Identity,
Performance, and Secrecy:
Gendered Life and the
“Modern” in Northern Nigeria

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The recent reimposition of Islamic criminal law in northern Nigeria has forcefully brought gender issues in the region to international attention. Sentences of death by stoning handed down to Safiya Hussaini and Amina Lawal and the sentence of flogging to Bariya Magazu (all convicted of adultery) have garnered global press coverage and condemnation. Some of this international scrutiny has been strikingly inaccurate, unhelpful, and anti-Muslim: as the northern Nigerian scholar and human rights activist Ayesha Imam has argued, “[H]uman rights are not the exclusive province of international human rights law or international human rights organizations. Human rights concepts exist in Muslim, customary, and secular laws.”1 Bariya’s sentence of flogging was irregularly carried out before her appeals were exhausted, while the convictions of Safiya and Amina were overturned by Islamic appellate courts. Other convictions for adultery and sodomy are under appeal. Although none of them has garnered the international concern of Bariya, Safiya, and Amina, there continues to exist an unfortunate politics in which certain convictions for sexual crimes get labeled simultaneously as a defense of traditional morality (by their proponents) and as atrocities (by outsiders, often identified with Christianity and the West). However, the economy of gender and sexual morality within northern Nigerian jurisprudence
cannot be reduced to a struggle between Islam and the West or between feminism and patriarchal reaction.

In this article I outline a stereotypical picture of gender relations in northern Nigeria—a normative description that some Islamists inside the region are attempting to enforce and that some outside commentators condemn. But I shall also suggest that this normative version is imperfect and contradictory. There is a much more dynamic way in which norther Nigerians construct their gender identities and through which they imagine and conduct their gendered and sexual relationships. Identities as male and female, as anywhere else in the world, are contingent and ambiguous. Various forms of nonnormative sexuality (extramarital heterosexuality, sex between men, sex between women) also are negotiated within well-developed subcultures and systems of understanding. This essay does not attempt to present a comprehensive overview of northern Nigerian gender, nor does it centrally present an original body of research. Instead, I shall suggest a field of concern for the study of gender and sexuality in the region.

My emphasis here is on Hausa-speakers, particularly those living in and around the city of Kano, which is the capital of the ancient emirate of Kano, as well as of the modern state within the federation of Nigeria. It is also the largest city in the northern section of the country. Kano was not the first state in Nigeria to restore the shari’a courts’ criminal jurisdiction, but it did do so shortly after Zamfara state pioneered the innovation. These developments cannot be separated from tensions between the Muslim northern part of the country and the federal government, whose then civilian president was a Christian southerner. Nonetheless, the convictions for adultery (and convictions for sodomy and other sexual crimes) suggest that something much more interesting is at stake than a simple enforcement of heterosexual patriarchy. Rather than imagining that conservative forces are targeting a relatively small group of people who deviate from conventional gender norms, I suggest that politicians have capitalized upon popular anxieties over the categories of normal and deviant. These are interdependent and somewhat negotiable; they stand in supplementary opposition to one another. I juxtapose a normative picture of gender and sexual identities with other practices that are often
condemned or ignored. The logic of "normal" gender highlights problem cases and constitutes particular groups of people as deviant and abnormal. However, this logic also tends to undermine itself. This tendency is ameliorated, or at least becomes possible to overlook, through a strong cultural emphasis on secrecy. Immoral behavior is not thought of as being so bad if it is conducted in secret, if it is unknown or at least can be gracefully ignored.

**Northern Nigeria**

Popular coverage (and not a little scholarship) depict northern Nigeria as deeply conservative, devoted to an ancient, puritanical form of Islam that dictates appropriate gender roles and sexual morality. Reality is more complicated. Early in the last millennium, a number of the region's Hausa-speaking city-states began to engage in the great trade across the Sahara, between savanna West Africa and North Africa and the Middle East. As trade links intensified, a number of Muslims settled in the region, and increasing numbers of Hausa-speakers themselves converted to Islam. As this process continued, aristocrats and eventually kings also converted, making the states officially Muslim. Our knowledge of Hausa social history in this period is somewhat sketchy, but it is clear that women played significant roles in politics and the economy. Women are remembered as rulers of some states (Queen Amina of Zazzau most notably), and the constitutions of most had various offices reserved for women. Other forms of religion remained important until today, even among nominal Muslims. Notable among these was the *bori* spirit possession movement, whose adherents and leadership included many women. Muslim rulers negotiated a metaphysical minefield, depending on legitimation from and the protection of indigenous gods even while also maintaining allegiance to a religion for which such accommodation was anathema.

This contradiction led to a religious reform movement that began in the kingdom of Gobir (in modern-day northwestern Nigeria) toward the end of the eighteenth century, following a member of the Fulani ethnic group, Usman 'dan Fodio. 'Dan Fodio became increasingly hostile to the king of Gobir's syncretistic practices, and he took to preaching against toleration of *bori*, the emir's oppression of commoners and slaves, and
other deviations from his interpretation of the norms of Islamic governance. During the first decade of the nineteenth century, ‘dan Fodio and his followers launched *jihad* against the king of Gobir and then the rulers of other states in the region, including all major Hausa states. The *jihad* resulted in the creation of a new empire, the Sokoto Caliphate, which incorporated the Hausa city-states as component emirates, their kings replaced by Fulani emirs. The Hausa dynasties of some of these states escaped and set up successor kingdoms—most notably the kings of Zazzau in Abuja and of Katsina in Maradi. Beyond the immediate political consequences of the *jihad*, it also installed a particular brand of Islamic orthodoxy, which was increasingly hostile to women’s presence in public life, and accordingly many offices previously held by women began to be held by men instead.

More generally, Islamic orthodoxy touched off a process of normalization, in which adherence to Islamic norms as interpreted by the leaders of the caliphal state became increasingly important, both for maintaining ties of patronage with state officials and for avoiding reprisals such as slave raids meted out to pagans and “bad” Muslims. Even as this occurred, however, caliphal officials were forced to come to terms with indigenous institutions and forms of religiosity. Thus, the noncanonical *jangali* cattle tax was reinstated, and at times the *sori* spirit possession movement was allowed to flourish. Areas north of the caliphate, dominated by refugees from the *jihad* or by polities that had not been conquered, were in many cases also Muslim and were not immune from these same processes of Islamic reform, although generally the process was more gradual.

The advent of colonialism at the start of the twentieth century hastened this process of normalization. The border between British Nigeria and French Niger roughly corresponded to the northern border of the caliphate, and within Nigeria the institutions of the Sokoto caliphate were retained in the system of indirect rule, although French practices of direct rule were, especially in nominal terms, considerably more interventionist. In effect, the Nigeria/Niger border signals a complex set of divisions, including caliphate/noncaliphate, anglophone/francophone, and incorporation into oil-rich Nigeria/sahelian Niger. There are obvious complexities to imagining Hausaland as a culturally homogeneous zone,
although cultural continuities and the ties of common language do justify cautious comparison between regions.

In northern Nigeria, the caliphate’s aristocracy was aided by British military force and by more secure communications between country and city, which enabled them to rule rural areas more systematically than in the precolonial period. Not coincidentally, rural practices of Islam became more orthodox. More married women entered seclusion, and increasing numbers of pagan Hausa converted to Islam. As the century progressed, however, debates of the proper practice of Islam emerged, intimately tied to other political and social divisions. Their net effect, however, was to extend and speed processes of normalization rather than retarding them. Even as people debated the proper methods of prayer or whether women could properly leave the house for schooling or medical care, the notion that religion dictated the answers to these questions became more and more pervasive. And reform movements also crossed the border into francophone Niger, causing most developments to be reflected there, although often at a somewhat later date.

Normality and Deviance

Hausa gender practices are neither static nor uniform across the geographic area of Hausaland or across the various axes of Hausa society—urban/rural, rich/poor, Muslim/non-Muslim, and so forth. However, there are certain normative visions that are broadly shared or that at least denote widely intelligible fields of significance—a terrain of debate that serves to structure processes of social change. For the purpose of narrative convenience, I shall describe these visions using the heuristic device of the “ethnographic present,” with the caveat that this is not meant to suggest that such practices are timeless or exhaustively accurate. As Barbara Cooper has argued, marriage is one of the most important institutions for negotiating the practices of Hausa adult gender in Maradi, an insight that can be applied more generally. The age of many women’s first marriages currently remains just after puberty, around 12 to 14, although some (those pursuing secondary or post-secondary education, for example) may marry rather later. Men tend to marry for the first time at an older age, often not until their twenties, when they are able to amass the capital
necessary for brideprice, something they may do with the aid of their father or another patron. This is something most men are anxious to achieve, because one does not attain full adult status until marriage. Before marriage one is a budurwa, maiden, or saurayi, youth (more pejoratively, a 'karamin yaro, a small boy). Muslim men can be married to up to four wives at one time, and until the abolition of the status of slavery at the beginning of the colonial period a man could also have as many slave concubines as he wished and could afford. The ethos is that a man should marry only as many wives as he can support, financially and sexually. Polygamous marriages can precipitate divorces, as senior wives find themselves displaced in their husbands' affections, often to their material detriment. Thirty to fifty percent of all marriages end in divorce. Statistics for the early twentieth century are unavailable; however, there is no reason to think that the divorce rate has changed significantly. Under Islamic law, men have the right of unilateral divorce, simply by pronouncing an Arabic formula three times in front of witnesses. Women can often manage to provoke a divorce, either by goading their husbands into repeating this formula or by running away from their marital homes. Luigi Solivetti has found that in rural Sokoto, to the west of Kano, the average woman will be divorced 2.19 times during her lifetime. He suggests that other areas of Hausaland are likely to show similar patterns, a contention in line with other estimates. When a woman is unable to provoke her husband to pronounce the formula for divorce, she can often obtain one in court. Because a woman's relatives often must return her brideprice if she runs away, however, they are often concerned to effect a reconciliation.5

Most forms of marriage require a brideprice payment from the man to the woman’s family. Since the beginning of the colonial period it has become increasingly common for married women to live in seclusion, auren kulle (literally, “locked marriage”). The terms of this seclusion are generally set before the marriage: women can usually go out visiting at night, but questions remain about traveling to visit relatives, for medical care, or more recently for schooling. Scholars debate the reasons for the increase in female seclusion. Many tie it to the end of slavery, arguing that female agricultural labor was associated with slavery, and that with the end of slavery free people and freed people both increasingly adopted
female seclusion as a mark of their free status. Cooper suggests that the end of slavery had another effect, as families that had previously depended on slave labor intensified demands on their own members, making wives subject to greater obligations to work on the farms of their husbands and fathers-in-law. By entering seclusion women were able to dodge this greater level of exploitation (because they could not go outside to work the family farms) and could instead devote their attention to craft manufacture and businesses whose profits were under their own control. Whatever the familial politics, women’s entering seclusion generally precludes the involvement of married women in agriculture. It is possible for a woman to tend a garden growing within the walls of her house compound, but a family’s farms fall outside this domain and therefore must be tilled by men.

Whatever the instrumental reasons for changes in the incidence of seclusion, the practice is understood as being religiously mandated. But even if female respectability is understood as correlated with marriage and seclusion—especially for women of childbearing years—that does not mean that all good, respectable women (or even all secluded women) are empirically located inside the house. Reality is much more complicated, as I learned one day while conducting an interview with an elderly man. He and I were sitting just outside the doorway of his house (I could not enter it, since his wife lived in seclusion inside), when a middle-aged woman appeared in the doorway. She said that she was going to the market being held in the center of town and stalked off. I did not remark on this exchange directly but later asked several neighbors who had seen the incident whether the woman was in fact my interviewee’s wife.

Yes indeed, they replied.
But I thought she lived in seclusion, I protested.
Of course she does.
But she went off to the market during the daytime, without even asking her husband’s permission!
Well, yes, but would you want to try to tell her that she couldn’t?

Very basic aspects of even religiously mandated respectability are in effect negotiable, at least for some. The “respectable” can get away with behavior that violates the strict letter of sanction; being “good” is as much
a matter of popular assessment as of actual conduct. These ambiguities extend into the interior of the family and play out in a family’s immediate neighborhood, because these are the environs in which an individual’s conduct is most closely monitored and against which it can be interpreted. This is not simply a matter of whether women obey their male relatives but rather pervades the domains of productive and reproductive labor, undergirding the intimate reaches of a family’s economy. In the village of Ungogo, where I conducted fieldwork in 1996-1997, a majority of households were inhabited by one male adult, his wife or wives, and their minor children, while a slightly greater percentage of the population lived in compound households, with more than one male adult, most usually related as father and son or as brothers. Often, one senior man (stereotypically a father) heads the entire household and is known as the *mai gida*, the “owner of the house.” “*Mai gida*” is not a gender-specific term, although in Ungogo there are very few female *masu gidaje*, and none with adult male dependents. People in these joint households often organize farmwork communally under the direction of the *mai gida*, who also controls the distribution of food and money produced by joint enterprise. Sometimes, although somewhat less common, food preparation is also organized communally by women under the direction of the *mai gida’s* senior wife, the *uwar gida*, “mother of the house.”

Junior men and women also often run enterprises whose proceeds are under their own control; men often farm individual plots on their own time or pursue other occupations (crafts, trading, and so forth), while women tend gardens or pursue occupations such as healing, trading, craft production, or cookery for sale. Many secluded women have extensive trade networks, using children to sell goods outside the confines of the house. In Ungogo as elsewhere, married women’s enterprises are often capitalized by their husbands, but the proceeds are their own, and a loan from a wife to her husband, for example, generally must be repaid. Nonetheless, adult female respectability is strongly correlated with marriage and seclusion, and this also correlates with men’s much greater ability to make a living.

Visions of gendered normality coexist with other modes of living. Adult women who have been married and divorced and who have chosen
not to remarry but live on their own, not under the tutelage of a male relative, are called karuwai (singular, karuwa), a word that is usually translated as “prostitutes” or “courtesans.” Karuwai are broadly condemned as being immoral, and they are understood to subsist on presents they receive from male suitors or admirers. Any divorcee living on her own may be called a karuwa (the term is insulting, so this is likely to be behind her back), but many karuwai live together in houses—usually far away from their relatives. They are visited, normally under cover of darkness, by men who wish to make their acquaintance and to court their favors. Houses of karuwai are known as places of iskansi (misbehavior, vice, craziness), where men can find sex, drink alcohol, listen to music, and enjoy the company of people who do not feel constrained while there by religious mores. In Kano such houses also tend to be located outside the confines of the old city, in areas where southerners or Christians live, or in relatively elite, quasi-suburban areas. Karuwai are well known for being witty and interesting. They are often not deferential to men in the way that respectable women are, and they are excellent conversationalists. In all respects, therefore, houses of karuwai are extraordinarily different from the normative gendered space of the respectable household.¹⁰

There is a group of men who ignore the norms of respectable masculinity in ways reminiscent of karuwai and the norms of femininity. These men, called ‘yan daudu (singular, ‘dan daudu), have an effeminate affect.¹¹ They sometimes wear some articles of women’s clothing, use female pronouns and otherwise address one another as women would (for example, using kawa, “girlfriend,” instead of aboki “[male] friend”¹²), use skin-lightening lotions, and so forth. Unlike being a karuwa, status as a ‘dan daudu suggests that one does not have a high level of Western education, and effeminate men who are educated, who hold elite jobs, or who are fluent in English tend not to be identified as ‘yan daudu. Oftentimes ‘yan daudu live in the same houses as karuwai, and they also receive masculine-identified suitors and admirers. Many ‘yan daudu make a living through stereotypically female professions, such as selling cooked food (as do many karuwai), but many also depend economically on gifts from boyfriends, even if they are married to women.

‘Yan daudu and karuwai are highly visible to respectable society. They are
widely condemned by Islamic reformers and respectable people more generally. They are, however, the tip of a nonnormative iceberg. The men who visit their houses and court their favors are not necessarily just errant “respectable” people. ‘Yan daudu are the most visible part of a widespread subculture of people who have sex with members of their own gender. Masculine men who like to have sex with ‘yan daudu are known in subcultural slang as ‘yan aras. There are also substantial numbers of women who enjoy sexual relations with other women; many (although not all) of these are karuwai. In the slang of male same-sex relationships, these women are called ‘yan kefi, while people who enjoy same-sex relations are called generically masu harka, “those who do the business.” Harka can also be used as a verb denoting having sex, either heterosexually or homosexually—Na harka da shi, “I had sex with him.” “Heterosexuals” (I use quotes because most harka people in northern Nigeria with whom I have spoken do not think of gender preference as being an orientation in the Western sense) who are unaware of this sexual subculture are called makofin, “blind people,” because they cannot see what is going on. A liking for same-sex relations is thought of as learned behavior, so that a harka person may be asked, “Who taught you [to be harka]?” Having sex with a person who had not previously had homosexual relations is called “opening”: Jiya da dare na bude shi, “Last night I opened him up.” Although anecdotal evidence points to long-standing forms of same-sex sexuality and gender-transgressive behavior, the subculture is in part a recent development. Masu harka with whom I have discussed the history of the harka community report a flowering during the 1970s and 1980s, the years of the oil boom. More recently the community has begun to be devastated by HIV/AIDS.

A taxonomy of different subcultural identities is not particularly useful in understanding the logic of sexual relations in northern Nigeria. Rather, it is possible to understand all sexual relations as being structured by a set of polarities that people can negotiate in different ways. These polarities include male/female, masculine/feminine, older/younger, rich/poor, insertive/receptive, patron/client, independent/dependent. Depending on how one negotiates these, one is positioned as unmarked/ marked, sexually unproblematic/sexually dangerous. In this regard, both relationships between men and karuwai and between harka people are less
about particular roles that people assimilate to than they are about being locatable within this universe of binaries. Many people in northern Nigeria would say that women, even respectable housewives (who are female, feminine, younger than their husbands, poorer, receptive, and dependent), are sexually dangerous. There is a widespread sense that the female libido needs to be carefully circumscribed and controlled.

The subordinate position of “respectable” women signals sexual danger, but any more ambiguous set of positions within this set of sex/gender dichotomies poses greater challenges to respectability and morality, partly through their demonstration that most human conduct does not fit neatly into morality’s heuristics. Thus, a karuwa is not dependent in the way a proper woman should be, and a ‘dan daudu is male, feminine, receptive, poor, and often acts as a client. Worse are cases in which a wealthy ‘dan daudu keeps a poor ‘dan aro, a wealthy woman keeps a poor man, a man with masculine affect prefers the receptive role, or two ‘yan daudu have sex with one another (calling it “lesbianism”). These are doubly transgressive. Thus, although the northern Nigerian sex-gender system is ideologically structured through a universe of binary oppositions, an integral aspect of its real-world instantiations is the contradictions actual practice produces.

What theoretical tools might elucidate this situation? A powerful case has been made that Western paradigms of gender difference are inappropriate for African cases, and these have been borne out by provocative studies arguing for very different articulations of gender in southwestern and southeastern Nigeria. However, this case is not easily informed by the vastly influential work of scholars like Ifi Amadiume and Oyeronke Oyewumi, who respectively argue that among the Igbo of southeastern Nigeria and the Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria—at least during the pre-colonial period—fixed gender dichotomies did not exist. It would be misleading to equate their arguments; Oyewumi more radically contends that the precolonial Yoruba simply lacked gender distinctions as such, instead acknowledging biological distinctions between women and men and a social distinction between junior and senior and between birth members of a lineage and wives who had married in. Amadiume points to the fact that members of one biological gender could take on (some
aspects of) the other gender identity. An important parallel is that both rely on the fact that the languages Yoruba and Igbo lack a pronominal distinction between the genders. Hausa by contrast does have pronominal gender. More generally, it would be much more difficult to argue for the same kinds of gender fluidity in the Hausa case, even if one were inclined to take grammatical features as directly indicative of social reality. It would be a grave mistake to apply Western categories to African societies unthinkingly, but a reified "Africa" is only marginally better than Eurocentric false universalism.

The point that Western models should not be imported uncritically is well taken, but it is important not to throw out the theoretical baby with the ethnocentric bathwater. Some strands of Foucauldian and post-Lacanian gender theory are particularly useful, especially to the extent that they signal generative constraints to gender categories rather than substantive descriptions of how gender systems operate. Following theorist Judith Butler, I would conceptualize gender as a performative. Rather than postulating it as a thing, a paradigm, or a state of being ("Hausa gender," "Hausa notions of gender"), it is more useful to think about it as a set of communicative actions analogous to Austinian performative speech acts. For J.L. Austin, a performative was something said that had effects in the world through being said—a judge's saying "I marry you," for example. In Butler's formulation, gender is the repeated enactment of particular "gendered" and therefore engendering ways of being. Although these are not unrelated to physiology or to one's already-existing gender position (I do not wake up in the morning and decide what gender to adopt for the day), our capacity to recognize physiological or behavioral characteristics as gendered stems from an always-already inculcated—and for that reason contingent—sense of femaleness or maleness. Gendered behavior is both the concrete realization of one's gender identity and a performative that continually creates gender itself. Gender is inherently communicative and never more so than when it provides a sense of interiority or, conversely, than when it provides a sense of the concrete facticity of embodiment.

The practices and the processes through which northern Nigerian gender and sexuality are performed are infinitely more complex than two
dichotomous collections of traits, deemed “male” or “female,” surrounded by an outlying group of deviant or perverse subject positions. The performatively and therefore contingent quality of even “respectable” gender underscores the interdependence of the licit and the illicit, a constitutive contradiction that brings forth a continuing set of problems, understood as crises of morality. Taking both gender and sexuality as performatives in Butler’s sense underscores the importance of explicating the communicative context in which such performances take shape and are morally evaluated. The most obvious markers for this are approved forms of gender and sexuality and stigmatized ones. Rather than suggesting a simple opposition between the normal and the deviant, I propose that all gender practices depend at least implicitly on a potential traffic between the licit and the illicit, which frequently appears also as the possible and the impossible. The interdependence of the normal and the perverse, which Butler terms the “constitutive outside,” can be masked by an emphasis on secrecy and modesty. Even though ideologically charged conduct can exist as such only in a context enabling both “good” and “bad” behavior (so that, for example, heterosexuality can exist as a category of experience only when homosexuality also exists), this interdependence is masked somewhat by keeping quiet. The existence of “normal” sex/gender categories depends upon deeming some as abnormal, perverse, deviant, but this process is complicated by the contingency and the permeability of the separation. And this is a problem that can be kept partially at bay through keeping it a secret.

Secrecy is not simply a matter of people’s managing to avoid revealing patterns of conduct that violate popularly accepted moral norms, making sure that others do not know one’s secrets. Ideas of good conduct in northern Nigeria also include being discreet, not engaging in fights that might cause unfortunate truths to be spoken of too publicly, and comporting oneself in a modest, controlled fashion. In this regard, the notion of kunya is particularly important. Kunya means “shame” or “modesty” and is a very desirable quality, particularly among subordinate people, the young, and especially young woman. Kunya is an emotion one feels toward people with whom one has a relationship of respect, and it causes one to avoid looking at them directly, using their given names, or speak-
ing familiarly. A person's feeling of modesty toward his or her parents would, for example, result in avoiding using the parents' names even to address others of the same name. Kunya leads children to be respectful toward adults and leads women (particularly of child-bearing years) to be modest and coy toward men. Having kunya also, critically, leads one to avoid broaching inappropriate topics. Sexual conduct—and particularly improper sorts of sexual conduct—is such a topic. Being a modest, appropriate, well-mannered person more or less ensures observing general norms of secrecy.

Secrecy is a matter that is again receiving theoretical attention. Georg Simmel and his followers have suggested that the secret is a form of unequally distributed knowledge that creates a distinction between those who know from those who do not. There is more to the secret than this; a secret can bind together those who share it, and it can mask immoral conduct.18 But this formulation raises as many questions as it addresses. Although an abstract code of morality may be widely distributed ("thou shalt not kill"), particular moral evaluations are often more contested ("he was asking for it"). This case indexes a secrecy very different from unequally distributed knowledge, in which not holding the secret is most importantly manifested by not talking about it. The ignorance of heterosexual "blind people" does not necessarily indicate their absolute lack of awareness of same-sex activity; rather, it stems from their ability not to admit knowledge of specific instances of it. The knowledge in question is not cognitive but behavioral. The code of conduct suggested by the norms of kunya help to explain some of the instances in which secrecy does not indicate the active keeping of a secret. It is somewhat closer to politeness, but it is more significant than being simply a code of manners. Maintaining secrecy is an enabling condition for regulated gender norms. Secrecy is a partial patch, a guardrail that disguises the vulnerability and the artificiality of the normal.

Affect, Islam, and (Post)Modernity
Part of what is at stake in the performance of any gender identity (being secluded, being respectable, being immoral) is a set of normative expectations that people experience within the context of affective ties, emotional
bonds (which may or may not be understood as being “love” as opposed to “respect” or “deference”) with particular intimates, most notably with their families. Much of the experience of being gendered stems from the experience of being treated as a son, daughter, sister, father, mother, and so forth. Most significant are the expectations that such relational identities place upon one’s behavior. If some of my identity as male stems from my identity as a husband, that identity is produced by my sense of how husbands ought to behave and my wanting to do so. And as the social dramaturgy of particular familial roles is instantiated in particular habits and courses of action, the process is experienced as an emotional one. I obey my father because I feel respect toward him.

Normative Hausa notions of family ultimately serve as an ideological bridge between people’s domestic arrangements and the relations of production and reproduction. Affective ties—the behavioral and emotional relations between parents and children, siblings, and so forth—undergird patterns of cooperation in agriculture and elsewhere within the economy of the household. Moral imperatives on individual behavior are most clearly and forcefully asserted in this intimate, politically and economically critical context. The family’s moral power is thus critical in determining gendered and generational subject positions. The ideological portrait of the family held as a model in northern Nigeria is an idealized version of the living arrangements of commoner, small-scale farmers. This consists of a household head, the mai gida; the uwar gida and her co-wives; their adult sons and the sons’ wives; marriageable daughters (a potential source of income or liability, especially in the case of daughters who have fled from their husbands); minor children; and other dependents, such as elderly parents or impoverished siblings. The mai gida is supposed to exercise control over his household, and masu gidaje who are unable to do so are often the object of gossip and ridicule. “Control” in this case denotes not only ensuring domestic harmony but also holding authority over farming and many other income-generating activities. Many adult sons work at least part time on their fathers’ farms, and many adult sons give their fathers all or part of their wages. The products of communal labor are then redistributed at the mai gida’s discretion—distributing food to women who need to cook, distributing money for necessary purchases.
Individual members of a family may have their own incomes to use as they please (to subsidize school fees, for example, or for a mother to purchase goods for a trousseau for her daughter). But because authority within the family is a means of governing both "productive" labor (on farms, in waged work) and "reproductive" labor (cooking, cleaning, engaging in childcare), the family itself is a primary site of accumulation or potential accumulation. Labor is always conducted in the context of familial authority, and the goods it produces are therefore always subject to familial claims. For the same reason, labor is a primary site of desire, where lack and absence (but also potential presence and creation) are felt. Sons work for their fathers, wives for their husbands, children for their parents. Fathers, as Sara Berry pointed out for Yorubaland in southwestern Nigeria, work for their sons. A son may save his own money for making a major purchase such as a motorcycle. Married women often invest considerable money in goods that decorate their bedrooms—elaborate bedsteads, ornaments, and cabinets to display their ornaments. People may save to make the pilgrimage to Mecca or to send their parents, spouses, or children there. It is a wonderful thing to be able to provide for one's children, but it is also wonderful for parents to have children able to lavish gifts on them.

There are considerable differences between these abstract codes and what people do in practice. The moral principles of domestic life form the terrain on which people's conduct is evaluated, although people can disagree about whether particular actions—and particular individuals' actions—are justified or unjustified. Thus, even if a woman is in seclusion, this does not mean that her body is always to be found literally in her house or even that it is in her house except for generally accepted trips outside. Certain women can get away with not abiding by the strict terms of seclusion even while being generally accepted as living "in seclusion." Those I have encountered tend to be older and rather formidable people, those women whom gossips would not dare suggest might misbehave. Many people are able to manipulate codes of gendered normality to their own advantage, although some with considerably more success than others.

The people who can most publicly get away with violating the strict protocol of gender conduct are those who can be excused from the stric-
tures of *kunya*, especially elderly men and postmenopausal women. Consider, for example, my interactions with Hajiya Halima, a woman of about sixty, who sells fried beancakes near the marketplace in Ungogo. Halima is not married at present, nor does she have children who support her, and all of her income stems from her beancakes. Despite her considerable economic vulnerability, she is a formidable person—or at least I always found her very intimidating. I encountered Halima almost daily in my own trips around town and would always pause to greet her and chat. Halima, like most people, was bemused that I had reached my late twenties without getting married; given my obvious prosperity it was more or less incomprehensible. Her interest, however, was much more specific than most people’s—what did I do for sex? At one point she posed the question by asking, “Don’t you like to do, thus, thus?” while rhythmically gyrating her hips. Halima took great delight in my obvious discomfort with her line of questioning, as she did at discomfiting other young men. Halima was no paragon of modest housewifeliness or prosperity. Nonetheless, she also was not a shocking or immoral person, merely an elderly woman who enjoyed bawdy talk, especially if it allowed her to tease young men. The secrecy thrown up by modest behavior does not need to be universal, as long as it is observed by those most necessary to restrain.

Within this ideological complex, the intricacies of gender relations refract against the dangers posed by *karuwai*, *'yan daudu*, and to a lesser extent the more covert *masu harka*. To return to Butler’s terminology, these forms of sexual aberrance are the “constitutive outside” in which nonnormative gender identities—those that stand outside of patriarchal authority or that do not neatly align with the binaries of gender—become threatening. But this logic complements a cultural emphasis on the importance of secrecy. One does not share one’s private business with outsiders; one does not talk about disputes for fear of exacerbating them. Behavior that does not accord with respectability is therefore not nearly as bad if it is secret, or at least technically “secret.” Part of what elicits the condemnation of *karuwai* and *'yan daudu* is that palpably they are what they are. *Karuwai* live on their own, and men come to visit them. Everyone can see where they live. On the other hand, men tend to visit houses of *karuwai* at night and, at least in Kano, these tend to be located outside the densely populated (and over-
whelmingly ethnically Hausa) environs of the old city where visits are most likely to be observed by the respectable. This is not true of the town of Ungogo, where the houses of karuwaí are sprinkled among other dwellings and where urban anonymity is impossible. Regardless, even if visiting karuwaí can be kept as a man’s secret, being a karuwa cannot be a woman’s secret.

‘yan dandu are visibly effeminate, and they do things that only women “normally” do. By contrast, a person who does not overtly present as deviant can politely be assumed to be moral. Even so, “knowledge” about same-sex sexuality is distributed very unevenly. Many people are unaware of the fact that ‘yan dandu have sex with other men, which is reflected in secondary literature that insists they are not “homosexual” but act as pimps for karuwaí. But even as same-sex sexuality is overtly denied or ignored, rumors and nasty stories abound. Many prominent men are widely known to enjoy sex with other men, but because they do not publicly admit this, they can be condemned only covertly. Indeed, because same-sex sexuality is thought of as learned, there are stories about particular big men who have “spoiled” the youth of entire quarters or who are enmeshed in long lines of prominent homosexual teachers and pupils, patrons, and clients.

These considerations help to reveal what is at stake in the politics of intimacy and in enforcing normative gender identities. They do not explain the forms that normative discussions of gender roles actually take or how precisely patterns of social change have contributed to transformations in the construction of gender and sexuality. Are women less sexually moral than in the past? Why have harka subcultures flourished in recent decades? In the absence of systematic scholarly treatment I cannot provide answers to these questions but can only suggest the cultural considerations that subvert them. One of the greatest challenges for discussing gender and sexuality in the region is the need to capture the importance of Islam. Contemporary gender relationships are no simple function of Islamization; the situation today was not somehow rigidly determined by an unequivocal and uncontested set of religious prescriptions and proscriptions. There is little unanimity on these. Nonetheless, Islam has played a critical role in constituting discourse of what it means to be
morally or immorally gendered. Islam is not a discrete set of rules more or less perfectly enacted, although those are the terms many people often use for describing it. Rather, Islam creates a moral terrain, a way of describing and evaluating specific people and actions, a set of general principles for characterizing the world.

Debates over appropriate gendered behavior (should women go to school; should women and men share taxis, for example) play out in the context of the increasing spread and rationalization of Islam. Although this process has been uneven and halting, complicated by borders, local sociopolitical considerations, and other contingencies, the Fulani jihad aligned debate over appropriate gendered conduct with broader questions of state authority, placing a strong emphasis on female modesty and sexual continence. In the two centuries since then, many new schools of thought have entered the mix, making contemporary religious politics complex indeed. In Kano at present there are various influential strands of Islamic thought, including those of various Sufi orders (most notably the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya, the first aligned with the elite of the Sokoto Caliphate and the second with other aristocratic factions), a group of Wahabi reformers known as Izala, and even a small group of Shiites who receive funding from Iran. Scholars within all of these traditions do not limit themselves to exhorting Muslims to follow their own versions of Islam; they also engage in vigorous debates (and violent conflicts) with one another. One important consideration for all of these groups is how far to accommodate or tolerate syncretistic practices—so, for example, to what extent Muslims should tolerate bori spirit possession practices. Practices like prostrating to emirs or negotiating the specific dynamics of female seclusion and veiling are all subject to considerable debate along these lines. For this reason it is difficult to distill a generic “influence of Islam” on gender identities. One could point to Qur’anic exhortations to female modesty, but there is little unanimity about how these should be fulfilled. There are general norms about modest and appropriate dress for both genders, observed by everyone who cares to be perceived as a respectable Muslim. Some schools of thought recommend more extreme forms of veiling for women. Such practices, and those like female seclusion, have changed over time, although less because they are determined
by Islam than that Islam provides a way of describing more complex patterns of social change.

Everyday life is subject to evaluation within this context of reform and debate, but Islam also forms a baseline for talking about nonnormative behavior. Thus, a story went around Kano in the late 1990s about a 'dan dau du who entered a bar at noon during Ramadan and saw a 'dan dau du friend of his sitting there drinking a beer. "Girlfriend," the first man said, "what are you doing here in a bar during the fast?" His friend replied, "I'm menstruating." In this case, both of the 'yan dau du were engaged in questionable behavior. All bars are immoral spaces, associated with drinking, immoral southern Nigerians, and many other forms of vice. The first 'dan dau du pointed out his friend's more serious sin—not only was he breaking the fast, he was doing it with alcohol. Certain categories of people are not obligated to keep the fast (although they should make up those days after the end of Ramadan) and menstruating women are one of them. The humor in the story stems from the second man's patently false justification for his immoral behavior. Nonreligious friends of mine who heard this story received it with great good humor—"That rascal, he really knows what he's talking about!" I have never told it to more devout friends, most of whom I doubt would receive it very well. What is interesting is that Islam can form, even for those who blatantly and brazenly flaunt its edicts, a baseline for describing their behavior. Islam is thus of critical importance for the negotiation of gendered identity, even if its influence is not necessarily only directly prescriptive.

To give a less charged example many, probably most, harka people I have discussed the matter with consider homosexual sex to be immoral; their pleasure in it is a bad habit they have acquired. One not particularly devout man argued instead that Allah had made him with this fondness for homosexual sex, and thus despite the Qur'anic proscriptions of sodomy he was obviously meant to engage in it. Who was he to object to the will of Allah? Others believed that homosexual sex is something that really should be given up—at some point in the indefinite future. As one man told me, "At first . . . I didn't like [receptive sex] at all, but now I do. I really should stop; Allah doesn't like it. So I will stop—later." In this case, "deviant" behavior is not justified through brazenly questionable appeals
to Islamic mores. Rather, people confess to an unfortunate fondness for particular immoral acts. Overcoming them is a matter of willpower—which they will find in a comfortably distant future.

Gender and sexual practices in northern Nigeria are not static, and change is a concern to many people. Indeed, many people I talked to about the cases of Safiya and Amina said that, although it was unfortunate that powerless girls like that should be singled out, an increasing incidence of sexual immorality among young women made harsh measures necessary. Some people explained that too many girls are going to secondary school and are becoming pregnant. Others felt that although girls should be educated, measures had to be taken to keep them from misbehaving. One cannot take this too literally. There have been concerns about schoolgirl sexuality for as long as there have been schoolgirls, and sexual immorality is certainly nothing new. But many recognize how ineffective the adultery verdicts are at addressing this seeming problem—neither Safiya nor Amina was an errant schoolgirl, nor was either verdict really legal, as evidenced by their being overturned on appeal. Safiya’s conviction was quashed because she became pregnant before the shari’a criminal code was in force, and Amina’s was overturned because her adultery had not been properly proven. (In the absence of a sustained confession, a conviction requires four adult male Muslim witnesses to penetration.) In effect, those prosecuted for moral violations are being punished for the fact that their behavior has come to symbolize more wide-ranging processes of transformation that arouse great ambivalence and hostility. Nonetheless, change is in the air. This is understood in sexual terms, and it is worth considering briefly some of the influences that work to transform the intimate patterning of production and reproduction that I have argued drive sex/gender performance and identity. One of the most obvious is ordinary people’s confrontation with the web of forces and transformations often collectively termed “modernity.”

In the West, people tend to understand “modernity” as being associated with capitalist industrialization and the concomitant social changes that capitalist economies have induced, a certain configuration of power within the context of liberal democracy and a novel approach to the technologies of the individual. Not all of these are fully compatible with one
another, nor have they unfolded as a unilinear, inevitable progression everywhere in the West. Nonetheless, modernity has been invoked, used as a grab-bag term, deployed to justify a host of positions and projects. Outside of the West, this constellation has been further inflected by a history of colonialism that postulated “native” alterity glossed as primitivism as a supplement for metropolitan modernity, a set of dependent economic relationships with the West, and new patterns of commodity consumption driven by imports and import substitution. Being “modern” has implied having access to Western education, knowledge of English and other European languages, having access to elite employment, and being able to buy imported goods. In northern Nigeria, people’s understanding of modernity as consumers is complicated by two different models of the modern consumer, one posed by the richer, Christian south and Western countries, and the other by Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Muslim Middle East. Being modern therefore can involve (being able to afford to use) toothpaste, Western cleaning products, canned goods, electrical appliances and electronics, and other Western-style consumer goods. It can involve listening to other Western (or southern Nigerian) popular music, smoking cigarettes, enjoying Western, Indian, or Hong Kongese films, or the Nigerian videos available in English and Hausa.

The “postmodern” forces associated with late capitalism–flexible accumulation, globalization–have played out in various ways in different locales and have been uneven or partial at best. In northern Nigeria they have in elite circles contributed to patterns of commodity consumption analogous to those one sees in the West. But Nigeria’s economy is undergirded by the petro-naira (Nigerian currency) and suffers from the economic stagnation of the “Dutch disease,” in which national-level prosperity from oil rents actually hurts the local economy because the wealth is not well linked to the local economy. Nigeria is hampered by nearly twenty-five years of depressed oil prices and twenty years of structural adjustment, and making a living is extremely difficult. In such a context, people’s aspirations to mark themselves as “modern” are distinctly limited by the high prices of “modern” commodities that are available. This is even more maddening given that they continue to be visibly consumed by the economic elite, and they used to be much more
widely available, in the days before the oil crash. Nigerians have responded to these challenges with great vigor: not only is Nigeria’s informal economy exceptionally dynamic, the country has become famous for its “419 fraud” money e-mails and faxes and other confidence schemes dependent on high technology and the gullibility of people in the developed world.27

Relevant to the considerations of this article is an implicit argument about strains within ideologies of the family. Although contemporary agricultural production is not identical to practices one hundred years ago, substantial continuities in the technologies of smallholder production make change incremental rather than revolutionary. Cash cropping (especially of groundnuts), opportunities for marketing and wage labor, increasing population pressure, the abolition of slavery, and changes in the gendered division of labor all make the early 2000s very different from the early 1900s, even as overarching relations of production within smallholder families persist. However, substantial changes within patterns of consumption—different foodstuffs, cleaning goods, textiles, prestige items—have driven subtle but wide-ranging changes in the relations of reproduction. And these have then led to alterations in affective ties, which have driven a transformation of sex and gender.

Seeing things in this way might help to explain why it is that many masu harka report that there was a flowering of harka subculture during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the days of the oil boom. The sudden explosion of imported consumer goods available at relatively low prices came as the market for agricultural goods continued its long-term decline. Although Hausa farming families have continued to produce groundnuts for export and other foodcrops for local sale, the oil boom facilitated a shift of activity into the urban economy, both formal and informal, and also made this shift more necessary. Migration to the city or to other centers of iskanci makes it possible to lead an “immoral” life while keeping one’s family ignorant of one’s sins, although major cities are hardly the only centers of iskanci. As in Ungogo, there are many houses of karriwai scattered through almost every town of any size at all, and there are also a number of towns that have red-light districts of sorts, with many beer parlors as well. Rudolf Gaudio describes relatively remote villages where yan daudu cluster, and in the period immediately following the reimposition of
shari'a criminal law, many karuwa and 'yan daudu fled to villages just over the Niger border. A commoditized economy enables reproductive patterns detached from the patriarchal household. The net result, however, has been something other than the emergence of a Western-style gay subculture.

The "secrecy" structuring nonnormative Hausa sexuality is epistemologically distinctive. It is not like the secrecy surrounding crime, Masonic ritual, or even ATM PINs. The closest analogue is the closet of Western homosexuality, but there is an important difference: its object is conduct rather than personal essence. Where the epistemic regime of the closet was a particular way of not-knowing that also produced a "truth" of homosexual orientation, the "immoral" acts covered over by this secrecy indicate contingent instances of sin rather than personal essence. It is a secrecy of which the most notable characteristic is silence rather than not-knowing. It is a mode of comportment where modesty and reserve, being polite and sensible, having kunya are, if anything, more important than being factually free from sin.

So what ought one to make of this? In this essay I offer only a few tentative conclusions. I have suggested that at least in northern Nigeria the performative nexus within which gender categories emerge is the set of normative claims that the family places upon its members. To use Butler's terminology, the girl is girled and the boy boyed through their assumption of the roles daughter, son, wife, husband, mother, father. The sexual economy of the family emerges from its gendered economy not because of biological determinism, but because of a much more complex set of prescriptive and proscriptive moral injunctions. This quasi-structuralist grid makes intelligible moral and immoral behavior, but through internal contradiction it makes perfect morality almost impossible to achieve. Moreover, individual conduct does not perfectly reflect normative codes, however universally approved. Desire, both for publicly recognizable projects of accumulation and socially recognized affective ties and for private relations of intimacy and pleasure, takes form within the symbolic economy of the family's productive and reproductive demands. Secrecy therefore is a way of finessing the contradictions and ambiguities that these demands create in daily life and daily desire. Changes in the
family as a nexus of consumption and accumulation therefore drive alterations in desire and its satisfaction. But these changes also highlight non-normative forms as indicative of trouble. "Modernity" and Islam drive change and aid its interpretation, but in unpredictable and ambiguous ways. Gender and sexuality in northern Nigeria neither change nor remain the same. How could they? Every performance of gender, every act of sex, is a contingent and located phenomenon, although interpretable through resemblance to past practice. This interpretability is the quality that Butler, following Jacques Derrida, terms "iterative," meaning that the use of a particular sign creates meaning not because it rigidly designates a fixed entity, but rather because it conjures up meanings created in previous instances of use. It is a repetition, but one never wholly identical with what had gone before. The impression that signs have a constant, systematic meaning is an illusion stemming from their being used at discrete moments in time. And thus, the future is as open-ended as the past.

Notes

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3. For a more sustained discussion of this device, see Steven Pierce, "Farmers and 'Prostitutes': Twentieth-Century Problems of Female Inheritance in Kano Emirate,


7. See Pierce, "Farmers and Prostitutes," 463-86.

8. The following is a summary of Pierce, *Farmers and the State*, 47-78. These findings in Ungogo are generally in accordance with those of writers studying other towns in rural Hausaland.


11. The best work on 'yan dautu is that of Rudolf Gaudio. See his "Men Who Talk like Women: Gender and Sexuality in Hausa Muslim Society" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1996). This section is based on Gaudio, on my own observations during fieldwork in 1993, 1996-1997, and 2002, and on personal communication with Gaudio, Susan O'Brien, and Adeline Masquelier.

12. Kawa is a term used by one woman to address and describe another with whom she has an intimate, quasi-formalized friendship, and it presupposes feminine gender for both the speaker and her friend. It would not be used by a man to describe a female friend, which itself would be a rarity. If he did, however, he would use the feminine of aboki, abokya. See Smith, *Baba of Kato*, 56-61.

13. Aras does not have another meaning. 'Ya literally means "children" (and 'da means "son"). When joined to another noun with the connective —n, it means "children of" or more figuratively "those who do." Thus, bor'i practitioners are 'yan bori, Nigerians 'yan Nageriya. 'Yan dauwu are associated with the bor'i spirit 'Dan Gala Dima.

14. Like aras, kefi does not have another meaning.


25. Gaudio in “Men Who Talk like Women,” makes a similar point, calling ‘yan daudu’s use of religious idiom “pious irreverence.”


