the partition $(\mathcal{P}_S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S})$, and $x(T) \geq V(T \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S})$ for each coalition $T \subseteq S$. This completes the definition.

The r-core predicts how $S$ will partition itself given that $N \setminus S$ is partitioned according to $\mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S}$, but the prediction may not be unique. Let $\mathcal{P}(S \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S})$ denote the set of all r-core partitions of $S$ given $\mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S}$. That is, $\mathcal{P}_S \in \mathcal{P}(S \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S})$ if and only if there is $x \in C(S \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S})$ which is feasible under the partition $(\mathcal{P}_S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S})$. We will show below that if $< N, P >$ is strictly superadditive, then the r-core makes the unique prediction that $S$ stays together, i.e., $\mathcal{P}(S \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S})$ contains only $(S)$. 
The final step of the recursive definition occurs when \( S = N \). Although the method is the same in each step, it is useful to simplify the notation at the last step. At the last step the worth of \( T \subseteq N \) will be denoted \( V(T) \) instead of \( V(T \mid N) \). Similarly, we write \( C(N) \) instead of \( C(N \mid N) \), and \( \mathcal{P}(N) \) instead of \( \mathcal{P}(N \mid N) \). By a slight abuse of terminology, we refer to \( C(N) \) as the r-core of \( < N, P > \). Notice that \( x \in C(N) \) if and only if there is some partition \( \mathcal{P}_N \) of \( N \) such that \( x \) is feasible under the partition \( \mathcal{P}_N \), and \( x(T) \geq V(T) \) for each coalition \( T \subseteq N \). This simplified notation should not cause any confusion.

Intuitively, the recursive core may be justified as follows. In a stable outcome, each coalition must get at least “what it is worth.” However, in partition function form games the payoff to coalition \( T \subseteq N \) depends on the behavior of the players in \( N \setminus T \). Therefore, in order to give coalition \( T \) “what it is worth,” we must predict what the players in \( N \setminus T \) will do if the coalition \( T \) forms. The \( \alpha \)-core applies maximal pessimism: the players in \( T \) think that what is worst for them will happen, regardless of the incentives of the members of \( N \setminus T \) to hurt the players in \( T \). The idea behind the recursive core is instead that the players in \( T \) think the players in \( N \setminus T \) will apply the solution concept to their own “reduced game”. Thus, if coalition \( T \) forms, every subcoalition of \( N \setminus T \) will insist on getting “what it is worth,” rather than trying to punish the members of \( T \). The set of payoff vectors that can occur when the players in \( N \setminus T \) behave according to the solution concept is \( C(N \setminus T \mid N \setminus T, T) \). Accordingly, we define the worth of coalition \( T \) to be

\[
V(T) \equiv \min\{x(T) : x \in C(N \setminus T \mid N \setminus T, T)\},
\]

and \( x \) is in the r-core of \( < N, P > \) if and only if \( x(T) \geq V(T) \) for all \( T \subseteq N \). This recursive logic is less pessimistic than the \( \alpha \)-core logic and accordingly computes a higher worth for any coalition. Thus, the r-core is always a subset of the \( \alpha \)-core.

Each characteristic function form corresponds to a “trivial” partition function form, where the payoff to any coalition \( S \) is independent of the behavior of the players in \( N \setminus S \). If the characteristic function form game is totally balanced, then the r-core for the corresponding partition function form game is non-empty and equals the \( \alpha \)-core, and also the core of the original characteristic function.
form game (because there is only one possible way to define the worth of a coalition). If the characteristic function form game is not totally balanced, then the r-core may be empty, because the recursive construction requires all subgames to have non-empty cores. In the Perry and Reny game, this corresponds to the requirement of subgame perfection (i.e., an equilibrium must exist in every subgame).

Peleg (1986) and Tadenuma (1992) characterize the core for characteristic function form games using a consistency axiom. In their definition of “reduced game,” a set of “remaining players” may cooperate with a set of “leaving players.” With externalities, we need to specify the behavior of those “remaining players” who are not cooperating. It seems natural to assume that they partition themselves according to the solution concept. We leave for future work a characterization of the r-core along these lines.

Just like classical cooperative game theory, we assume agreements are fully binding. To avoid any misunderstanding, suppose contracts are legally binding and will be enforced by a court of law. Since a coalition can form under a legally binding contract, they need not worry about destabilizing deviations within the coalition. Therefore, a coalition can always insist on getting at least “what it is worth.”

The r-core is non-empty if and only if \( C(N) \) is a non-empty set. Of course, it is easy to construct examples where the r-core is not non-empty. Even if the r-core is non-empty, the grand coalition may not form. Consider the following example. Let \( N = \{1, 2\} \). The grand coalition is worth \( V(N) \equiv P(N \mid N) = 1 \). Each player \( i \in \{1, 2\} \) on his own is worth 2, i.e., \( V(\{i\}) = P(\{i\} \mid \{1\}, \{2\}) = 2 \). The r-core is a singleton, \( C(N) = (2, 2) \), and the r-core partition structure for \( N \) is \( P(N) = (\{1\}, \{2\}) \). Here the grand coalition breaks apart by mutual agreement. This type of situation will complicate the non-cooperative implementation of the r-core. To simplify the analysis, we would like to be assured that each coalition \( S \) prefers to stick together rather than break apart, i.e., \( P(S \mid S, P_{\mathcal{N} \setminus S}) = (S) \). Thus, we introduce the following definition.
**Definition 1** The game \( < N, P > \) is totally r-balanced if and only if for any \( S \) and \( P_{N \setminus S} \), \( P(S \mid S, P_{N \setminus S}) = (S) \).

We will discuss this assumption in Section 6. This property is not easy to check as it stands. However, it turns out that strictly superadditive games are totally r-balanced, provided the r-core is non-empty. Formally, \( < N, P > \) is strictly superadditive if for any two disjoint coalitions \( S \) and \( T \) and any coaltional structure \( P_{N \setminus (S \cup T)} \) on the remaining players,

\[
P(S \mid S, T, P_{N \setminus (S \cup T)}) + P(T \mid S, T, P_{N \setminus (S \cup T)}) < P(S \cup T \mid S \cup T, P_{N \setminus (S \cup T)}).
\]

(1)

For example, symmetric Bertrand competition with differentiated commodities (Deneckere and Davidson (1985)) satisfies (1). In strictly superadditive games, a coalition will maximize its joint payoff by staying together.

**Proposition 1.** If the game \( < N, P > \) is strictly superadditive and the r-core is non-empty, then \( < N, P > \) is totally r-balanced.

**Proof.** By definition, \( V(S \mid S, P_{N \setminus S}) = P(S \mid S, P_{N \setminus S}) \). Strict superadditivity implies that if \( S \) breaks up into several coalitions, the sum of the payoffs of the members of \( S \) will be strictly lower than \( P(S \mid S, P_{N \setminus S}) \). But if \( x \in C(S \mid S, P_{N \setminus S}) \) then \( x(S) \geq V(S \mid S, P_{N \setminus S}) \), which implies that \( S \) must stay together. QED

### 3 A three-player example

We illustrate some aspects of the recursive core and its implementation in a symmetric three-player example. Suppose \( N = \{1, 2, 3\} \), and for \( i, j, k \in N \) distinct,

\[
\begin{align*}
P(&\{i\} \mid (\{i\}, \{j\}, \{k\})) = 0, \\
P(&\{i\} \mid (\{i\}, \{j, k\})) = a, \\
P(&\{j, k\} \mid (\{i\}, \{j, k\})) = b, \\
P(N \mid N) = 1.
\end{align*}
\]
To calculate his own worth, player $i$ must predict what players $j$ and $k$ would do if player $i$ “leaves the game”, i.e., refuses to cooperate with $j$ and $k$. If players $j$ and $k$ form a coalition, the resulting structure is $({i}, {j,k})$, in which case players $j$ and $k$ share $b$ while player $i$ gets $a$. If players $j$ and $k$ break apart and induce $({i}, {j}, {k})$, all three players receive zero. A reasonable prediction is that players $j$ and $k$ will stick together if $b > 0$, but break apart if $b < 0$. This is indeed what will happen in subgame perfect equilibrium of the Perry and Reny game. Accordingly, if player $i$ “leaves the game” as a singleton coalition, he expects to earn $V({i})=0$ if $b < 0$ and $V({i})=a$ if $b > 0$.

There are three cases.

Case 1. If $b < 0$ then the recursive core $C(N)$ consists of all payoff vectors such that $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1$ and $x_i \geq 0$ for all $i$. Notice that $C(N) \neq \emptyset$. We predict that the grand coalition forms even if $a + b > 1$. The structure $({i}, {j,k})$ is not a possible r-core structure when $b < 0$ because under this structure, feasibility implies that players $j$ and $k$ get $b$ in sum. At least one of them would get strictly less than the worth of a singleton coalition (zero), which is not possible. In the Perry and Reny game, a player would rather leave on his own than take a negative payoff.

Case 2. If $b > 0$ and $a + b < 1$, then $C(N)$ consists of all payoff vectors such that $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1$, $x_i \geq a$ for all $i$, and $x_i + x_j \geq b$ for all $i,j$ distinct. This implies that $C(N) \neq \emptyset$ as long as $a \leq 1/3$ and $b \leq 2/3$. If $C(N) \neq \emptyset$ then the prediction is that the grand coalition forms.

Case 3. If $b > 0$ and $a + b > 1$, then $C(N)$ consists of all payoff vectors such that $x_i \geq a$ for all $i$, $x_i + x_j \geq b$ for all $i,j$ distinct, and there is $i$ such that $x_i = a$ and $x_j + x_k = b$ for $j,k$ distinct and different from $i$. This implies that

---

2If $b = 0$, then player $i$ is assumed to have pessimistic expectations, $V({i}) = \min\{0, a\}$. 

8
$C(N) \neq \emptyset$ only if $a = b/2$, in which case two players will form a coalition and share $b$, leaving the third player to stand alone and get $a$.

These r-core predictions seem intuitively plausible. In contrast, according to the $\alpha$-core logic, player $i$ must fear that if he refuses to cooperate, the other two players will induce whatever coalition structure is the worst for player $i$. Therefore, player $i$ is worth only $\min\{0, a\}$, regardless of $b$. However, these fears may be unfounded. If $a < 0$ and $b < 0$, why would players $j$ and $k$ form a coalition just to hurt player $i$? If $a > 0$ and $b > 0$, why would players $j$ and $k$ break up just to hurt player $i$? The recursive core rules out such incredible threats.

An important aspect of Perry and Reny’s game is that it does not specify a fixed order of moves. If $a > 0$ and $b > 0$, then each player will insist on at least $a$, because he thinks that he can leave, and then the other two will react by forming a coalition. On the other hand, suppose there is an exogenously given order of moves (say 1,2,3), as assumed for example by Maskin (2003). Then the following might be an equilibrium if $a$ is large: player 1 starts by leaving, then players 2 and 3 merge. Even if player $j \in \{2,3\}$ gets less than $a$, when he moves player 1 has already left, and so player $j$ may be unable to get $a$. In contrast, in the Perry and Reny game, player $j \in \{2,3\}$ can always preempt player 1 by leaving first. A fixed order of moves would yield predictions even in cases when the r-core is empty; however, it would not capture the spirit of free competition underlying the core.

A refinement of the $\alpha$-core could be obtained by recursively defining stable coalition structures, starting at the finest and building toward coarser structures. Suppose we postulate that $((i), \{j\}, \{k\})$ is always a stable partition, and then define $((i), \{j, k\})$ to be stable if and only if players $j, k$ prefer to stay together rather than induce $((i), \{j\}, \{k\})$. Suppose, finally, we postulate that if player $i$ defects from the grand coalition, he fears the worst of all stable partitions. This refined $\alpha$-core seems more compelling than the original $\alpha$-core. If $a < 0$ and $b < 0$, it would yield the “correct” prediction that player $i$ on his own

\footnote{This discussion was prompted by the comments of a referee.}
is worth 0. However, suppose $a > 0$ and $b > 0$. According to the refined $\alpha$-core logic, player $i$ fears that by defecting from the grand coalition, he may trigger the stable structure ($\{i\},\{j\},\{k\}$) and get zero. Here he is too pessimistic, because if player $i$ leaves then players $j$ and $k$ actually prefer to form a coalition (and this is what they will do in any equilibrium of the Perry and Reny game). In general, if we start by postulating that the finest coalition structure is always stable, and then recursively define stability for coarser structures, and finally postulate that a deviator fears the worst of all stable coalition structures, then a deviator may fear structures that are "too fine" to be truly credible. The refined $\alpha$-core would be biased in favor of "splitting up" with not enough "re-merging." It would not correspond to equilibria of the Perry and Reny game, because that game has no such bias: players $j$ and $k$ will not fall apart if they prefer to merge.

We end this section by considering the question of internal instability of coalitions. Although the Perry and Reny game rules it out by assumption, one can imagine scenarios where a coalition falls apart after it has "left." There are in fact two separate issues. First, if (contrary to our assumption) legally binding contracts cannot be signed, then a coalition member may worry about other members leaving the coalition, thereby hurting him. The fear of such defections may prevent the coalition from forming in the first place. Second, even if legally binding contracts can be signed, one can imagine coalitions breaking apart by mutual agreement if this is beneficial to all its members. A judge may be unwilling to stop the break-up of a coalition if its members unanimously agree to "tear up the contract."\footnote{Of course, there are many real-world situations where even unanimous consent is not enough to break a coalition. An example would be certain laws of marriage.} We address these issues in turn.

To be specific, suppose $0 < b \leq (1 - a)/2$ and $a < 0$ (which is case 2 above). Consider the payoff vector $x$ where $a \leq x_1 < 0$, $b \leq x_2 < b - x_1$, and $x_3 = 1 - x_1 - x_2 \geq b$. Such $x$ exists (for instance, take $x = (a, b, 1 - a - b)$). Since $x_1 + x_2 < b$, we have $x \notin C(N)$. If legally binding contracts are available, then $x$ will be rejected by players 1 and 2, because they can sign a binding agreement which guarantees themselves $b$. However, suppose the players cannot
sign binding agreements. Player 1 certainly cannot improve on $x$ on his own, because if he refuses to cooperate, then players 2 and 3 will form a coalition and share $b > 0$, and player 1 would only get $a \leq x_1$. Suppose instead player 1 proposes to form coalition $\{1, 2\}$, and he offers $x_2 + \varepsilon$ to player 2, where $\varepsilon > 0$. Player 1 would get $b - (x_2 + \varepsilon) < 0$. For $\varepsilon$ small enough, $b - (x_2 + \varepsilon) > x_1$ so both players 1 and 2 would be better off forming coalition $\{1, 2\}$ than accepting $x$.

However, without a binding contract, player 2 may suspect that player 1 plans to break up $\{1, 2\}$ and induce the finest coalition structure ($\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}$). This would give each player zero, which is better for player 1 than staying in coalition $\{1, 2\}$ (since $b - (x_2 + \varepsilon) < 0$). Fearing this internal instability of $\{1, 2\}$, player 2 may reject player 1’s proposal, preferring to get $x_2 > 0$. Thus, $x$ may be viable if binding contracts are not available. In fact, $x$ is an Equilibrium Binding Agreement for the grand coalition (Ray and Vohra (1997)). By allowing legally binding contracts, we avoid these issues.

Now consider the issue of break-up by mutual agreement. Suppose $b < 0$, and suppose a two-player coalition $\{i, j\}$ forms, sharing $b$ equally. If instead they manage to break apart and induce ($\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}$), they are both made better off. A coalition $S$ is said to be not credible if there is a partition $\mathcal{P}_S$ of $S$ such that

$$\sum_{T \in \mathcal{P}_S} V(T) > V(S)$$

Thus, if $b < 0$ then two-player coalitions are not credible. One might argue that it is not realistic to assume that non-credible coalitions stick together.

---

5 A potential problem with this argument is the hypothesis that player 1 can induce the finest coalition structure ($\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}$) by defecting from $\{1, 2\}$. Recall that player 1 cannot block $x$ on his own, because he fears that the other two players will merge. But then, why does he think he can induce ($\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}$) by defecting from $\{1, 2\}$? The argument seems to put too much emphasis on the breaking apart of coalitions and too little on the possibility of re-merging.

6 No internally stable EBA for the coalition $\{1, 2\}$ can block $x$, since $x_2 \geq b$. More generally, if $0 < b \leq \frac{1-a}{2}$ and $a < 0$, then payoff vector $x$ is an EBA for the grand coalition if $x_i \geq a$ for each $i \in N$, $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1$ and either there are at least two distinct players $j, k \in N$ such that $x_j, x_k \geq b$, or $x_i + x_j \geq b$ for all distinct $i, j \in N$. 

11
However, this problem is moot, because if a coalition is not credible, then the corresponding core constraint is anyway redundant (see Ray (1989)). Notice that if \( b < 0 \), then \( x_i \geq 0 \) for all \( i \) implies that \( x_j + x_k \geq b \) for all \( j, k \) distinct.

Suppose we modify the example by setting

\[
P(\{1\} \mid \{(i), \{j\}, \{k\}) = P(\{2\} \mid \{(i), \{j\}, \{k\}) = c > 0
\]

Otherwise, the partition function is as before. Suppose \( a < 0, c < b < 2c, \) and \( a + b < 1 \). Now \( b > c \) implies that if player \( i \in \{1, 2\} \) leaves, then the other two will form a coalition. Therefore, \( V(\{i\}) = P(\{i\} \mid \{(i), \{j, k\}) = a \) for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \). But \( b < 2c \) means that if player 3 leaves, the other two will split up. Therefore, \( V(\{3\}) = P(\{3\} \mid \{(i), \{j\}, \{k\}) = 0 \) for any two-player coalition, \( V(\{j, k\}) = b \), and \( V(N) = 1 \). Thus, the recursive core \( C(N) \) consists of all payoff vectors such that \( x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1, \) \( x_1 \geq a, x_2 \geq a, x_3 \geq 0 \) and \( x_i + x_j \geq b \) for all \( i, j \in N \) distinct. Intuitively, one might argue as above that perhaps \( \{1, 2\} \) is unlikely to stick together, because if they split up and induce \( \{(1), \{2\}, \{3\}\) they get \( c > b/2 \) each. However, they cannot be assured that \( \{(1), \{2\}, \{3\}\) would be the final outcome. Each player \( i \in \{1, 2\} \) fears that if he stands alone the other two will merge. Coalition \( \{1, 2\} \) is credible in the sense that \( V(\{1, 2\}) = b > 2a = V(\{1\}) + V(\{2\}) \). Accordingly, it is not unrealistic to assume that \( \{1, 2\} \) sticks together. The recursive method computes the value of a coalition based on the whole strategic situation, it does not automatically declare the finest partition stable.

4 The non-cooperative game

We will show that a modified Perry and Reny (1994) extensive form game yields a natural non-cooperative implementation of the \( r \)-core. The modification is required in order to allow for externalities across coalitions. First, we will informally describe the non-cooperative game, following Section 2 of Perry and Reny (1994).
4.1 Informal description

The game starts at \( t = 0 \) and time is continuous. At any point in time, a player can either: 1) make a proposal; 2) accept the current proposal; 3) stay quiet or 4) leave.\(^7\) A proposal \( (w_i)_{i \in S}, S \) by any player who hasn’t left consists of a division rule \( (w_i)_{i \in S} \) and a coalition \( S \). Here \( w_i \in \mathbb{R}_+ \) represents \( i \)’s share of the worth of \( S \). We require \( \sum_{i \in S} w_i = 1 \) and \( w_i \geq 0 \) for all \( i \in S \). In Perry and Reny (1994), a player proposes a payoff vector, but this won’t work here because the members of \( S \) don’t know what payoffs are feasible until all other coalitions have formed. (In a partition function form game the coalitional structure determines the value of \( S \).) A division rule does work, because it implies a feasible distribution of payoffs within \( S \) for every possible coalitional structure that might form.\(^8\)

When a proposal is made, it is effective as long as no new proposal is made. Once a new proposal is made, the previous proposal is no longer effective. To avoid the simultaneous proposals of distinct proposals, when this happens it is ruled that no new proposal is effective. So there is at most one effective proposal at any point in time.

If an effective proposal \( (w_i)_{i \in S}, S \) is accepted by all members in \( S \), then the proposal becomes binding, and \( S \) is a binding coalition. If any player in binding coalition \( S \) chooses to leave, then all players in \( S \) must leave at the same time. At any point in time, there might be several binding proposals among the players who haven’t left. If a new proposal contains any player in any binding coalition, then it must contain all players in that binding coalition. This reflects the idea that annulment of a binding agreement has to be approved by every member in it. To avoid the problem where a player is involved in two different binding coalitions, if a new proposal \( (w_i)_{i \in S}, S \) becomes binding, then any old binding proposal that involves members of \( S \) is annulled. Hence, at any point in time, all

\(^7\)At the very beginning of the game when \( t = 0 \), players can only choose either 1) or 3).

\(^8\)We could generalize to allow a proposal pertaining to a coalition \( S \) to specify a complete contingent plan regarding how to divide \( S \)’s value under all possible coalitional structures \( N \setminus S \) may form. Allowing this does not change the result of the paper.
binding coalitions are disjoint. Players consume only after all have left. Notice that when all players leave, the coalitional structure is uniquely defined. Thus, the partition function implies a well-defined payoff for each coalition. Players share the payoff of the coalition to which they belong according to the binding proposals they have signed.

We now more formally define the rules and the equilibrium concept. Again, the description closely follows Perry and Reny (1994).

4.2 Histories

A proposal specifies a division rule \((w_i)_{i \in S}\) and a coalition \(S\). Thus, the set of feasible proposals is

\[
P \equiv \{((w_i)_{i \in S}, S) : S \subseteq N, \sum_{i \in S} w_i = 1 \text{ and } w_i \geq 0 \text{ for all } i \in S\}.
\]

Denote by \(a\) the choice to accept the current effective proposal, \(q\) the choice to be quiet and \(l\) the choice to leave. A history for player \(i\) up to time \(t > 0\) is a function \(h_i\) such that

\[
h_i : [0, t) \to P \cup \{a, q, l\}.
\]

If \(h_i\) is a history for player \(i\) up to time \(t\), and \(t' < t\), then let \(h_i|t'\) denote the history for player \(i\) up to time \(t'\) which is implied by \(h_i\) (i.e., \(h_i|t'\) is the truncation of \(h_i\) at time \(t'\)).

Since players can only leave once and for all, \(h_i^{-1}(l)\) is either empty or a singleton. We follow Perry and Reny (1994) by assuming that \(h_i^{-1}(P \cup \{a\})\) is a finite set. At \(t = 0\), since nothing has happened, \(h_i(0) = \emptyset\). For convenience, denote a history up to time \(t\) by the \(n\)-tuple of functions \(h \equiv (h_1, h_2, ..., h_n)\). For \(t' < t\), let \(h|t'\) denote the truncation of \(h\) at \(t'\). Let \(H(t)\) denote the set of all histories up to time \(t\) and \(H \equiv \cup_{t=0}^{\infty} H(t)\) the set of all histories.

Let \(p(h)\) denote the current effective proposal according to \(h\). To make it well-defined, if according to \(h\), either no proposal has been made, multiple distinct proposals are simultaneously made, the current effective proposal has
become binding or some member in a binding coalition which is involved in the current effective proposal has exercised to leave, then $p(h) = \emptyset$.  

Let $\tau(h)$ for $h \in H(t)$ denote the amount of time that has passed up to time $t$ since $p(h)$ was proposed. Whenever $p(h) = \emptyset$, $\tau(h)$ measures the time that has passed since the previous effective proposal becomes binding. When there is never any effective proposal, $\tau(h)$ measures the time that has passed since time 0.

Let $N(h) \subseteq N$ denote the set of players who have not left and $A(h) \subseteq N(h)$ the set of players who have accepted $p(h)$. Whenever $p(h) = \emptyset$, $A(h) = \emptyset$.

Player $i$ is said to have accepted the current effective proposal $p(h)$ for $h \in H(t)$ if $p(h)$ is made at time $t < t$ and $h_i(t) = a$ for some $t' \in (t, t)$. If everyone involved in $p(h)$ has accepted it, then $p(h)$ is binding. The coalitions in binding proposals are called binding coalitions.

Let $\Pi(h)$ denote the set of binding proposals among the players in $N(h)$. Since there are externalities across coalitions, we also need to keep track of those binding coalitions that have left. Let $K(h)$ denote the coalitional structure formed by those players that have left, i.e., $N \setminus N(h)$, according to $h$. Perry and Reny (1994) do not keep track of $K(h)$ since for characteristic function form games the remaining players’ values are not affected by the coalitional structure of the players who left. In our setting, the coalitional structure of the players who left does affect the values of the remaining players.

---

9When some member in a binding coalition which is involved in the current effective proposal has exercised to leave, we need to reset $p(h)$ to an empty set to avoid the following from happening. Suppose players 1, 2 and 3 remain and the current proposal pertains to them. Suppose player 1 and 2 have accepted the current proposal and 3 hasn’t. Suppose coalition \{3\} is binding. If 3 exercises to leave, then by the rules in Perry and Reny, if $p(h)$ is not reset to an empty set, players 1 and 2 cannot do anything further and they have to stay in the game forever.
4.3 Payoffs

If a proposal \(((w_i)_{i \in S}, S)\) becomes binding and player \(i \in S\) leaves, then in contrast to Perry and Reny (1994) he cannot consume immediately (because the worth of \(S\) depends on the final coalitional structure \(P_N\)). All he can guarantee himself by leaving is that coalition \(S\) will be part of the final coalitional structure. When all players have left, so that \(N(h) = \emptyset\), a structure \(P_N\) of binding coalitions has formed. Every coalition in \(P_N\) distributes its value according to its binding division rule. Thus, if \(S \in P_N\) and its division rule is \((w_i)_{i \in S}\), then player \(i \in S\) gets \(w_i P(S \mid P_N)\). If there is a player who never leaves the game, then every player \(i \in N\) gets \(-\infty\).\(^{10}\)

4.4 Strategies

A strategy for any player is a function which maps every possible history to an action. Hence, a strategy for any player \(i \in N\), denoted by \(f_i\) is:

\[
f_i : H \rightarrow P \cup \{a, q, l\}.
\]

Denote the \(n\)-tuple of strategies by \(f \equiv (f_1, f_2, ..., f_n)\). We impose several restrictions on the strategies.

\(\textbf{(S0)}\) For \(h \in H(0)\), \(f_i(h) \in P \cup \{q\}\). That is, at the very beginning of the game, players can only make a proposal or be quiet.

\(\textbf{(S1)}\) If \(i \in N(h)\) has accepted the current effective proposal \(p(h)\), then \(f_i(h) = q\). That is, before the current effective proposal becomes binding, an accepting player can only be quiet. If \(i \in N \setminus N(h)\), then \(f_i(h) = q\). Thus, a leaving player can only be quiet.

\(^{10}\) One can relax this rather strong assumption. For instance, if some binding coalitions have left while others remain in the game forever, it might be argued that although the remaining players might get the worst possible payoffs, any leaving coalition should at least get its value in the coalitional structure where all the leaving coalitions have formed and the remaining players form into the worst possible coalitional structure for this coalition in consideration. Allowing this does not change the result.
If \( f_i(h) = ((w_i)_{i \in S'}, S') \), then for any binding coalition \( S \), either \( S \cap S' = \emptyset \) or \( S \subseteq S' \). Moreover, \( S' \subseteq N(h) \). That is, if a new proposal contains some players in a binding coalition, it has to include all of them. Any new proposal can only contain players who haven’t left.

If a player \( i \) is not a member of any binding coalition, then \( f_i(h) \neq l \). That is, a player can only leave if he belongs to a binding coalition.

For all \( i \) and all \( \overline{t} > 0 \) and for all \( h \in H(\overline{t}) \) and \( t \in [0, \overline{t}) \), there exists an \( \varepsilon > 0 \) such that \( f_i(h|\tau) = q \) for all \( \tau \geq 0 \) and \( \tau \in (t - \varepsilon, t + \varepsilon) \setminus \{t\} \). That is, there are two open intervals \((t - \varepsilon, t)\) and \((t, t + \varepsilon)\) in which player \( i \) is quiet. This assumption makes sure that players always have enough time to respond.\(^{11}\)

Lastly, denote player \( i \)'s payoff induced by the strategy tuple \( f \) after \( h \) by \( u_i(f|h) \). Let \( F_i \) denote the set of strategies for \( i \) which satisfy (S0) to (S4).

### 4.5 Equilibrium concept

The equilibrium concept is stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE). By definition, a strategy profile \( \tilde{f} \equiv (\tilde{f}_1, \tilde{f}_2, ..., \tilde{f}_n) \) is an SSPNE if (E1) and (E2) are satisfied:

(E1) Perfection: For all \( i \in N, h \in H \) and \( f_i \in F_i \),
\[
 u_i(\tilde{f}|h) \geq u_i((f_1, \tilde{f}_2, ..., \tilde{f}_n)|h). 
\]

(E2) Stationarity: For \( h, h' \in H \), if
\[
 (p(h), \tau(h), N(h), A(h), \Pi(h), K(h)) = (p(h'), \tau(h'), N(h'), A(h'), \Pi(h'), K(h')),
\]
then \( \tilde{f}(h) = \tilde{f}(h') \).

Notice that we have one more state variable \( K(h) \) than Perry and Reny because of externalities across coalitions.

\(^{11}\)See Example 1 and the last paragraph on page 806 in Perry and Reny (1994) for a discussion of this assumption.
5 Results

We will prove two theorems, corresponding to Theorems 1 and 2 in Perry and Reny (1994). The first theorem states that every SSPNE outcome of the extensive form game is in the r-core of the partition function game \(<N, P>\). The second theorem needs some qualification. We will show that for any totally r-balanced game \(<N, P>\), every r-core outcome can be supported as an SSPNE outcome of the extensive form game.

The proof of Theorem 1 is more complicated than the corresponding proof in Perry and Reny (1994). This is because in our model the value of a coalition is not given by a characteristic function, but instead has to be derived recursively from the partition function. Thus, we first need to show that if there exists an SSPNE of the extensive form game, then the value of each coalition is well defined. After having done this, we show the existence of an r-core outcome which corresponds to this SSPNE outcome.

The following proposition is used to prove Theorem 1.

**Proposition 2.** Suppose an SSPNE \(\hat{f}\) exists. Take any \(S \subseteq N\) and any partition \(P_{N\setminus S}\) on \(N\setminus S\). Let \(x\) denote the subgame equilibrium outcome induced by \(\hat{f}\) where players in \(N\setminus S\) have left according to \(P_{N\setminus S}\), i.e. in the subgame where the states are \((p(h), \tau(h), N(h), A(h), \Pi(h), K(h)) = (0, 0, S, \emptyset, \emptyset, P_{N\setminus S})\).

The following is true:

(a) \(C(S \mid S, P_{N\setminus S}) \neq \emptyset\).

(b) There must exist a \(y \in C(S \mid S, P_{N\setminus S})\) such that \(x_i = y_i\) for all \(i \in S\).

(c) The coalitional structure induced by \(\hat{f}\) must be \((P_S, P_{N\setminus S})\) where \(P_S \in \mathcal{P}(S \mid S, P_{N\setminus S})\).

**Proof.** We will proceed by induction.

Suppose \(|S| = 1\). For any \(S = \{i\}\) and any \(P_{N\setminus \{i\}}\) on \(N\setminus \{i\}\), \(C(\{i\} \mid \{i\}, P_{N\setminus \{i\}}) \neq \emptyset\) since by definition, it consists of every payoff vector where \(i\) gets \(P(\{i\} \mid \{i\}, P_{N\setminus \{i\}})\) and every coalition \(S' \in P_{N\setminus \{i\}}\) gets \(P(S' \mid \{i\}, P_{N\setminus \{i\}})\).
In the subgame where all players in $N \setminus \{i\}$ have left and formed the coalitional structure $P_{N \setminus \{i\}}$, player $i$ must first propose $((1), \{i\})$ and then leave according to $\tilde{f}_i$. For otherwise, $i$ is staying in the game forever and getting $-\infty$, which cannot be an equilibrium strategy. Parts (b) and (c) follow immediately.

Thus, we have established that parts (a), (b) and (c) hold for any $S$ such that $|S| = 1$ and any partition $P_{N \setminus S}$ on $N \setminus S$.

To continue the induction, suppose that for any $S$ such that $|S| \leq k - 1 < n$ and any partition $P_{N \setminus S}$ on $N \setminus S$, parts (a), (b) and (c) hold.

Suppose $|S| = k$. For any partition $P_{N \setminus S}$ on $N \setminus S$, to show part (a), we first need to make sure that $V(T \mid S, P_{N \setminus S})$ is well defined for all $T \subseteq S$. By definition, $V(S \mid S, P_{N \setminus S}) = P(S \mid S, P_{N \setminus S})$. And $V(T \mid S, P_{N \setminus S})$ is also well defined because $C(S \setminus T \mid S \setminus T, P_{N \setminus S}) \neq \emptyset$ by the induction hypothesis (because $|S \setminus T| \leq k - 1$).

Suppose by contradiction that $C(S \mid S, P_{N \setminus S}) = \emptyset$. At time $t$, let $h$ be any history such that $(p(h), \tau(h), N(h), A(h), \Pi(h), K(h)) = (\emptyset, 0, S, \emptyset, \emptyset, P_{N \setminus S})$. Consider the continuation equilibrium outcome $x$ induced by $\tilde{f}$. Since $C(S \mid S, P_{N \setminus S}) = \emptyset$, there must exist a coalition $S' \subseteq S$ such that $x(S') < V(S' \mid S, P_{N \setminus S})$. Without loss of generality, suppose $S' = \{1, 2, \ldots, s'\}$ where $s' = |S'|$. Let

$$y_i = x_i + \frac{V(S' \mid S, P_{N \setminus S}) - x(S')}{|S'|}$$

for all $i \in S'$,

and define

$$w_i = \frac{y_i}{V(S' \mid S, P_{N \setminus S})}$$

for all $i \in S'$.

Consider any time $t' > t$, any history $h' \in H(t')$ such that $h'|t = h$ and (i) $p(h') = ((w_i)_{i \in S'}, S')$, (ii) $N(h') = S$, (iii) $A(h') = \{1, 2, \ldots, s'-1\}$, (iv) $\Pi(h') = \emptyset$, (v) $K(h') = P_{N \setminus S}$, and (vi) $\tilde{f}_i(h') = q$ for all $i \in N$. Thus, at time $t'$ player $s'$ is the only member of $S' = \{1, \ldots, s'\}$ who has not yet accepted the proposal $((w_i)_{i \in S'}, S')$.

Claim: According to $\tilde{f}$, player $s'$ will accept $((w_i)_{i \in S'}, S')$ before any new proposal is made and thus $((w_i)_{i \in S'}, S')$ will become binding.
Proof of claim. A feasible action for player \( s' \) is to accept the current effective proposal \(((w_i)_{i \in S'}, S')\) and leave before anything happens. In this case the whole coalition \( S' \) leaves by the rules of the game. The resulting coalitional structure will be \((\mathcal{P}_{S\backslash S'}, S', \mathcal{P}_{N\backslash S})\) for some \( r \)-core coalitional structure \( \mathcal{P}_{S\backslash S'} \in \mathcal{P}(S\backslash S' \mid S\backslash S', S', \mathcal{P}_{N\backslash S})\), according to the induction hypothesis. When \( S' \) is calculating its value \( V(S' \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N\backslash S}) \), it expects the worst possible \( r \)-core coalitional structure and \( \mathcal{P}_{S\backslash S'} \) is not necessarily the worst one, so

\[
V(S' \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N\backslash S}) \leq P(S' \mid \mathcal{P}_{S\backslash S'}, S', \mathcal{P}_{N\backslash S}),
\]

(If \( S' = S \), then \( V(S' \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N\backslash S}) = P(S' \mid S', \mathcal{P}_{N\backslash S}) \)). Player \( s' \) gets

\[
w_{s'} P(S' \mid \mathcal{P}_{S\backslash S'}, S', \mathcal{P}_{N\backslash S}) \geq y_{s'} > x_{s'}.
\]

Suppose, according to \( \hat{f} \), player \( s' \) never accepts any proposal ever. Then player \( s' \) gets \(-\infty\), which contradicts the assumption that \( \hat{f} \) is an SSPNE, since we have just shown that by accepting and leaving he can do better. Suppose instead that, according to \( \hat{f} \), some new proposal \(((w_i)_{i \in S'', S''})\) is made before player \( s' \) accepts \(((w_i)_{i \in S', S'})\). In the continuation equilibrium, \( s' \) must get at least \( w_{s'} P(S' \mid \mathcal{P}_{S\backslash S'}, S', \mathcal{P}_{N\backslash S}) > x_{s'} \) (we have shown that he has a feasible action which gives him \( w_{s'} P(S' \mid \mathcal{P}_{S\backslash S'}, S', \mathcal{P}_{N\backslash S}) \)). By stationarity, this means whenever any history \( h' \) yields the states

\[
(p(h'), \tau(h'), N(h'), A(h'), K(h')) = (((w_i)_{i \in S''}, S''), 0, S, \emptyset, \emptyset, \mathcal{P}_{N\backslash S}),
\]

player \( s' \) gets strictly more than \( x_{s'} \). But then player \( s' \) could have proposed \(((w_i)_{i \in S'', S''})\) at time close enough to \( t \). This is in contradiction to \( x \) being a continuation equilibrium outcome. Hence according to \( \hat{f} \), player \( s' \) will accept \(((w_i)_{i \in S', S'})\) before any new proposal is made and thus \(((w_i)_{i \in S', S'})\) will become binding. This proves the claim.

Next consider at any time \( t'' > t \), any history \( h'' \in H(t'') \) such that \( h''|t = h \) and i) \( p(h'') = ((w_i)_{i \in S''}, S'') \), ii) \( N(h'') = S \), iii) \( A(h'') = \{1, 2, \ldots, s' - 2\} \), iv) \( \Pi(h'') = \emptyset \), v) \( K(h'') = \mathcal{P}_{N\backslash S} \) and vi) \( \hat{f}_i(h'') = q \) for all \( i \in N \).
Claim: According to \( \hat{f} \), players \( s' - 1 \) and \( s' \) will accept \( ((w_i)_{i \in S'}, S') \) before any new proposal is made and \( ((w_i)_{i \in S'}, S') \) will become binding.

Proof of claim. The argument is virtually the same as the proof of the previous claim. A feasible action for player \( s' - 1 \) is to accept the proposal, and if he does, then the previous claim applies so \( s' \) will accept as well. Thus player \( s' - 1 \) can guarantee himself the payoff of

\[
-w_{s' - 1} P(S' \mid \mathcal{P}_S \setminus S', S', \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S}) \geq y_{s' - 1} > x_{s' - 1}
\]

by accepting and leaving after \( s' \) accepts. As in the previous claim, suppose to the contrary that either according to \( \hat{f} \) player \( s' - 1 \) never accepts anything, or a new proposal is made before player \( s' - 1 \) accepts \( ((w_i)_{i \in S'}, S') \). In the first possibility, player \( s' - 1 \) gets \(-\infty\), which is a contradiction of the fact that \( \hat{f} \) is an SSPNE. In the second possibility, by an analogous argument, when the new proposal is made, player \( s' - 1 \) must get strictly more than \( x_{s' - 1} \). But he could have made that proposal at time close enough to \( t \). This proves the claim.

Proceeding stepwise just as in these two claims, we can finally establish the following claim. Let \( t'' > t \), and consider a history \( h'' \in H(t'') \) such that \( h''|t = h \), and suppose: i) \( p(h'') = ((w_i)_{i \in S'}, S') \), ii) \( N(h'') = S \), iii) \( A(h'') = \{1\} \), iv) \( \Pi(h'') = \emptyset \), v) \( K(h'') = \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S} \) and vi) \( \hat{f}_i(h'') = q \) for all \( i \in N \). Then, according to \( \hat{f} \), players 2 to \( s' \) will accept \( ((w_i)_{i \in S'}, S') \) before any new proposal is made and \( ((w_i)_{i \in S'}, S') \) will become binding.

However, this claim contradicts the hypothesis that \( x \) is a continuation equilibrium outcome induced by \( \hat{f} \), because player 1 can always propose \( ((w_i)_{i \in S'}, S') \) and subsequently accept it at time close enough to \( t \). By this deviation, he gets at least \( y_1 > x_1 \). Thus \( C(S | S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S}) \neq \emptyset \) and part (a) is proved.

For part (b), suppose \( x \) is the continuation equilibrium outcome induced by \( \hat{f} \) where players in \( N \setminus S \) have left according to \( \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S} \), i.e., in the subgame where the states are \( \langle p(h), \tau(h), N(h), A(h), \Pi(h), K(h) \rangle = (\emptyset, 0, S, \emptyset, 0, \emptyset, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S}) \). If there does not exist a \( y \in C(S | S, \mathcal{P}_{N \setminus S}) \) such that

\[
x_i = y_i \text{ for all } i \in S,
\]

21
then there must exist a coalition $S' \subseteq S$ such that $x(S') < V(S' \mid S, P_{N \setminus S})$. By the same argument in the proof of part (a), this leads to a contradiction. Part (c) follows from part (b) immediately. QED

Proposition 2 directly implies the following theorem, which states that every SSPNE outcome is in the r-core of $< N, P >$. This is directly analogous to Theorem 1 in Perry and Reny (1994).

**Theorem 1.** Suppose an SSPNE $\hat{f}$ induces an equilibrium outcome $x$. Then $x \in C(N)$, and the coalitional structure induced by $\hat{f}$ belongs to the r-core structure $\mathcal{P}(N)$.

Now consider the converse of Theorem 1. For any r-core outcome, we need strategies that support it as an SSPNE. It turns out that strategies similar to those used by Perry and Reny (1994) in the proof of their Theorem 2 work here as well. The main modification is due to the fact that players must propose division rules instead of payoff vectors. If we assume total r-balancedness, then analogues of Lemmas 1 and 2 in Perry and Reny (1994) can be readily proved, and from this we obtain a converse to Theorem 1.

If the r-core exists, then it exists for any reduced society $S$ given any $P_{N \setminus S}$. Thus, for any $S \subset N$ and $P_{N \setminus S}$ we can select an r-core payoff vector from $C(S \mid S, P_{N \setminus S})$. In the following, we denote this payoff vector by $x(S \mid P_{N \setminus S})$, where

$$x(S \mid P_{N \setminus S}) \in C(S \mid S, P_{N \setminus S}).$$

For the grand coalition, we choose

$$x(N \mid P_{N \setminus N}) \in C(N).$$

Note that when the game is totally r-balanced, for any reduced society $S$ given any $P_{N \setminus S}$, $P(S \mid S, P_{N \setminus S}) = (S)$.

Perry and Reny (1994) construct two continuation equilibrium payoff vectors: one for the continuing equilibrium when the current proposal is rejected, the other for the continuation equilibrium when the current proposal is accepted.
For any history \( h \) where

\[
\Pi(h) = \{(w_i^1)_{i \in S^1}, (w_i^2)_{i \in S^2}, ..., (w_i^m)_{i \in S^m}\},
\]

define

\[
z_i(h) = \begin{cases} 
  w_i^k \sum_{j \in S^k} x_j(N(h) | K(h)) & \text{if } i \in S^k \text{ for some } k \in \{1, 2, ..., m\} \\
  x_i(N(h) | K(h)) & \text{if } i \in N(h) \setminus (S^1 \cup S^2 \cup ... \cup S^m).
\end{cases}
\]

If the current effective proposal is \( p(h) = ((w_i)_{i \in S}, S) \), without loss of generality we can assume that there exists an integer \( r \) such that in the current proposal \( p(h) \), the coalition \( S \) contains all the coalitions \( S^k \) where \( k \leq r \). On the other hand, \( S \) is disjoint from all the coalitions \( S^k \) where \( k \geq r + 1 \). Thus when the current proposal becomes binding, the resulting new set of binding proposals becomes

\[
\hat{\Pi}(h) = \{(w_i^1)_{i \in S}, (w_i^{r+1})_{i \in S^{r+1}}, ..., (w_i^m)_{i \in S^m}\}.
\]

Define

\[
\tilde{z}_i(h) = \begin{cases} 
  w_i \sum_{j \in S} x_j(N(h) | K(h)) & \text{if } i \in S, \\
  w_i^k \sum_{j \in S^k} x_j(N(h) | K(h)) & \text{if } i \in S^k \text{ where } k \in \{r + 1, ..., m\} \\
  x_i(N(h) | K(h)) & \text{if } i \in N(h) \setminus (S \cup S^{r+1} \cup ... \cup S^m).
\end{cases}
\]

By construction, \( z_i(h) \) will be player \( i \)'s payoff in the continuation equilibrium if the current effective proposal gets rejected, while \( \tilde{z}_i(h) \) will be his payoff if it gets accepted. When \( p(h) = \emptyset \), \( z_i(h) = \tilde{z}_i(h) \).

The equilibrium strategies are defined as follows. For every \( t \geq 0, h \in H(t) \) and \( i \in N(h) \), if \( \tau(h) \) is not a positive integer then \( f_i(h) = q \). If \( \tau(h) \) is a positive integer, then player \( i \) behaves as follows:

(a) if \( p(h) = ((w_i)_{i \in S}, S) \neq \emptyset \), and \( \tilde{z}_j(h) \geq z_j(h) \) for all \( j \in S \setminus A(h) \), then

\[
f_i(h) = \begin{cases} 
  a & \text{if } i \in S \setminus A(h) \\
  q & \text{otherwise}.
\end{cases}
\]

\(^{12}\)Recall that if a new proposal contains any player in any binding coalition, then it must contain all players in that binding coalition.
(b) Otherwise, 
\[ f_i(h) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } i \in N(h) \text{ and } \Pi(h) = \{ (\cdot, N(h)) \} \\
\left( \frac{\sum_{j \in N(h)} z_j(h)}{\sum_{j \in N(h)} x_j(N(h) \setminus K(h))} \right)_{j \in N(h)} & \text{if } i \in N(h) \setminus A(h) \text{ and } \Pi(h) \neq \{ (\cdot, N(h)) \} \\
q & \text{if } i \in A(h) 
\end{cases} \]

Here \( \Pi(h) = \{ (\cdot, N(h)) \} \) means that the binding coalition is \( N(h) \) and \( \Pi(h) \neq \{ (\cdot, N(h)) \} \) means that the binding coalition is not \( N(h) \).

These strategies depend only on the state variable. On the equilibrium path, all players propose \( ((\sum_{i \in N(h)} z_i(h))_{j \in N(h)}, N(h)) \) at time 1, accept at time 2, and leave at time 3. The equilibrium outcome is \( x(N \mid P_{N \setminus N}) \) where every \( i \in N \) gets \( x_i(N \mid P_{N \setminus N}) \). For any history \( h \) where \( K(h) \) has left and nothing else has happened, in the continuing subgame, on the equilibrium path every \( i \in N(h) \) gets \( x_i(N(h) \mid K(h)) \).

With these strategies, we can easily prove two lemmas analogous to Lemmas 1 and 2 in Perry and Reny (1994). The proof of Lemma 1 shows how total \( r \)-balancedness is used.

**Lemma 1.** Assume total \( r \)-balancedness. For any \( h \in H \), if \( p(h) = ((w_i)_{i \in S}, S) \) and \( \Pi(h) = \{ ((w_1^1)_{i \in S^1}, S^1), ((w_2^2)_{i \in S^2}, S^2), \ldots, ((w_m^m)_{i \in S^m}, S^m) \} \)

then\(^{14}\)

(a) for any \( k \in \{1, 2, \ldots, m\} \) and \( i \in S^k \),

\[ z_i(h) \geq w_i^k \sum_{j \in S^k} x_j(N(h) \setminus S^k \mid S^k, K(h)) \]

\(^{13}\)In other words, there exists a division rule \((w_i)_{i \in N(h)}\) such that \( \Pi(h) = \{ ((w_i)_{i \in N(h)}, N(h)) \} \).

\(^{14}\)Recall that there exists an integer \( r \) such that the current proposal \( S \) contains all the coalitions \( S^k \) where \( k \leq r \) and is disjoint from all the coalitions \( S^k \) where \( k \geq r + 1 \).
(b) for any $k \in \{1, 2, ..., m\},$

$$\sum_{i \in S^k} z_i(h) = \sum_{i \in S^k} x_i(N(h) \mid K(h))$$

(c)

$$\sum_{i \in S} z_i(h) = \sum_{i \in S} \hat{z}_i(h) = \sum_{i \in S} x_i(N(h) \mid K(h)).$$

Proof. (a) By definition

$$z_i(h) = w_i^k \sum_{j \in S^k} x_j(N(h) \mid K(h)).$$

Since $x(N(h) \mid K(h))$ belongs to the r-core for $N(h)$ given $K(h),$

$$\sum_{j \in S^k} x_j(N(h) \mid K(h)) \geq V(S^k \mid N(h), K(h))
= P(S^k \mid S^k, N(h) \setminus S^k, K(h))$$

The equality follows because by total r-balancedness, when $S^k$ breaks off, the remaining players in $N(h) \setminus S^k$ stay together in the r-core. Now $x(N(h) \setminus S^k \mid S^k, K(h))$ belongs to the r-core for $N(h) \setminus S^k$ given $(S^k, K(h))$, and by total r-balancedness players in $N(h) \setminus S^k$ stay together. So,

$$\sum_{j \in S^k} x_j(N(h) \setminus S^k \mid S^k, K(h)) = P(S^k \mid S^k, N(h) \setminus S^k, K(h)).$$

Hence

$$z_i(h) \geq w_i^k \sum_{j \in S^k} x_j(N(h) \setminus S^k \mid S^k, K(h)).$$

(b) By definition,

$$\sum_{i \in S^k} z_i(h) = \sum_{i \in S^k} w_i^k (\sum_{j \in S^k} x_j(N(h) \mid K(h)))
= \sum_{i \in S^k} x_i(N(h) \mid K(h)),
$$

since $\sum_{i \in S^k} w_i^k = 1.$
(c) By definition,
\[
\sum_{i \in S} z_i(h) = \sum_{k \in \{1, \ldots, r\}} \left( \sum_{i \in S^k} z_i(h) \right) + \sum_{i \in S \setminus (S^1 \cup \ldots \cup S^r)} x_i(N(h) \mid K(h))
\]
\[
= \sum_{i \in S} x_i(N(h) \mid K(h)),
\]
where the second equality follows because of (b). By definition,
\[
\sum_{i \in S} \hat{z}_i(h) = \sum_{i \in S} w_i \left( \sum_{j \in S} x_j(N(h) \mid K(h)) \right)
\]
\[
= \sum_{i \in S} x_i(N(h) \mid K(h))
\]
because \(\sum_{i \in S} w_i = 1\). QED

**Lemma 2.** Assume total \(r\)-balancedness. For any \(t \geq 0, h \in H(t)\) and \(A(h) = \emptyset\), the outcome generated by the strategies \(f \equiv (f_1, \ldots, f_n)\) after \(h\) is such that player \(i\) gets \(z_i(h)\) for all \(i \in N(h)\).

*Proof.* Let \(t_1\) be the smallest time at least as large as \(t\) such that \(t_1 - \tau(h)\) is an integer. According to the strategies \(f\), if \(t \neq t_1\), then all players are quiet between \([t, t_1)\). Denote the history generated by \(h_1 \in H(t_1)\). There are four possible cases depending on what players will do at \(t_1\) according to the strategies \(f\).

**Case 1.** If \(f_i(h_1) = l\), then it must be the case that \(\Pi(h_1) = \{ (\cdot, N(h_1)) \}\). This implies that there exists a division rule \((w_i)_{i \in N(h_1)}\) such that \(\Pi(h_1) = \{ ((w_i)_{i \in N(h_1)}), N(h_1) \}\). Thus player \(i\) gets \(w_i \sum_{j \in N(h_1)} x_j(N(h_1) \mid K(h_1))\) for all \(i \in N(h_1)\) according to \(f\). If \(t \neq t_1\), then since everyone is quiet between \([t, t_1)\), \(\Pi(h) = \Pi(h_1), K(h) = K(h_1),\) and \(N(h) = N(h_1)\). This implies that
\[
\sum_{i \in S} \hat{z}_i(h) = w_i \sum_{j \in N(h)} x_j(N(h) \mid K(h))
\]
\[
= w_i \sum_{j \in N(h_1)} x_j(N(h_1) \mid K(h_1)).
\]
Hence player \(i\) gets \(z_i(h)\).\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15}If \(t = t_1\) then it is obvious that \(h = h_1\) and therefore \(z_i(h) = z_i(h_1)\).
Case 2. If \( f_i(h_1) = a \) for some \( i \in N(h_1) \setminus A(h_1) \) and \( p(h_1) = ((w_i)_{i \in N(h_1)}, N(h_1)) \), since everyone is quiet between \([t, t_1]\) and thus \( A(h_1) = A(h) = \emptyset \), then it implies \( \hat{z}_i(h_1) \geq z_i(h_1) \) for all \( i \in N(h_1) \) by the construction of the strategies \( f \). So the current proposal becomes binding at \( t_1 \). By Lemma 1 (c) \[
\sum_{i \in N(h_1)} z_i(h_1) = \sum_{i \in N(h_1)} \hat{z}_i(h_1), \text{ hence } \hat{z}_i(h_1) = z_i(h_1) \text{ for all } i \in N(h_1).
\]
Moreover, \( N(h_1) = N(h) \) and \( z_i(h_1) = z_i(h) \) for all \( i \in N(h) \) because everyone is quiet between \([t, t_1]\).

By the equilibrium strategies, everyone is quiet between \((t_1, t_1 + 1)\). Let \( t_2 = t_1 + 1 \) and denote the history generated by \( h_2 \in H(t_2) \). Since everyone is quiet between \((t_1, t_2)\), \( N(h_1) = N(h_2) \) and \( K(h_1) = K(h_2) \). At \( t_2 \), since \( \Pi(h_2) = \{ (\cdot, N(h_2)) \} \), so all players leave. Thus player \( i \in N(h_2) \) gets
\[
\begin{align*}
& w_i \sum_{j \in N(h_2)} x_j(N(h_2) | K(h_2)) \\
& = w_i \sum_{j \in N(h_1)} x_j(N(h_1) | K(h_1)) \\
& = \hat{z}_i(h_1) = z_i(h_1) = z_i(h).
\end{align*}
\]

Case 3. If \( f_i(h_1) = ((\sum_{j \in N(h_1)} \frac{z_i(h_1)}{x_j(N(h_1), K(h_1))})_j \in N(h_1), N(h_1)) \), then everyone is quiet between \((t_1, t_1 + 1)\). Let \( t_2 = t_1 + 1 \) and denote the history generated by \( h_2 \in H(t_2) \). By definition for all \( i \in N(h_1) \),
\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{z}_i(h_2) &= \sum_{j \in N(h_1)} \frac{z_i(h_1)}{x_j(N(h_1) | K(h_1))} \sum_{l \in N(h_1)} x_l(N(h_2) | K(h_2)) \\
&= z_i(h_1) = z_i(h_2).
\end{align*}
\]
The second equality follows because no one leaves between \([t_1, t_2]\), so \( N(h_1) = N(h_2) \) and \( K(h_1) = K(h_2) \). The third equality follows because no new proposal binds between \([t_1, t_2]\), so \( z_i(h_1) = z_i(h_2) \). Thus all players in \( N(h_1) \) accept the proposal at time \( t_2 \). According to the equilibrium strategies, everyone is quiet between \((t_2, t_2 + 1)\). Let \( t_3 = t_2 + 1 \) and denote the history generated by \( h_3 \in H(t_3) \). Since no one leaves between \([t_2, t_3]\), so \( N(h_2) = N(h_3) \). Hence all
players in $N(h_3)$ leave at time $t_3$. Thus player $i \in N(h_3)$ gets
\[
\frac{\sum_{j \in N(h_1)} z_i(h_1)}{x_j(N(h_1) | K(h_1))} \sum_{i \in N(h_3)} x_i(N(h_3) | K(h_3)) = z_i(h_1) = z_i(h).
\]
The first equality follows because no one leaves between $[t_1, t_3]$ so $N(h_1) = N(h_3)$ and $K(h_1) = K(h_3)$. The second equality follows because nothing happens between $[t, t_1]$.

**Case 4.** If $f_i(h_1) = a$ for some $i \in S \backslash A(h_1)$ and $p(h_1) = ((w_i)_{i \in S}, S)$ where $S \neq N(h_1)$, since everyone is quiet between $[t, t_1]$ and thus $A(h_1) = A(h) = \emptyset$, then it implies $\hat{z}_i(h_1) \geq z_i(h_1)$ for all $i \in S$ by the construction of the strategies $f$. So the current proposal becomes binding at $t_1$. By Lemma 1 (c), $\sum_{i \in S} z_i(h_1) = \sum_{i \in S} \hat{z}_i(h_1)$, hence $\hat{z}_i(h_1) = z_i(h_1)$ for all $i \in S$. Denote
\[
\Pi(h_1) = \{(w_i)_{i \in S^1}, (w_i)_{i \in S^2}, \ldots, (w_i)_{i \in S^m}\}
\]
and without loss of generality, assume that $S$ contains all the coalitions $S^k$ where $k \leq r$ and is disjoint from all the coalitions $S^k$ where $k \geq r + 1$. Then for all $i \in N(h_1) \backslash (S \cup S^{r+1} \cup \ldots \cup S^m)$,
\[
\hat{z}_i(h_1) = z_i(h_1) = x_i(N(h_1) | K(h_1)),
\]
and for all $i \in S^k$ where $k \geq r + 1$,
\[
\hat{z}_i(h_1) = z_i(h_1) = w_k \sum_{j \in S^k} x_j(N(h_1) | K(h_1)).
\]
Thus $\hat{z}_i(h_1) = z_i(h_1)$ for all $i \in N(h_1)$. Note that all players are quiet between $(t_1, t_1 + 1)$. Let $t_2 = t_1 + 1$ and denote the history generated by $h_2 \in H(t_2)$.

Since no one leaves between $[t_1, t_2]$, so $N(h_1) = N(h_2)$.

Since $S \neq N(h_2)$, at time $t_2$, for all $i \in N(h_2)$ $f_i(h_2) = ((\sum_{i \in N(h_2)} z_i(h_2) x_i(N(h_2) | K(h_2)))_{j \in N(h_2)}, N(h_2))$. Everyone is quiet between $(t_2, t_2 + 1)$. Let $t_3 = t_2 + 1$ and denote the history generated by $h_3 \in H(t_3)$. By definition for all $i \in N(h_2)$,
\[
\hat{z}_i(h_3) = \frac{z_i(h_2)}{x_j(N(h_2) | K(h_2))} \sum_{i \in N(h_2)} x_i(N(h_3) | K(h_3)) = z_i(h_2) = z_i(h_3).
\]
The second equality follows because no one leaves between \([t_2, t_3]\), so \(N(h_2) = N(h_3)\) and \(K(h_2) = K(h_3)\). The third equality follows because no new offers binds between \([t_2, t_3]\). Thus all players in \(N(h_2)\) accept the proposal at time \(t_3\).

Everyone is quiet between \((t_3, t_3+1)\). Let \(t_4 = t_3 + 1\) and denote the history generated by \(h_4 \in H(t_4)\).

Since no one leaves between \([t_3, t_4]\), so \(N(h_3) = N(h_4)\) and \(K(h_3) = K(h_4)\). At \(t_4\), since \(\Pi(h_4) = \{\cdot, N(h_4)\}\), so all players leave. Thus player \(i \in N(h_4)\) gets

\[
\sum_{j \in N(h_2)} \frac{z_i(h_2)}{x_j(N(h_2) \mid K(h_2))} \sum_{l \in N(h_4)} x_l(N(h_4) \mid K(h_4)) = z_i(h_2).
\]

However \(z_i(h_2) = \tilde{z}_i(h_1)\) because at time \(t_1\), \(p(h_1)\) binds. Combining with \(\tilde{z}_i(h_1) = z_i(h_1)\), thus \(z_i(h_2) = z_i(h_1) = z_i(h)\). The last equality follows because nothing happens between \([t, t_1)\).\(^{16}\) Thus player \(i \in N(h)\) gets \(z_i(h)\) in the continuing equilibrium. QED

The following result is the partial converse to Theorem 1.

**Theorem 2.** If \(<N, P>\) is totally \(r\)-balanced, then any payoff vector in the \(r\)-core can be supported as an SSPNE outcome.

**Proof.** We want to show that the strategy \(f\) does constitute an equilibrium. Therefore, we want to show that any player \(i\) has no profitable deviation after any history, given all others are playing according to the equilibrium. For any \(t \geq 0\), \(h \in H(t)\) and \(i \in N(h)\backslash A(h)\), if \(f_j(h) = l\) for some \(j \in N(h)\backslash \{i\}\), then according to the equilibrium strategies, it must be the case that \(\Pi(h) = \{(\cdot, N(h))\}\). Hence player \(i\) has to leave anyway. So \(f_i(h) = l\) is clearly optimal. Thus we only need to show that for any \(i \geq 0\), \(h \in H(t)\) and \(i \in N(h)\backslash A(h)\), if \(f_j(h) \neq l\) for all \(j \in N(h)\backslash \{i\}\), then using the equilibrium strategy \(f_i\) given all others are using their corresponding equilibrium strategies \(f_{-i}\) is optimal for player \(i\).

---

\(^{16}\)Hence \(N(h) = N(h_1)\) and \(K(h) = K(h_1)\).
Consider another strategy $f'_i$ for player $i$. Notice that $f'_i$ and $f_{-i}$ generate a unique continuation path $h'$ subsequent to $h$. Since $i$ gets at least $z_i(h) > -\infty$ by following $f_i$, he does no better if he never leaves according to $f'_i$. Thus suppose $i$ leaves at time $t' \geq t$ with the proposal $((w'_j)_{j \in S'}, S')$. Notice that since others are following the equilibrium strategies $f_{-i}$, everyone must leave the game ultimately. The coalitional structure thus formed, denoted by $P'_N$, must satisfy:

$$S \in P'_N \text{ for all } S \in K(h) \text{ and } S' \in P'_N.$$ 

That is, it must respect the coalitions that have left. Thus player $i$ obtains the payoff of $w'_i P(S'/P'_N)$. Since the proposal $((w'_j)_{j \in S'}, S')$ must be binding before the coalition $S'$ can leave, thus $((w'_j)_{j \in S'}, S') \in \Pi(h'|t')$. By Lemma 1

$$z_i(h'|t') \geq w'_i \sum_{j \in S'} x_j(N(h'|t') \setminus S'/S', K(h'|t')) = w'_i P(S'/P'_N).$$

The equality follows because after $S'$ has left, since others are playing according to the equilibrium strategies, they must stay together and form a grand coalition of their own. Thus, $P'_N = \{N(h'|t') \setminus S'/S' \cup K(h'|t')\}$. Moreover, the payoff vector $x(N(h'|t') \setminus S'/S', K(h'|t'))$ is in the core $C(N(h'|t') \setminus S'/S', K(h'|t'))$, and by total $r$-balancedness, $P(N(h'|t') \setminus S'/S', K(h'|t')) = P(N(h'|t') \setminus S'/S', K(h'|t')) = P(S'/P'_N)$.

There are three exhaustive cases.

Case A: $A(h) = \emptyset$.

Case B: $p(h) = ((w_j)_{j \in T}, T)$ and either $\hat{z}_i(h) \leq z_i(h)$ or $\hat{z}_j(h) < z_j(h)$ for some $j \in T \setminus A(h)$.

Case C: $p(h) = ((w_j)_{j \in T}, T)$, $\hat{z}_i(h) > z_i(h)$ and $\hat{z}_j(h) \geq z_j(h)$ for all $j \in T \setminus A(h)$.

Notice that case B covers the instances where $i \notin T$ since then $\hat{z}_i(h) = z_i(h)$. Case A covers the instances where $p(h) = \emptyset$. As in Perry and Reny (1994), the argument applying to cases A and B have a common component, thus we treat
them together until it is necessary to separate them.

**Cases A and B.** By Lemma 2, in case A, player \(i\) will get \(z_i(h)\) by using the equilibrium strategy \(f_i\). In case B, by the equilibrium strategies, either player \(i\) does not belong to \(T\), he is the only player who hasn’t accepted the current proposal \(p(h)\) and will accept it or at least a player will reject the proposal by making a new proposal involving all the players \(N(h)\). In any case, player \(i\) gets \(z_i(h)\). Thus suppose to the contrary that by following \(f_i'\), player \(i\) made a profitable deviation. Thus \(w_i'(S' | P'_N) > z_i(h)\).

Since \(z_i(h'|t') \geq w_i'(S' | P'_N) > z_i(h)\), it must be the case that \(t' > t\). This is because \(h'|t = h\). Hence, let

\[
t^* = \inf \{ \hat{t} \in [t, t'] \mid z_i(h'|\hat{t}) > z_i(h) \}.
\]

It follows that \(z_i(h) \geq z_i(h'|t^*)\). To see this, note if \(t^* = t\), then since \(h'|t = h\), the weak inequality is certainly true. If \(t^* > t\) and suppose to the contrary that \(z_i(h) < z_i(h'|t^*)\), then by (S4), there exists an \(\varepsilon > 0\) small enough so that \(t^* - \varepsilon > t\) and nothing happens between \([t^* - \varepsilon, t^*]\). Hence \(z_i(h'|t^* - \varepsilon) = z_i(h'|t^*) > z_i(h)\). But then \(t^*\) is not the infimum. Hence \(z_i(h) \geq z_i(h'|t^*)\). This implies \(t^* \neq t'\) because \(z_i(h'|t') > z_i(h)\). Thus \(t' > t^*\).

Because \(z_i(h) \geq z_i(h'|t^*)\) and \(t^*\) is the infimum, there must exist a sequence of positive numbers \(\{\varepsilon_n\}\) where \(\lim_{n \to \infty} \varepsilon_n = 0\) and \(z_i(h'|t^* + \varepsilon_n) > z_i(h) \geq z_i(h'|t^*)\) for every \(\varepsilon_n\). By (S4), there must exist an \(n^*\) large enough such that nothing happens between \((t^*, t^* + \varepsilon_{n^*})\). Thus something must happen at time \(t^*\) for otherwise it cannot be the case that \(z_i(h'|t^* + \varepsilon_{n^*}) > z_i(h'|t^*)\). Thus either the current proposal \(p(h'|t^*)\) which contains player \(i\) becomes binding at \(t^*\) or someone leaves at \(t^*\). The latter cannot happen because according to \(f_i'\), player \(i\) leaves at \(t' > t^*\). Players other than \(i\) cannot leave at \(t^*\) either for otherwise, since they are playing according to the equilibrium strategies \(f_{-i}\), when one leaves, all must leave, contradicting that player \(i\) leaves at \(t' > t^*\). Therefore, the current proposal \(p(h'|t^*)\) becomes binding at \(t^*\). Let \(p(h'|t^*) = (w_j^*)_{j \in S, S}\). Notice that \(i \in S\) as argued.

Since the current proposal \(p(h'|t^*)\) becomes binding at \(t^*\) and nothing hap-
pens between \((t^*, t^* + \varepsilon_n)\), this implies that \(\tilde{z}_i(h'|t^*) = z_i(h'|t^* + \varepsilon_n)\). Because \(z_i(h'|t^* + \varepsilon_n) > z_i(h'|t^*)\), it follows that \(\tilde{z}_i(h'|t^*) > z_i(h'|t^*)\). By part (c) of Lemma 1 \(\sum_{j \in S} z_j(h'|t^*) = \sum_{j \in S} \tilde{z}_j(h'|t^*)\). Because \(i\) is in \(S\), this implies that there exists a player \(k\) in \(S\) such that \(\tilde{z}_k(h'|t^*) < z_k(h'|t^*)\). We now separate the discussion for cases A and B.

**Case A.** Since \(p(h'|t^*)\) becomes binding at \(t^*\) and at time \(t\) no one has accepted any proposal because \(A(h) = \emptyset\), thus player \(k\) must accept \(p(h'|t^*)\) at some point of time \(t_k \in [t, t^*]\). At that time, since \(k\) is playing according to the equilibrium strategy, so \(\tilde{z}_k(h'|t_k) \geq z_k(h'|t_k)\). Note that \(\Pi(h'|t_k) = \Pi(h'|t^*)\), \(N(h'|t_k) = N(h'|t^*)\) and \(K(h'|t_k) = K(h'|t^*)\) since \(p(h'|t_k) = p(h'|t^*)\). Hence \(\tilde{z}_k(h'|t_k) = \tilde{z}_k(h'|t^*)\) and \(z_k(h'|t_k) = z_k(h'|t^*)\). This implies that \(\tilde{z}_k(h'|t^*) \geq z_k(h'|t^*)\), yielding a contradiction. Hence there is no profitable deviation for case A.

**Case B.** Note that \(p(h) = ((w_j)_{j \in T}, T)\) will not bind. This is because if there exists some \(j \neq i\) where \(j \in T \setminus A(h)\) such that \(\tilde{z}_j(h) < z_j(h)\), then he will not accept the proposal and will make another proposal pertaining to \(N(h)\) at the next integer time if no one has done so. If there exists no \(j \neq i\) where \(j \in T \setminus A(h)\) such that \(\tilde{z}_j(h) < z_j(h)\), then either \(\tilde{z}_i(h) = z_i(h)\) or \(\tilde{z}_i(h) < z_i(h)\). When \(\tilde{z}_i(h) = z_i(h)\), according to the equilibrium strategies, all \(j \neq i\), \(j \in T \setminus A(h)\) will accept the proposal at the next integer time. Thus if player \(i\) accepts as well, the proposal will bind. However, once it binds, say at time \(t''\), then \(p(h'|t'') = \emptyset\). Since we have shown in Case A that no profitable deviation is possible, player \(i\)’s optimal strategy is to follow the equilibrium strategy \(f_i\) from \(t''\) on. This implies \(i\)’s payoff will be \(\tilde{z}_i(h) = z_i(h)\) by using \(f_i'\). Since \(\tilde{z}_i(h) = w'_i P(S' \mid P'_N)\). This is in contradiction to \(w'_i P(S' \mid P'_N) > z_i(h)\). When \(\tilde{z}_i(h) < z_i(h)\), there are two possibilities. Either there exists an \(j \neq i\) where \(j \in T \setminus A(h)\) or \(\{i\} = T \setminus A(h)\).

In the first situation when there exists a \(j \neq i\), \(j \in T \setminus A(h)\), then according to player \(j\)’s equilibrium strategy, he will not accept the proposal\(^{17}\) and will make another proposal pertaining to \(N(h)\) if no one has done so. In the second situation.

\(^{17}\)Because according to the equilibrium strategy, player \(j\) will not accept \(p(h)\) since \(\tilde{z}_i(h) < z_i(h)\).
where \( \{i\} = T \setminus A(h) \), player \( i \) will not accept the proposal. For if he did, say at time \( t''' \), then \( p(h'|t''') = \emptyset \). Again, since we have shown in Case A that no profitable deviation is possible from \( t''' \) on, player \( i \) gets \( \tilde{z}_i(h) < z_i(h) \), yielding a contradiction. Therefore in all possible situations, \( p(h) = ( (w_j)_{j \in T}, T ) \) will not bind.

Since \( p(h|t^*) \) becomes binding at \( t^* \) and \( p(h) = ( (w_j)_{j \in T}, T ) \) will not bind, \( p(h'|t^*) \) must be proposed at time \( t \) or later but before \( t^* \). Hence player \( k \) must accept \( p(h'|t^*) \) at some point of time \( t_k \in [t, t^*] \). Now apply exactly the same logic in case A to get a contradiction. Thus there is no profitable deviation for case B.

**Case C.** We will show that player \( i \) has no profitable deviation. If player \( i \) plays according to the equilibrium strategy \( f_i \), since all others are also playing the equilibrium strategies, his payoff is \( z_i(h) > \tilde{z}_i(h) \). If instead player \( i \) deviates to another strategy \( f'_i \), there are two possibilities.

In the first possibility \( p(h) \) becomes binding. This implies player \( i \) accepts \( p(h) \) at some time \( t'' \). Since all other players accept \( p(h) \) by the equilibrium strategies at the next integer time, say \( t''' \), this implies \( p(h) \) becomes binding at \( \max\{t', t''\} \). Therefore \( p(h'| \max\{t', t''\}) = \emptyset \). By the argument in case A, it is optimal for player \( i \) to follow the equilibrium strategy from time \( \max\{t'', t'''\} \) on. Hence player \( i \)'s payoff from using \( f'_i \) is at most \( \tilde{z}_i(h) \).

In the second possibility \( p(h) \) does not become binding. This implies either player \( i \) makes another proposal at some time \( t'' \) or \( i \) leaves before accepting. In the first situation, since others are playing according to the equilibrium strategies, if the next integer time arrives before or at \( t'' \), all others accept \( p(h) \) at the next integer time except player \( i \). If the next integer time arrives after \( t'' \), this new proposal is made before anyone has accepted it. Both imply \( p(h'|t'') = \emptyset \). By the argument in case A, it is optimal for player \( i \) to follow the equilibrium strategy from time \( t'' \) on. Hence player \( i \)'s payoff from using \( f'_i \) is at most \( z_i(h) \). In the second situation where \( i \) leaves before accepting, it must be the case that player \( i \) is in a binding coalition \( S^k \). After \( S^k \) leaves, all players still play according to the equilibrium strategies. Thus
$x(N(h)\setminus S^k \mid S^k, K(h))$ is expected in the continuing equilibrium. Hence player $i$’s payoff is $w_i^k \sum_{j \in S^k} x_j(N(h)\setminus S^k \mid S^k, K(h)) \leq z_i(h)$ by part (a) of Lemma 1.

Thus there is no profitable deviation for case C. QED

6 Discussion

We note that total $r$-balancedness indeed guarantees the existence of the $r$-core. In fact, it makes a precise prediction that for any $S$ and $\mathcal{P}_{N\setminus S}, \mathcal{P}(S \mid S, \mathcal{P}_{N\setminus S}) = (S)$. When there is no externality across coalitions, it naturally boils down to the standard notion of total balancedness. In addition, total $r$-balancedness plays an important role in Theorem 2. More precisely, the assumption of total $r$-balancedness is convenient for the following reasons.

First, suppose $S_1$ has become binding. After this history, the relevant partition function game is no longer $<N, P>$. Since $S_1$ cannot break apart, we should instead treat $S_1$ as a “composite player” and consider the “derived” partition function consistent with the fact that members of $S_1$ stay together. According to Theorem 1, whenever this happens, in the continuing equilibrium some $r$-core of this “derived” partition function game must occur. The existence of the $r$-core for this “derived” partition function game is not guaranteed, however, since the existence of the $r$-core only implies that when every player is on its own, the $r$-core for any reduced society exists. For totally $r$-balanced games, since the grand coalition for any reduced society always form, treating $S_1$ as a “composite player” actually reduces the number of the inequalities to check for the $r$-core to exist. For instance, suppose $S_1 = \{1, 2\}$ and $N = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. When we treat $S_1$ as a “composite player,” for the grand coalition $N$ to form in the “derived” partition function form game, we do not need to worry, for instance, whether the sum of payoffs of players 1 and 3 is greater than their worth. Therefore, if the $r$-core exists in the original game, then it exists in this “derived” partition function game. The grand coalition is always the resulting $r$-core structure. When the game is not totally $r$-balanced, existence may be a problem. Example 2 demonstrates this.
Example 2 Suppose $N = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. Suppose
\[
P(\{1, 2, 4\} \mid (\{1, 2, 4\}, \{3\})) = \\
P(\{1, 2, 3\} \mid (\{1, 2, 3\}, \{4\})) = \\
P(\{3, 4\} \mid (\{1, 2\}, \{3, 4\})) = 2,
\]
\[
P(\{1\} \mid (\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3, 4\})) = \\
P(\{2\} \mid (\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3, 4\})) = \\
P(\{3, 4\} \mid (\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3, 4\})) = 1,
\]
and $P(S \mid P_N) = 0$ in all other cases. For this game $V(\{1, 2, 3\}) = V(\{1, 2, 4\}) = 2$, $V(\{1\}) = V(\{2\}) = V(\{3, 4\}) = 1$ and the values for all other coalitions are zero. The r-core exists and the unique r-core structure for the society $N$ is $(\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3, 4\})$.

However, suppose off the equilibrium path $\{1, 2\}$ has formed. Treating $\{1, 2\}$ as a composite player, there exists no r-core in this “derived” partition function form game. This is because now the value of $\{3, 4\}$ becomes 2 since players 1 and 2 cannot break apart. Combined with the fact that the values of $\{1, 2, 3\}$ and $\{1, 2, 4\}$ are 2, there is no way to give each coalition its worth. Therefore, off the equilibrium path, when $\{1, 2\}$ has formed, no continuation equilibrium exists.

Second, suppose the r-core structure is not the grand coalition. After some coalitions in the r-core structure have formed, since we have to treat the formed coalitions as “composite players,” it is not guaranteed that the resulting r-core in the “derived” partition function is the original r-core anymore. For the same reason as argued above, when the game is totally r-balanced, this does not result in a problem. Example 3 demonstrates this.

Example 3 Suppose $N = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. Suppose
\[
P(\{1, 2\} \mid (\{1, 2\}, \{3\}, \{4\})) = 2,
\]
\[
P(\{1\} \mid \{(1), (2), (3, 4)\}) = \\
P(\{2\} \mid \{(1), (2), (3, 4)\}) = \\
P(\{3, 4\} \mid \{(1), (2), (3, 4)\}) = \\
P(\{3\} \mid \{(1, 2), (3), (4)\}) = \\
P(\{4\} \mid \{(1, 2), (3), (4)\}) = 1, \\
P(\{3, 4\} \mid \{(1, 2), (3, 4)\}) = 3,
\]

and \( P(S \mid P_N) = 0 \) in all other cases. For this game, \( V(\{3, 4\}) = V(\{1\}) = V(\{2\}) = V(\{3\}) = V(\{4\}) = 1 \) and the values for all other coalitions are zero. The \( r \)-core exists and the unique \( r \)-core structure for the society \( N \) is \( ((1, 2), (3), (4)) \).

However, suppose \( \{1, 2\} \) has formed. Treating \( \{1, 2\} \) as a composite player, the unique \( r \)-core structure in this “derived” partition function form game is \( ((1, 2), (3, 4)) \). This is because now the value of \( \{3, 4\} \) becomes 3 since players 1 and 2 cannot break apart.

References


