Together, Apart:
Suspect Lives in West Bank Refugee Camps and Israeli “Mixed” Cities

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State violence and mass displacement have regularly punctuated and continue to disrupt the modern history of Palestinians. Through these acute moments of disruption, and most crucially, during the decades-long intervals between them, when violence and displacement subside (but do not disappear), Palestinians have unwillingly established close relationships with powerful and typically hostile agencies of control. These relationships are grounded in the general status of “suspect” imposed on them: displaced, pushed into statelessness, or granted degraded forms of citizenship, everywhere they live and go they are routinely deemed and treated as “suspect” or “dangerous.” The experience of being controlled links their varied predicaments of displacement, division, and immobility. As Rashid Khalidi (1997:1) writes, the regular scrutiny of their “suspect” identity “brings home to them how much they share in common as a people.”

However, the discourses and practices of coercive control woven around Palestinian lives clash or reinforce one another in different ways. So do the emotional bonds that they form and the moral-political worlds that they inhabit in response to this distribution of forms of state suspicion and control. My book, Together, Apart, develops this argument about the link between forms and styles of control, emotional relationships, and political expression and action through a comparative analysis of Palestinian populations on each side of the Green Line, the “border” separating Israel and the West Bank, as well as across it. Specifically, based on long-term multi-sited ethnography, I trace the bifurcated history of displacement and control that connects the Palestinian urban poor living in Lydda, an Israeli city adjacent to the Ben Gurion International Airport, and Palestinian refugees, originally from the Lydda area, who now live in Jalazon, a West Bank camp about twenty miles away (across the border) from Lydda. I compare these two populations’ emotional and moral-political responses to state suspicion and coercion while also studying the two-way traffic in emotions and perceptions between them. This comparison reflects the broader legal-spatial duality produced by the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 between those Palestinians who managed to remain within the newly established state, obtaining citizenship status but also experiencing military rule until 1966 (about 160,000) and those who became refugees and were dispersed in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip (about 750,000). A similar process took place at the urban level. Until 1948, Lydda was an Arab city with about 20,000 Palestinian residents. All of them, except for about 1,000, became refugees. In the decades after the establishment of the Israeli state, other Palestinian citizens of Israel, mostly poor populations from rural and desert areas, settled in the city attracted by the low-paid jobs in Lydda and nearby Tel Aviv. Currently, Palestinians make up about twenty-five percent of Lydda’s population.
As Khaled Furani and Dan Rabinowitz (2011: 484) write, while Palestinians have been recently “admitted” as “subjects of anthropological inquiry,” this admissibility is still “ensnared by the logic of the nation-state.” For example, it is limited by the “denial of the content and costs of subjugation to Israel” and by the fact that “few ethnographies venture to study Palestinian citizens of Israel.” Challenging the “methodological nationalism” that discourages cross-border research, this book examines structures and experiences of control in the Jalazon camp and Lydda.

The conceptual framework that orients this paired comparison draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, especially his early theorization of state power, displacement, and subjectivity in colonial Algeria, in dialogue with different strands of theory on law, emotions, morality, and politics. I build on this theoretical integration to examine how targeted Palestinians in Lydda and the Jalazon respond emotionally to the type of control they experience and how, in the process, they acquire certain moral-political dispositions. Put differently, I consider emotions as an intermediate mechanism between the control exercised from above and the articulation of political claims and practices from below.

A Study in Contrasts

Rami and Bilal, are two Palestinian men in their early fifties, both poor, the former an Israeli citizen and living in Lydda, and the latter a stateless refugee living in Jalazon. Each has come in close contact with different agencies of control and they relate differently to these agencies through distinct emotions and political orientations. Like most poor Palestinians in Lydda, Rami is originally from somewhere else, in his case from the Naqab (Negev), a desert area in Southern Israel. Rami’s life has always been precarious: in the Naqab, his extended family has lost much land to state confiscation; in Lydda, he lives in the Mahatta (railway station) district, a segregated and under-serviced district, and his house, already demolished once, is again under the threat of demolition because he built it without a hard-to-obtain building license. While Rami currently works as an assistant car mechanic, when he was in his twenties and early thirties, he engaged in various criminal activities, for example he used to steal cars and sometimes smuggle them across the border of the adjacent West Bank. During that period, he was repeatedly arrested and interrogated by Israeli police (shurta in Arabic). State security was central to these interrogations. For example, once while in police custody, he was warned: “do whatever you want, but don’t touch the security of the state.” He interpreted this comment as a reference to the trafficking of arms across the border. Rami’s status as a “suspect” citizen in the eyes of law-enforcement agencies has not disappeared even though, for over twenty years of his life, he has turned to low-paid jobs to make ends meet. Thus, days after a demonstration against house demolitions in his district, he was brought to a local police station to have “a chat” and the police cautioned him not to join future protests.

Rami describes law enforcement as an illegitimate power: he contests the legitimacy of the law for its lack of fairness and justifies unlawful practices as legitimate attempts to secure access to unjustly denied resources. While these are surely material
resources such as housing and income, resistance to the law also has for Rami a distinct symbolic dimension. For example, he endlessly watches on his mobile phone both TV clips on political unrest around the world and videos from movies on organized crime. If Rami finds a sense of (political) self-empowerment in (real or imagined) acts of subversion against the law, his encounters with law-enforcement agencies are central to another troubling dimension of his experience of the law: distrust toward fellow Palestinians in Lydda. He is concerned that the Shabak (the main Israeli security agency)\(^2\) is interested in his whereabouts and that his neighbors, who, like him, live in precarious conditions, are under pressure to monitor and collect information about him. His concern emerges from his own experience: the Shabak was involved in some of his interrogations at the police station and they pressured him to collect information for them on his friends and neighbors. This concern makes him particularly circumspect in his everyday social relations. Participation in openly collective activities, for example in neighborhood meetings on the question of how to obtain building licenses or prevent house demolitions, interests him but mostly triggers his anxiety of being surveilled and eventually punished.

On the other side of the Green Line, Bilal has quite a bit in common with Rami: not only language and ethnonational culture, but also protracted experiences of displacement, poverty and precariousness. Like Rami, Bilal too is an object of security. In his case, however, security has brought him into close contact with the jaish (Israeli army in Arabic). Bilal has lived all his life in Jalazon. Like most refugees in the camp, he is originally from the Lydda region. Like most men of his generation, Bilal was arrested during the first Intifada (the uprising from 1987-1993) against the military occupation and he spent eight years in a military prison. In addition to this prison experience, like other camp men, he has been rounded up by the Israeli army into the camp’s small square on several occasions: he had to sit there under the rain or in the heat during different military operations within the camp.

Using a metaphor, Bilal equates the camp to a tree: the camp is rich in branches and leaves but its life runs inside its trunk. For him, the trunk consists of the social relationships that camp inhabitants establish with one another. What happens within the trunk can strengthen the roots, helping the tree withstand the repetitive storms that come its way. While struggling to make ends meet for his family of five, Bilal is active in the camp’s associational life. At times, he also helps organize camp visits by foreign delegations (e.g. journalists, architects, lawyers, and students). When he is unable to secure work, mainly in construction or the service sector, he typically spends his mornings in the courtyard of the camp’s UNRWA\(^3\) office (Uakale, “the agency” in Arabic). There he joins other unemployed men as they drink coffee together. These informal gatherings often lead to animated discussions about the dangers that camp inhabitants face and how to deal with them, from the organization of demonstrations against UNRWA’s budget cuts to camp initiatives for reducing tensions between the main political factions. At times, Bilal works as a service worker, “making coffees,” as he puts it, in one of the many “ministries” of the PA (Sulta, Authority in Arabic)\(^4\) in the nearby Ramallah city, where he is exposed to new emerging lifestyles of the PA-oriented urban middle classes.
Why does Rami feel distrust toward his neighbors and friends? Why is he fearful of the Israeli authorities? In addition, why does he not participate in neighborhood meetings? By contrast, why does Bilal feel a desire for maintaining and nourishing solidarity within the camp? Moreover, why is he oriented toward open political discussion and participation? Lives that powerful agencies of control mark and target as political-security threats are full of tensions and contradictions: negotiating daily proximity to hostile agencies of control surely is a process fraught with everyday dilemmas about what to say and do. These dilemmas are particularly intense for the poor, for whom the negotiation of imposed state scrutiny is intertwined with daily attempts to eke out a living from precarious, informal, and at times, unlawful practices. One might say that the experience of being reduced to an object of security is so personal that it varies from individual to individual. Alternatively, one might emphasize how, in each locality, axes such as gender and generation inflect experiences of being controlled. While Rami’s and Bilal’s life stories surely have idiosyncratic features and important gendered and generational dimensions, nevertheless they also belong to and reveal distinct collective affective and political experiences of state suspicion and control among the Palestinian urban poor in Lydda and camp refugees in Jalazon.5

My findings show that, in Lydda, the affective foundation of everyday life consists of distrust and fear, whereas a collective desire for organized solidarity prevails in the Jalazon camp. Further, I found that urban dwellers have a politicized theory of justice directed against the state, especially its law-enforcement agencies, but they withdraw from openly political claims and practices. In contrast, camp dwellers value and practice collective forms of politics. These affective and political dispositions are collective and cut across the lines of division within each community. Take, for instance, Rema and Amal, two Palestinian women in their mid-thirties who, like Rami, live in the Mahatta and who struggle with unemployment and poverty. Like Rami, they experience distrust: they do not speak to each other, each claiming that the other is “not clean.” Moreover, they share with Rami a politicized view of illegality. Thus, despite their mutual distrust, both interpret their neighbor’s drug dealing as a reaction against an unjust political order. In the Jalazon camp, by contrast, the young refugees Hassan and Mahmud share with Bilal a deep concern for social solidarity. They passionately debate, disagreeing about whether participation in political factions or place of origin-based associations is the best way for preserving and strengthening camp solidarity. In addition, collective claims to rights are very important to both.

These findings are counterintuitive. They complicate assumptions that increased rights allow for increased political expression and they reverse the typical opposition between citizenship and refugees, and between cities and refugee camps, as legal and spatial categories that have fixed political content. The typical opposition represents urban life and citizenship as empowering, whereas camp life and refugee status amount to “bare life.” Despite recent attempts to theorize refugee camps as sites of political and urban agency, these fixed oppositions continue to undergird dominant conceptualizations of refugees and refugee camps at one pole of the political and urban spectrum with citizens
and cities at the other pole. My findings show that fixed dichotomies of place (city versus camp) and legal status (citizens versus refugees) cannot explain how and why, despite their access to formal citizenship rights and their incorporation in a postindustrial “advanced” society, poor Palestinians in Lydda experience mutual distrust, feel uneasy about open political expression, and engage in scattered acts of subversion against the law. By contrast, despite their statelessness and their protracted immobility in an impoverished refugee camp under military occupation, poor Palestinians in Jalazoun such as Bilal, invest considerable energy in organized solidarity, openly claim rights, and are oriented toward collective forms of political expression and action.

Casting a transnational lens enriches these counterintuitive findings. For example, the freedom of movement that Rami formally enjoys as an Israeli citizen would allow him to visit Jalazoun and the broader West Bank with relative ease. Yet, while expressing his desire to travel to the West Bank and even as he made plans to do so, he eventually renounced the idea telling me: “I am afraid of what the Shabak (GSS, the main internal security agency) might think.” Further, his symbolic relationship with the West Bank is complex: on the one hand, he admires it as a place where “there is [political] action;” on the other, he depreciates it as a place of pre-modern “backwardness.” For his part, Bilal both strives to reconnect with present-day Lydda and perceives it as a site of moral-political weakness. He used to choose Lydda as a place to look for work when border crossings were allowed and he remains in touch with some relatives, including a married sister, in the city. However, he also disparagingly calls it “a city of drugs and collaborators” and, in line with Rami’s feelings, he too thinks that many Palestinian residents in Lydda cannot be trusted.

This paradox of an urban environment imbued with distrust, fear, and withdrawal from open political activities contrasts with a refugee camp at its edge, where inhabitants invest in organized solidarity and value collective mobilization. The paradox can only be explained if we de-essentialize both the city and the refugee camp and situate them within the broader spatial-legal distribution of modes of rule. Along these lines, Together, Apart traces the different emotional relationships and moral-political dispositions and practices in the Jalazoun camp and Lydda to the concrete discourses and practices of control that Palestinians living there have historically negotiated. Specifically, it connects them to the triadic interplay between the wakale (UNRWA), the jaish (the army), and the sulta (PA) in the refugee camp and the combined interventions of the shurta (the police) and the Shabak (the security agency) in the city.

Control, Emotion, and Politics

The book develops its comparative argument about control, emotions, and politics in two steps. First, it highlights how different forms of control have emerged through waves of forced displacement and land confiscations and how these forms of control have come to be distributed along the axes of legal status, place, and class. I take from conversations about settler-colonialism in Palestinian Studies the fundamental point that the
distribution of techniques of control across and within the West Bank and urban Israel is intertwined with chains of physical displacement and land dispossession. These conversations correctly highlight how the securitization of Palestinian lives is a process that has historically occurred within a broader political project of land control and population removal (and/or concentration).  

While engaging emerging works on settler-colonialism, I draw on a broader range of works on colonial and neoliberal urban forms of control to capture fully how certain techniques of control have come to be embedded in some (but not other) places across the border between Israel and the West Bank. Nadia Abu El-Haj’s (2010: 40) definition of the Israeli state is a particularly good departure point for doing this. As she writes, the Israeli state “has both liberal and distinctly illiberal dimensions: it is a colonial state and, for its Jewish citizens, a liberal democracy; it is governed by the rule of law and it operates with a sustained suspension of the law, under the rubric of military rule and the guise of security requirements. The Israeli state is that complex multifaceted matrix of forms and tactics of rule.” Building on this definition, the book looks at the axes of legal status and place not abstractly or separately but, instead, in terms of the distinct positions that camp refugees in Jalazon and the urban poor in Lydda have historically held vis-à-vis the Israeli security state and the international humanitarian administration. Further, it includes an urban marginality perspective that is attentive to the two poor populations’ spatial relegation to the bottom of the social-urban order in the West Bank and Israel respectively.  

To specify this distribution of “forms and tactics of rule” toward Palestinians across the divide between subjects and citizens and between the middle-classes and the poor, I build on and merge two models of duality in the literature on colonial rule (Mamdani 1996, 2001) and neoliberal urban control of poverty (Wacquant 2008, 2009). On the one hand, I follow Mahmud Mamdani’s (2001: 653-654) attention to the law: “there is a language particular to the modern state, including its colonial version. That is the language of the law. Legal distinctions are different from all others in that they are enforced by the state, and then are in turn reproduced by institutions that structure citizen participation.” Along these lines, I show how the distribution of colonial and illiberal practices toward Palestinians is based on two nested legal dualities: first of all, between Jewish and non-Jewish (Palestinian) citizens of Israel and, second, between Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinian stateless subjects in the West Bank. On the other hand, I supplement this focus on legal dualities with attention to the differentiation of rule between elite and non-elite segments of the ruled population in colonial societies (Go 2008) and I look at segments of Palestinian citizens and subjects who, like other “urban outcasts” (Wacquant 2008, 2009), live at the bottom of the socio-spatial order. This attention to urban marginality allows approaching neoliberal processes in the West Bank (Clarno 2017) and within Israel (Maron and Shalev 2017) in connection with the broader structural distribution of modalities of rule in both its historical continuities and changes.  

Thus, while the Palestinian urban poor in Lydda share with other Palestinian citizens the condition of being “suspect” minority citizens, their urban condition reflects
how they experience the blurred line between security and crime control practices and discourses. They live at the bottom of the urban order within the city and the state, in segregated districts that have a precarious legal status and are routinely defined in state and public discourses (and also among their residents) as dangerous and illegal zones. For example, they remain at the margins of the legal activism and associationism among the educated and middle-class Palestinian citizens who have managed, at least partially, to escape the grip of the Israeli security state. Similarly, while they share with other West Bank Palestinians their condition of being marked as “suspect” subjects and increasingly “enemy nationals” under the Israeli military occupation (Gordon 2008), camp refugees experience the military occupation in the context of an international humanitarian apparatus that provides them with a distinct institutional-symbolic space within the camp. Their relationship with the PA and its neoliberal program of urban-based economic development is also shaped by their socio-spatial marginality within a camp that is physically close to Ramallah, the PA’s “capital” city with its urban middle classes, but symbolically disconnected from it. The point here is not to overly emphasize micro-differences. Instead, the question is to ask how Israeli rule works—how it is distributed, negotiated, and contested—at the bottom of the social-urban order along the axes of legal status and place.

Within this historical-comparative approach, my book takes a second step explaining ethnographically how and why emotions and politics differ between Palestinians in Lydda and those in the Jalazon camp. Specifically, it shows how these differences emerge from the negotiation of two forms of control, which both contain elements of coercion but are driven by distinct logics and exercised by different structures of control. Urban Palestinians negotiate their everyday lives over and against invisible and continuous interventions by the Israeli security agencies with the routine support of the police. By contrast, Palestinian camp inhabitants experience an everyday reality marked by the Israeli army’s visible and intermittent attacks. They are also exposed to visible signs of this openly hostile and offensive army such as the soldier-manned military tower dividing the camp from Beit-El, a nearby Jewish Israeli settlement and military base. Further, while the Israeli state monopolizes control in the city and manages the Palestinian urban poor as both petty criminals and potential terrorists through its security apparatus, the structure of control in the refugee camp includes not only the Israeli army with its coercive repertoire, but also the UNRWA, with its humanitarian practices and discourses. Additionally, the establishment of the PA with its neoliberal stigmatization of poverty, especially camp poverty, has further fragmented the structure of control in the camp.

Thus, the style of coercion is strikingly different in the city and the camp and so is the structure of control within which such coercion takes place. In the city, there are the invisible and intrusive interventions of the security agencies, which the Palestinian urban poor experience as anxiety-triggering “ghosts” to be avoided and possibly challenged through equally elusive individual subversion. By contrast, in the camp, there are the highly visible, destructive raids and attacks conducted by the Israeli army, which camp-dwellers experience as collective forms of punishment to fend off through equally
collective forms of resistance. Further, whereas the presence of an international humanitarian agency in the camp “interrupts” the (already intermittent) militarized control, providing refugees with material and symbolic resources for sustaining their collective efforts, the Israeli police’s logistical support to the security agencies in the city cements the (already pervasive) scrutiny of Palestinian urban life, intensifying its fragmenting effects.

Put differently, the formally dyadic structure of control in the city’s Arab districts is, to all effects and purposes, a unified structure dominated by the security agencies with the police supporting and reinforcing these agencies’ discourses and practices. As a result of the subterranean presence of the Israeli security agencies and of the blurred line between the political control exercised by these agencies and the crime control practices pursued by the police, the Palestinian urban poor experience mutual distrust and fear of open political expression. Thus, for example, a Palestinian resident participating in a meeting to set up a neighborhood committee was discouraged by the presence of what he identified as “one of those” [police informers] and expressed the need to find “clean guys.” If distrust mars their communal lives, Palestinians in Lydda express a keen awareness of the ethnonational logic of law enforcement in the city and in the state. They have developed a subjugated “theory of justice” interpreting law enforcement as a tool of aggression, and legitimizing acts against the law, including criminal conduct, as attempts to secure access to unjustly denied resources.

In the camp, on the other hand, the structure of control has historically been fragmented with a fundamental tension between the UNRWA’s humanitarian practices and discourses and the Israeli army’s visibly aggressive militarism. The establishment of the PA in the early 1990s has added a third pole to this fragmented structure of control. The (unintended) cumulative effect of this triadic structure of control on camp inhabitants has been to push them to valorize organized solidarity as a fundamental resource to nourish from within, through the enforcement of shared standards of behavior, and defend against external threats, mainly through collective mobilization. First, the Israeli army’s raids and arrests generate a protracted experience of collective suffering among camp inhabitants against an illegitimate and arbitrary external force that quite openly treats them as “enemy nationals.” Second, the UNRWA provides a space, both institutional and symbolic, that counteracts the denigrating discourse of refugee camps as “zones of terrorism” that underpins the Israeli army’s style of coercion. Refugees also mobilize collectively to protect their access to the (decreasing) educational, health, and employment services run by the UNRWA inside the camp. Third, the inability of the PA to protect refugees against the Israeli army, its orientation towards urban middle-class Palestinians, and its neoliberal stigmatization of poverty have reinforced the external boundaries between the camp and the rest of the West Bank, especially the nearby city of Ramallah, the de-facto “capital” of the PA. The PA has also activated internal lines of division among refugees—for example, political factionalism—that, while never totally absent in the camp, had previously been more successfully defused by the work of camp inhabitants. Refugees react to factionalism by looking for other sources of solidarity such
as place of origin-based associations and by intensifying efforts to quench internal dissent. In their negotiation of this “punctuated” form of aggressive militarism, camp refugees both help and exercise informal control over one another.

Like the broader West Bank, the camp is not spared from the Israeli security agencies’ attempts to create subterranean ties similar to those linking them to the Palestinian urban poor in Lydda. As Yael Berda (2017) has recently documented, West Bank Palestinians typically encounter the Israeli security agencies through the labyrinthine permit regime they navigate to obtain travel and work permits. Security agents in the military prisons also interrogate them. Yet, while these security contacts surely produce uncertainty and anxieties among West Bank Palestinians, it is important to embed them within the broader colonial relationship between Palestinians and the military occupation in the West Bank; a relationship marked by aggressive militarism, mass imprisonment, and collective resistance against them. For example, Lena Meari (2014: 547) analyzes accounts made by West Bank Palestinian prisoners in Israeli military courts, highlighting their collective disposition against informing on other Palestinians. In one account, the prisoner imagines himself as a table and then a mountain: “Go interrogate a table. If it talks back to you, come to me and you’ll find that I have become a mountain.” In another account, the prisoner opposes his interrogators by imaging his friends and family: “I was envisioning how I would be received by them when released without providing a confession.”

This desire to keep a unified front against the Israeli army is particularly strong in refugee camps, which have historically been considered primary targets by the Israeli army. Thus, while, like Palestinians in Lydda, camp inhabitants are anxious about the recruitment of informers, in their case, this distinct security practice does not weaken their efforts to maintain social cohesion and quench internal disagreement; on the contrary it reinforces social cohesion. By investing in social cohesion, they defensively attempt to minimize their exposure to security agencies’ offer of material resources (for example, a work permit) in exchange for information. Theirs is thus a defensive solidarity tinged with a strong morality of togetherness. In the camp, “the figure of the collaborator...has strong moral overtones” (Kelly 2010: 181): individual behavior that violates communal norms is policed and censured because it is perceived as more likely to expose refugees to security intrusions. By contrast, Palestinians in Lydda speak about informing as a system of exchange of resources for information that, regardless of morality or lifestyle, the Israeli state systematically forces on them.

Continuity and Change

Throughout this book, I situate the comparison between the two Palestinian populations within a discussion of both historical continuities and changes in how mechanisms of coercion work and how Palestinians respond to them on both sides of the Green Line as well as across it. Thus, for example, I discuss how camp inhabitants’ organized solidarity is a defensive form of solidarity, a solidarity “in waiting,” which keeps them potentially
preparation for collective action (as when their solidarity spilled over the camp boundaries during the First Intifada). In other words, theirs is a collective investment in anticipation of an improved situation for the currently crisis-stricken Palestinian national movement in the West Bank (and the Gaza Strip). Scholars have identified the increased salience of individualized forms of micro-politics (Junka 2015) as well as the growing disillusion with formal politics, especially among the younger generations in the West Bank. In a productive dialogue with this literature, I emphasize how much energy camp refugees continue to invest in maintaining, nourishing, and practicing a collective political voice (Gren 2015). This does not mean that they do not complain about a weakened solidarity both within the camp and within the broader West Bank due, among other things, to political factionalism. Nor does it mean that the preservation of moral-social cohesion is not a laborious and exhausting set of practices that always come at a personal cost, at times a tremendous one, and that many camp refugees, especially the younger generation, do not feel constrained by it. What it does mean is that their orientation toward organized solidarity and collective political expression is a durable disposition that they have acquired by negotiating a distinct structure of control. It also means that the renegotiation of this disposition—example toward more individualized forms of politics—is not an easy matter especially under unchanged structural conditions. When it does occur, it comes at a cost and carries risks as high, if not higher, than its preservation.

The title Together, Apart aims to capture the comparative dimension of the study: togetherness aptly captures the experience of coercive control in the refugee camp and apartness captures that experience in the city. On the one hand, as Aida, a Palestinian woman in her late fifties who spoke at length about the history of the camp, put it: refugees have been pushed “close together, like glue” (jamb ba’d, laseq) after being forced to spread out through waves of displacement. They have also actively mobilized to maintain moral-social cohesion in the face of continued threats such as the protracted military occupation of the West Bank that might spread them out once again. On the other hand, Palestinians in Lydda have been pulled apart by practices and discourses of law enforcement that, embedded within a long history of displacement, legal vulnerability in land tenure and housing, and precariousness in employment, have produced divisive stigmatization, mutual distrust, and fear of Israeli authorities.

Second, Together, Apart signals the cross-border, transnational approach of the book. Most Palestinians who live in Lydda today are not originally from the city—some of them were “internally displaced” from rural areas in 1948 while others resettled in the city in the decades after the establishment of the Israeli state. Yet, there are still salient ties between Lydda and refugee camps such as Jalazon, where most people come from the Lydda region. For example, camp refugees quite smoothly facilitated my transition from the camp to the city by contacting relatives, friends, and acquaintances in the city. Further, there are rich symbolic ties (as well as tensions) between the two localities. The book supplements its comparative approach with a discussion of this dimension of “entrapped transnationalism,” which remains quite under-theorized and under-examined in the literature on Palestinians under Israeli rule. To conclude, Together, Apart is an attempt to
piece together different experiences of state surveillance and control among Palestinians across legal status, place, and class and, in the process, to initiate new conversations about the security state in everyday life in comparative and historical perspective.
REFERENCES


ENDNOTES

1 All names are pseudonyms.

2 The General Security Services (GSS) is the main internal security agency of the Israeli state, also known by its Hebrew acronyms: Shabak and Shin Bet.

3 UNRWA is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees established by the United Nations in 1949 and still operating today in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.

4 The Palestinian Authority (PA) was established in 1993 as an authority of self-rule in certain areas of the West Bank, especially the cities, and of the Gaza Strip. The PA has been increasingly conceptualized as an institution driven by a neoliberal project of proto-statehood through economic development and privileging the small urban-based Palestinian middle-class in the West Bank (Clarno 2017).

5 I follow Wacquant (1995, p. 490, 526, note n. 14) in his argument that, while there is a tension between focusing on “the invariants” of a certain “viewpoint” and analyzing possible “variations” within it, “an elucidation of” these variations “presupposes a prior understanding” of “what these experiential paths hold in common.”

6 My research belongs to a recent “urban turn” in the study of refugee camps (see e.g. Agier 2011; Sanyal 2011; Pasquetti 2015; see also the edited special issues on “durable camps” and on “informality and confinement, I co-edited with Giovanni Picker 2015, 2017).

7 Border crossing was relatively easy in the period between 1967 and the early 1990s. In this period, poor West Bank Palestinians, including many from refugee camps, used to work as day laborers in construction and agriculture within Israel. In the 1990s, the Israeli authorities introduced a permit system significantly replacing West Bank workers with migrant workers from Thailand and other places. In the 2000s, Israeli authorities blocked another route for legal crossing: marriage with Israeli citizens. West Bank spouses of Israeli citizens are no longer entitled to permanent residence within Israel.


9 Before the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank in 1967, the UNRWA interacted with the Jordanian military and police apparatus (1948-1967).