Archive of the Social Science Seminar

2017-2018 | The Social Sciences in a Changing World
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2017-2018

Founded in 1973, the School of Social Science is the most recent and smallest of the four Schools of the Institute for Advanced Study. It takes as its mission the analysis of contemporary societies and social change. It is devoted to a pluralistic and critical approach to social research, from a multidisciplinary and international perspective. Each year, the School invites approximately twenty-five scholars who conduct research with various perspectives, methods and topics, providing a space for intellectual debate and mutual enrichment. Scholars are drawn from a wide range of disciplines, notably political science, economics, law, sociology, anthropology, history, philosophy, and literature.

To facilitate intellectual engagement among the visiting scholars, the School defines a theme for each year. Besides the informal conversations that take place all year long, the scientific activity of the School is mostly centered on two moments. The weekly Social Science Seminar offers the opportunity to all members to present their work, whether it is related to the theme or not. The Theme Seminar meets on a bimonthly basis and is mostly based on discussion of the literature and works relevant to the theme. In 2017-2018, the theme was “The Social Sciences in a Changing World.” The program was led jointly by Didier Fassin, James D. Wolfensohn Professor in the School, and Visiting Professor George Steinmetz, Charles Tilly Collegiate Professor of Sociology at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
School of Social Science
2017-2018

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I

Social Science Seminar
COLONIAL SOCIOLOGISTS IN THE FRENCH AND BRITISH COLONIAL EMPIRES, 1930s-1960s
BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC DEPENDENCY AND INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY

George Steinmetz

The apogee of European colonialism coincided with the emergence and consolidation of European sociology in its modern disciplinary form in the years after World War II. These two phenomena were not unrelated. Colonialism was centrally involved in British and French sociology between the late 1930s and the mid-1960s. Some colonial sociologists tried to help preserve European sovereignty. Many sociologists took a skeptical or openly oppositional stance toward colonialism. And many of them also worked hard to increase their scientific autonomy. Questions of scientific independence and heteronomy, central to Bourdieu’s field theory, are highly relevant to understanding postwar colonial sociology. Scientific autonomy was even more tenuous in colonial settings than in democratic metropolitan ones. At the same time such autonomy is a core main precondition for intellectual creativity. Some of these colonial sociologists produced work of lasting importance. These include the core theoretical categories of social field and habitus, adumbrated in the work of Pierre Bourdieu carried out in French Algeria in the late colonial period.

The historical sociology of social science mobilized here operates at three levels. The first, akin to the sociology of knowledge, involves a contextualizing explanatory approach. This entails extending Bourdieu’s social field concept to the geographic scale of empires. Postwar British and French sociology was organized at an imperial scale. The second analytic level concentrates on the substantive contents and arguments in this colonial social science. At the third level of analysis, some of these sociologists’ ideas can be remobilized for theoretical renovation and critique in the present.

The first part of the lecture discussed the determinants of the postwar emergence of colonial sociology, focusing on colonial developmentalism, social policy, and the creation of universities and research institutes in the colonies. The second section reconstructed colonial sociology as an academic subfield, demonstrating that these scholars were dispersed across the entire disciplinary field and constituted a significant proportion (between one third and half) of the entire discipline between 1945 and 1960. Part Three discussed some of the resources for current social science and social theory (including postcolonial theory) that can be gleaned from this late colonial research.

September 25, 2017
DISUNITY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: DIFFERENT OR FRUITFUL?

Jean-Louis Fabiani

In the first sentence of his famous piece, “Trading Zone: Coordinating Action and Belief”, Peter Galison issues a strong statement: “I will argue this: science is disunited and—against our first intuitions—it is precisely the disunification of science that underpins its strength and stability”. How can his point of view affect our science, or our sciences in the plural, or our disciplines, or more recently, our “studies”? I would like to tie two epistemological tasks: the first is to acknowledge the irreducible plurality of our cognitive endeavors (in theory as well as in research practices); the second is to plead for the cohesiveness of our goals and the necessary interconnection of our knowledge production. I consider that we do produce knowledge, partly configured by the specificity of its objects, namely their historical dimension, in line with Weberian epistemology, and also their reflexive character, the fact that they talk back to us and that mere observation tends to modify situations. My paradoxical argument is a Galisonian one: the lack of epistemic unity in the social sciences, its constitutive disorder, and its apparently Babel-like atmosphere are the main conditions of its fecundity. The last forty years have been characterized by the multiplication of little niches that we call studies. There seems to be no limit for the extension of such niches. At the same time, one of the most successful of those studies, the post-colonial studies, has shown the imperial roots of the social sciences. What should we do once we have accepted the post-colonial revision of our ambitions? We must start by giving a precise account of the current globalized circulation of ideas in the social sciences, following many works inspired by Bourdieu on the issue, but also trying to re-use the notion of trading zone. The radical thinking that has been prosperous since the late 1960s should have driven us to the definitive dismissal of our so-called founding fathers. It did not happen. On the contrary, the link has been maintained, and even revived. This ambivalent situation deserves our careful attention. The issue is now: how to construct a conversation that would re-involve all the members of the Cité savante, a notion coined by Georges Sorel with critical overtones but appropriated in a more positive way by Bachelard and Bourdieu, to account for their own situation in a reflexive way? The seemingly hyper-fragmented situation of the social sciences should not impress us. As we use natural language and cannot escape it, we understand each other so well.

October 2, 2017
FIERCELY NATIONALISTIC OR EUROPEAN COSMOPOLITAN?
MAX WEBER ON WORLD POLITICS

Álvaro Morcillo-Laiz

Weber wrote explicitly on world politics as he intervened in some of the major public debates that were held in Germany during World War I and immediately thereafter. At the risk of excessively simplifying, what Weber pursued through these pieces can be summarized as follows: an honorable peace for Germany that would enable it to participate in world politics. This is what he considered appropriate for a Machtstaat, a “power state” of seventy million, home to the German nation, and situated at the center of Europe. Over this area, called Mitteleuropa, Germany was called to wield a noticeable military and security influence. This clout, however, should be combined with utmost respect for the cultural autonomy of its smaller nations and their languages, most prominently Polish. To achieve these foreign policy goals, Germany, and in particular its large federal entity, Prussia, had to undergo a thorough domestic reform: only democratization would bestow the government with the support of all social classes and, in particular, of the large numbers of leftist workers and soldiers. Conversely, peacemaking with an autocratic state crowded with imperialists, such as Russia before and after the 1917 revolution, posed special difficulties.

One hundred years later, the problems that commanded Weber’s attention continue being of relevance for us, from the perspective of current political development as well as for the improvement of our research agenda and methods. As it happens, the challenges of establishing a single polity in Mitteleuropa are now those of the European Union. How do we combine political and economic integration with the respect of cultural diversity? What should be the role of the larger EU countries, in particular Germany, within this new polity, in terms both of their influence when making political decisions and of their financial solidarity towards other European states? Germans’, then and now, fear of contributing more than what they get is reciprocated by the fears of Poles and Greeks of being dominated by larger, wealthier, and more powerful neighbors. A final political conundrum that Weber tackled, and for which there is no solution so far, is the relation between Germany, Europe, and Russia. In terms of improving the research agenda and methods, Weber’s take on world politics offers a historical sociology of international relations. Guided by the old postulate of the primacy of foreign policy, Weber examined how classes and estates bear upon the ability of a government to wage war or to sign a peace treaty. In a simplified form, this was rediscovered by US scholars of international relations as “the second image reversed”.

October 9, 2017
KHOMEINI’S THEORY OF ISLAMIC STATE AND THE MAKING OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

Mehdi Shadmehr

The Iranian Revolution is one of the most influential events of the late twentieth century, with far-reaching consequences that still echo through the rise of the Islamic state. I show that Khomeini’s doctrine of the Guardianship of the Jurist played a decisive role in the making of the Iranian Revolution by changing the goals and strategies of the religious opposition from reforming government policies to establishing an Islamic state. An ideological innovation like the Guardianship of the Jurist provides a new alternative that individuals can compare and contrast with the status quo. Like technological innovations that increase production possibilities and tactical innovations that increase the repertoires of contentious actions and change the pace of insurgency, ideological innovations increase the set of alternatives to the status quo and change the individuals’ goals and strategies. Expanding the scope beyond Iran and Islam, I explore the role of ideological innovations in the Russian and American Revolutions, and discusses the potentially critical role of ideological innovations in democracy movements in Islamic countries.

Methodologically, I combine the comparative method over time with a study of the role of the new Islamic ideology in the Islamic opposition’s decision-making processes. Within this methodological framework, the paper uses both primary sources (interviews, autobiographies, documents, and data) and secondary sources to support its claims. In particular, I compare the only two periods of the post-coup Pahlavi regime that witnessed widespread popular uprisings: the first occurring in the early 1960s and the second in the late 1970s. While the former uprising dissipated, the latter led to a revolution. Contrasting these periods, the paper shows that the structural and agency-free process factors (derived from grievance-based theories, political process theories, and state-centered theories) underwent the same dynamic in both periods, and hence do not sufficiently explain the variation in outcome. The paper then argues that accounting for Khomeini’s ideological innovation, his treatise on Islamic state first published in 1970, is critical in explaining this variation. Overall, the paper offers a perspective on a key role of Khomeini’s ideological innovation and on the methodology of historical investigation that takes the middle ground between historical accounts, analytical narratives, and process tracing on the one hand, and comparative historical method on the other.

Many American-educated Iranian revolutionaries who supported Khomeini knew his doctrine of the Guardianship of the Jurist, and yet ignored its consequences at their own peril and millions of others. In all revolutions, many sacrifice dearly to bring about a “Glorious Cause”; in some revolutions, many more are sacrificed by the unruly Leviathan that replaces that Cause. I hope that this paper contributes to our understanding of the critical role of ideological innovations in revolutions, and helps prevent the pathological paths they can take.

October 16, 2017
This talk focused on a Conjuror, "Guinea" Sam Nightingale, said to have been shot by cannon directly from Africa to Boonville, Missouri sometime in the 1850s. In Missouri, his political and intellectual life intersected with the revolutionary practices of German émigrés in ways that transformed the struggle against slavery in the United States, as well as subsequent international communism. Through Nightingale's life and work, we can learn about the important role played in the American Civil War by two international revolutionary movements: the conjuring power of African American root doctors and the communism of German political exiles. Both conjure and communism, moreover, put forward a model of revolutionary change that differs sharply from the narratives of gradual national progress characteristic of liberalism, as well as much of the discipline of academic history.

Reading conjure and communism together, and in light of each other and the social transformations they each sustain, helps clarify what it might mean to provincialize global (and not just European) history and to decolonize theory. Transnational approaches to history do not, by themselves, disrupt academic disciplines or the worlds of which they are a part. Theory remains as central as ever in the project of writing histories that seek to interrupt rather than reproduce the hierarchies within which we all work. But, as numerous scholars have reminded us, theory is itself often Eurocentric. Gurminder Bhambra offers an especially important critique of Eurocentric theory as a set of ideal types under which history, understood as a raw material for social scientists, is to be organized as a process of modernization. Historians are often willing participants in this division of labor, conceiving of their writing as raw material for theorization elsewhere. Decolonizing theory is thus an operation performed not only on theory but also on history. It is thus also of paramount importance in provincializing global history.

Decolonizing theory can have at least two senses. The first is revealing the specific colonial investments, including racism, at work in various theorists and theoretical traditions. Decolonizing theory in this sense involves intensive, historicizing reading, and this is one way that decolonizing theory can be part of historians’ practice. But scholars can also locate theory that is itself decolonizing, with decolonization an operation that theory performs on the world and on us, rather than an operation that we perform on theory. Theory here does not float above history, for scholars to apply as they see fit, but rather emerges toward us from the history we study. Decolonizing theory would seize us, perhaps possess us, and assist us in thinking and writing about history. Guinea Sam Nightingale and Karl Marx are decolonizing theorists in this sense.

October 23, 2017
WHEN THE SUBALTERN SpeAKS

Peter D. Thomas

“Subaltern studies” emerged in the 1980s as an intervention into Indian historiography, based upon a creative reading of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks by Ranajit Guha and the Subaltern Studies collective. Particularly following Gayatri Spivak’s interventions, the subaltern was understood as a figure of exclusion, and as the specular opposite of the citizen. It soon became an influential paradigm of research across the social sciences and humanities internationally, in disciplines such as literary and cultural studies, sociology, anthropology and political science, and in contexts such as Latin America, Central and East Asia, the Middle East, the USA and Ireland. Precisely at the moment of its intellectual and institutional “success”, however, key participants in the early subaltern studies project, including Spivak, Dipesh Chakrabarty and Partha Chatterjee, began to question the continuing relevance of the figure of the subaltern, particularly in its “classical” formulation as insurgent peasant. This lecture explores the ways in which subaltern studies may be reformulated and the figure of the subaltern “refigured”, by focusing upon what was foreclosed in the original moment of institution of subaltern studies. It can thus be understood as a case study of the ways in which a research program can confront a moment of (perceived) crisis or exhaustion, in order to renew its original critical impulses.

The initiative of Subaltern Studies was determined from the outset by reference to a partial English translation of Gramsci’s carceral writings. In this lecture, I argue that a contextualist and diachronic study of the development of the notion of subaltern classes throughout Gramsci’s full Prison Notebooks reveals new resources for “refiguring” the subaltern. The Prison Notebooks provide a general characterization of political modernity as a process of subalternization. Subalternity in Gramsci’s formulation is not a relation of exclusion from citizenship, but rather, one of the forms in which the contradictions of modern citizenship are most intensely realized. I thus propose in conclusion three alternative figures to comprehend specific dimensions of Gramsci’s theorizations: the “irrepressible subaltern”, the “hegemonic subaltern”, and the “citizen-subaltern”. Far from being exhausted by the eclipse of the conditions it was initially called upon to theorize in Subaltern Studies, I argue that such a refigured notion of the subaltern has the potential to cast light both on the contradictory development of political modernity and on contemporary political processes.

October 30, 2017
THE KRUGER NATIONAL PARK AND THE CONSERVATION OF SCIENCE

Jacob S. T. Dlamini

The Kruger National Park, founded in May 1926, is the jewel in South Africa’s conservation crown. It is the second oldest in Africa (after Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and is about the same size as the state of New Jersey. The Kruger National Park boasts an impressive research record and has been at the forefront of a range of scientific endeavors, from animal behavior, fire ecology, savannah ecology to zoology. How did this record develop? When did conservation become a science? What does it mean to call conservation a science?

My presentation sought to answer these questions by drawing on the park’s social history. I argued that the development of the science of conservation was co-terminous with the systematic exclusion of Africans from the park as well as the entrenchment of Afrikaner control over the South African state. Whereas the park’s legendary warden James Stevenson-Hamilton relied on local African expertise to assert colonial control over the park, Afrikaner nationalists sought to achieve control through the professionalization of conservation. Thus it was that Afrikaans universities and technikons were the first to offer diplomas in nature conservation, and that it was only after the advent of apartheid in 1948 that the National Parks Board, the parastatal in charge of South Africa’s national parks, introduced educational qualifications for park rangers. This led to the professionalization of nature conservation and the development of conservation science in South Africa. However, as I argued in my presentation, these two developments—the professionalization of nature conservation and the development of conservation science—had the effect of distancing the Kruger National Park further from the African communities on whose lands it was established, and of shielding the park from its social responsibilities.

November 6, 2017
MAKING SENSE OF GLOBALIZING SOCIAL SCIENCE

Johan Heilbron

The social sciences are globalizing. Now practiced in virtually all countries and regions of the world, social science disciplines form a four-level structure: in addition to the local and national, the ‘transnational regional’ and the global level have gained importance. Since these different levels have a structure and a dynamics of their own, their understanding cannot be reduced to a single mechanism or an overall system dynamics. More fruitful than such a systemic account, is a multi-level field analysis, inquiring into the specific dynamics at the various levels, their interdependencies, and the strategies of specialization or switching that individual and collective actors employ to deal with these multi-level realities.

At the global level, the social sciences continue to be dominated by western countries. Beyond their global presence and general growth, globalization of research has, in fact, mostly favored the already dominant regions of North America and Europe. Relations among social science producers worldwide display a duopolistic structure, with a dominant North American-European core, various semi-peripheral, and multiple peripheral countries; the latter ones with only a minor share in the legitimate production of articles and books, and an even smaller part in terms of recognition (as indicated by citations) and prestige (prizes).

According to the evidence (citation hierarchies, patterns of transnational authorship) institutional arrangements (journals for example) on both the transnational regional (Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America) and the global level represent weak fields. They depend on more institutionalized national fields, on the one hand, and on the international hegemony of one country, the US, on the other. Rather than international or global, the predominant pattern of citations, for example, is bi-national: references tend to be limited to national and US journals.

In countries where local and national levels are weak, internationalization tends to lead to: a) the imposition of internationally dominant models, b) an impoverishment of local and national production of knowledge, and c) a deterioration of the public role of social science.

Internationalization through international organizations tends to reinforce mainstream approaches, favoring decontextualized knowledge through formal modeling and quantitative methods over historically oriented and contextually sensitive approaches and case-studies.

More innovative and critical approaches in the social sciences circulate less through international organizations, than through migration, translation, and punctual transfers.

November 13, 2017
I draw attention in this paper to the emergence and ideas of the ‘virtually radical’ in Kashmir, understood best not as situated in digital spaces, but as part outcome of the discursive encounters digitality made possible with its heightened possibilities for ‘knowing’, even if provisionally, the (multiplicity of) other standpoint/s, and as consequence, its resistance to firm constructions of coherent others. This relationship, by no means privileging digital technology with inherent capacities that make societies reflexive, draws attention to the ontological and political ramifications of the access that these technologies enabled to (both read, and contribute to) speech, in spaces where other modes of participation in the public sphere have for some populations been near impossible. My larger project is to examine the institutional structures that underlie even this subjectivity, detailing the ways in which discourses over digital spaces are engaged with, and the ways in which they intersect with and alter self and politics in Kashmir, contributing to reconfigure dominant modes of existential, and political resistance in the region.

The post millennium generation in Kashmir that forms the empirical interest of this project came of age in an overtly less violent, but still highly militarized context, where speech or talk was the first casualty, or at least suffered deep deprivations. The paper explores, through self-accounts of young people, including ordinary students, stone-pelters, and (once) street protestors now at the fringes of a resurgent armed movement (mainly in South Kashmir), lived meanings to speech, and to its contemporary surveillance, that include not just closure of spaces of spatial and virtual discourse, censorship of opposing/local media, but also the horrifying simultaneity and recursive cacophony of Indian national media stridency, and its symbolic product, the spectacle of the self in Kashmir. Surveillance then, the paper argues has certain particularities in the contemporary state of exception: if possibilities for speech as aspects of enabling (forms of) bios or the ‘lived’ life, will have been historically denied in the state of exception, now in digital times, even in, or particularly in such surveilled space, some kinds of speech are as deeply sanctioned (as others are excluded) to pervade, and appropriate the discursive terrain. The paper examines finally, the relationship of this contemporary surveillance with loss of hope of discursive resolution of cause, and the silence of the militant.

November 20, 2017
THE HORRIFIC HISTORY OF COMPARISONS BETWEEN
COGNITIVE DISABILITY AND ANIMALITY (AND HOW TO MOVE PAST IT)

Alice Crary

Animal comparisons have figured prominently, at many different times and places, in rhetoric and practices integral to the marginalization, abuse and killing of human beings who are members of non-dominant social groups. There is an extensive and horrifically violent history of the use of animal likenesses to subjugate members of different racialized groups of humans, and there is a similarly long and ugly history of the use of these likenesses to relegate women to subordinate social positions. Indeed, strategies of animalization have contributed substantially to the oppression of members of an indefinitely large number of subjugated social groups, including, among others, the cognitively disabled, the physically disabled, the 'lower class', the very old, the very poor and the gender non-conforming. Moreover, historically it has been common for activists to combat animalizing ideologies by insisting that members of the targeted groups have a moral standing as human beings that places them 'above' animals. One thing noteworthy about this response is that it retains and reinforces the denigration of animals internal to many modes of oppression. That is, it re-inscribes what some theorists call the "human supremacism" of much political discourse.

Confronted with this persistent and pernicious political dialectic, we might well ask whether it is possible to arrive at an adequate representation of the value of human lives without rehearsing the subjugation of animals. Notice furthermore that, while this question is evidently pertinent to the concerns of thinkers committed to the cause of animals, it is also directly relevant to the projects of all radical social theorists who hope to dismantle the—'animalizing'—scaffolding on which a substantial proportion of oppressive ideologies are built. Granted the general interest of the question, then, what might it be to do justice to human moral standing without indulging human supremacism? Strikingly, many contemporary answers to this basic question proceed by grounding moral status in individual capacities—and by thereby implying that cognitively disabled human beings merit less respect in virtue of their disabilities. We might accordingly ask whether it is possible, without rehearsing the subjugation of animals, to arrive at a representation of the value of human lives that is adequate specifically in that it enshrines the idea of human moral equality.

This lecture, which defends an affirmative answer to this question, proceeds by commenting on a remarkable conversation that took place in 2008, at a conference at New York State’s Stony Brook University, on challenges that the lives of cognitively disabled human beings pose to generally held philosophical beliefs. The event’s most arresting debates centered on what some of the speakers saw as the rebuke cognitive disability represents to the classic idea of human equality, with the most high-profile exchange occurring between the conference’s most vocal critic of the idea of equal human dignity—Peter Singer—and its most vocal defender—Eva Feder Kittay. A key issue at stake between Singer and Kittay was the appropriate role of animal comparisons in thinking about the lives of humans with cognitive disabilities. The current lecture addresses this issue by arbitrating the Singer-Kittay dispute, ultimately departing from both thinkers in combining a call for extreme caution in the use of animal comparisons with a defense of a ‘non-human-supremacist’—and thus suitably radical—account of human moral equality.

November 27, 2017
FROM COHABITATION TO DISPOSABILITY:
DOGS OF ISTANBUL

Ayten Alkan

“From Cohabitation to Disposability: Dogs of Istanbul” was the starting-point of, or my first attempt to apperceive a larger problematic, shortly, “the urban & and the non-human animals”, in relation to which I would subsequently ask the questions to read as:

(i) What are the critical moments of the history of human demographics and settlements that had dramatic effects on other animal species on the one hand, and had created structural transformations in the human’s relations to other animal species on the other? What kind of particularities can be distinguished within this grand history, as regard both the evolution of ‘the dog’, and human-dog relations?

(ii) To what extent, how and why does the modern city segregate, exclude, dispatch, and/or eliminate non-human animals? What are the exceptions to these mechanisms of exclusion (for example, companion animals) and what are conditions and/or limitations of these exceptions?

(iii) How does the exclusion of non-human animals differ from that of other (human) groups? What kind of particularities and additional questions come to the fore when one focuses especially on (free-ranging) dogs?

(iv) By which methodological tools and criteria can we accomplish a “categorization of animals in the city” today? What is a dog’s place/different ‘classes’ of dogs’ places within these possible categories? How can we conceptualize denominational or social class-like differentiations of dogs within urban life?

Istanbul is a city, which has been known for hundreds of years for its dogs, amongst its other distinguishing characteristics. Throughout centuries that have been scene to many political, cultural, governmental and sociological transformations, dogs have been an inherent part of the city life. It is almost impossible to read a Westerner’s travels which does not say a word about the city’s neighborhood dogs who received proper care from, and were fed by human Istanbulites. They had the right to live in this city. However, starting from the first decades of the 19th Century, and in parallel to the Ottoman Empire’s asymmetrical articulation process to Western capitalism, the city has been scene to the first attempts to exile the city dogs. Finally, it was in 1910, 13 years before the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic, and one year after the Jeunes Turcs’ accession to power by the dethronement of Abdülhamit II, when the third attempt took place; this time, leading to an indirect mass massacre of approximately 80,000 dogs, on Oxia/Sivriada, or by its popular name Hayırsız Ada meaning wicked island, the bare, tiny, rocky island in the midst of the Sea of Marmara, where they were deported. Today, a century after the “Wicked Island Massacre”, Istanbul’s faraway forests are full of tens of thousands of dogs, who are rounded up and dumped illegally.

This lecture traces the milestones of this history by drawing upon the notions of spatial divisions, borders, insides/outsides, differentiated territories; of “clean-ness/uncleaness”, which itself is at the same time a spatially-determined dichotomy; and of mobility, both in socio-spatial, and economic terms.

December 4, 2017
THE JAPANESE STUDENT MOVEMENT OF 1968, 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL REVOLUTION, AND THE END OF THE FIELD GENERATION

Miriam Kingsberg Kadia

This presentation introduces my current book project, which seeks to answer a pair of fundamental, related questions in the history of twentieth-century Japan: after the war, how did Japanese society so swiftly jettison structures and mentalities often depicted as fascist, militarist, and imperialist—or did it? And why did the nation virtually simultaneously embrace the new, self-consciously oppositional values of democracy, capitalism, and peace—or were they?

I apply a generational lens to this problem through a collective biography of the intellectual cohort active from the 1930s through the 1960s—the so-called transwar period. In this way, I highlight epistemological continuity across the traditional chronological watershed of 1945. Beyond any demographic variable, the transwar cohort was linked by common commitment to the ideal of objectivity, or the belief in some universally applicable “truth,” pursued through a scientific research method (fieldwork) intended to discipline the individual mind of its perspective and bias. My particular focus is on human scientists, or practitioners of the disciplines that address the diversity of humankind. During the transwar years, what I call the “field generation” reached the apex of their political and social sway, capitalizing on the credibility accorded to objective research to entrench certain visions of national identity.

In this talk, I focus specifically on the end of this period of influence amid the student movement of 1968 (“the long 1968”). At this time, events in Japan were informed by global developments but followed their own course. Traditional scholarship has focused on students as the primary actors in this cataclysm. As the lives of most students were not fundamentally changed by their experience of the movement, this perspective does not capture the transformative significance of the long 1968. Restoring agency to the field generation, I show how its members actually anticipated the grievances of student activists. Ironically, it was their critiques of the postwar order that paved the way for epistemological revolution. In the process, their vision of objective and therefore legitimate knowledge was decisively rejected, ending their intellectual hegemony.

December 11, 2017
MAKE YOURSELVES GODS:
SECULARISM, SEX, AND THE RADIANT BODY OF EARLY MORMONISM

Peter Coviello

This talk takes up the history of Mormonism, as it was practiced, theorized, denigrated, and transformed across the American nineteenth century. It tells the story of the Mormons from the period of their emergence as a dissident sect, notable as much for their post-Protestant heterodoxy as for a dramatically nonnormative sexual imagination, through to their renunciation of polygamy at century’s end. That 1890 renunciation, with which the Mormons at last attained statehood for Utah – transforming them into reluctant monogamists and enfranchised U.S. subjects – marked, too, the culmination of a fantastically vexed history, in which the Mormons had appeared by turns as heretics, sex-radicals, “American Mohammedans,” racialized refugees, anti-imperialists, colonizers, and eventual white nationalists, protected in their citizenship less by the secular state’s offer of official “toleration,” I contend, than by the complex wages of a sovereign whiteness.

I argue that Mormon depravity was read most commonly as both cause and effect of a deranged practice of bad belief: a failure, in all, to hew to the coordinates of religion as they came to be assembled under the aegis of secularism. Speaking in concert with a wealth of practitioners of postsecular critique (Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood, Tomoko Masuzawa, Joan Scott, John Modern), I use the story of the Mormons to vivify a counterposition about what secularism is: not what results from the dissolution of religion in public life; not the happy extirpation of benighted orthodoxy; nor quite a climate of pluralistic fragilized belief, or scene of fair play among theological options; nor again a sociality anchored in a capacity for adjudication and free choice among the multiplying possibilities for belief in a rationalizing and therefore disenchanted world and therefore liberated world. The unceasing attacks on Mormonism, and the specific terms in which they were prosecuted, bring into exceptional focus a contrary rendering of secularism as, rather, a “normative sociality” and “disciplinary structure,” one intimately involved in the harnessing of the terrain of ritual, practice, belief, and spirit to the imperatives of a settler colonial empire coming to understand itself more and more entirely in the framework of a redemptive liberalism. The story of the Mormons, I argue, illuminates not just an economy or a discursive regime but a biopolitics: what I call the biopolitics of secularism.

January 22, 2018
My lecture excavates a deep history of one of the central topics of the contemporary cognitive science of religion (CSR)—that curious engine of belief that goes by the name of the “hyperactive agency detection device.” Cognitive scientists such as Pascal Boyer and Justin Barrett use this felicitous phrase to discuss the bundle of cognitive processes that prime humans to scan for and believe in supernatural agents. The hyperactive agency detection device is a machine whose measurements may be taken as it takes the measure of incoming stimuli and their potential to inflict harm. It is inside your head right now. It is the machine that makes your prayers possible. It is a machine that scans the horizon for movement and pattern and alerts us to forces of otherness, variously construed. Like all the other machines that fill our days with the joy of social mediation, the hyperactive agency detection device is engaged in perpetual prediction. It is calculating how to act in an environment made up of “statistical structures.”

CSR is self-consciously proffering a particular theory of secularization in which our capacity to scan the horizon for agents will become even-tempered with right reason. Scanning, here, is the opportunity for and engine of secularization. It is also the base mechanics of probability theorizing—the fact that our agency detection devices are bent toward hyperactivity, of erring on the side of overestimating the presence of agents, is for our long-term evolutionary good. Tamping down such hyperactivity, however, is a hard job and comes at a price—for reason, rightly arrived at, portends the jettisoning of our illusions of comfort and divine connection, of being watched over, of seeing the world straight and mean and just as it is.

By excavating four sites integral to the conceptual infrastructure of hyperactive agency detection—the MRI Suite, Antebellum phrenology, Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel’s “An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior” (1944), and Jonathan Edwards’ notion of a “new spiritual sense,” I situate CSR as a formation of secularism with a distinctive Protestant character. In doing so I argue that the cognitive explanation of hyperactive agency detection is not so much false as effectively overdetermined.

For the hyperactive agency detection device, for whatever else it might be, is also an historical object. For the claim that the brain is involved in processes of scanning, statistical inference and prediction may well be true but that truth (and our arrival at it) is not unrelated to the desire for that claim to be true (not to mention the cultures and contexts that fuel that desire). What kinds of worlds, I ask, are being validated when such a brain is assumed to be self-evident? For if the hyperactive agency detection device turns out to be the mark of my humanity and yours too, dear reader then the conclusion is unavoidable: together We scan. We count data points and calculate. We predict. We detect false positives. We learn. We repeat. We move forward. We function executively. We are human according to little more than an elaborately detailed cognitive blueprint.
A FIELD OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL SCIENCE?
ON THE POSSIBLE EMERGENCE OF A FIELD OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL SCIENCE

Kristoffer Kropp

Social science knowledge production is undergoing huge changes. Changes from big data, the decline of tenure and public research university as well as the rise of new political institutions all suggests that the social sciences’ historical relations to the nation states may be undergoing changes. What I propose today is that the last roughly 30 years has witnessed the emergence of a European field of social science and that this emergence is closely related to European integration processes, especially EU research policies and the various ways social scientists have entangled with it in their pursuit of building European-wide social science institutions and knowledge.

My ambition is thus to try to understand how changes in funding institutions and policies are entangled with, have been shaped by, and have shaped European social scientists striving to produce social science knowledge, and how these developments eventually led to the constitution of what can be understood as a relatively autonomous European field of social science.

In my talk, I will focus on two distinct but related processes in producing a field of European social science. First of all the political struggles over the position and role of social science in European, especially EU, research policies. Here I show how social science research has been constructed in EU research policies in line with the applied nature of EU research policies and the changing political priorities of the EU. More specific I argue that European social science is to a very large extent dominated by on the one hand policy problems and on the other problems coming especially from ‘hard science’. Thus, social science in EU research policy is constructed as a transdisciplinary and policy oriented enterprise occupied with solving the political and social problems of increasing marked integration in Europe. Secondly, I show how social scientists have used emerging opportunities and strategical opening on a European level to pursue their own social science projects. To illustrate this, I show how a group of survey researchers used their connections to European institutions to ensure access to European resources and establish the European Social Survey around 2000. All in all I argue that there is a field of social science emerging in Europe although it still a weak field under formation and heavily dominated by on the one hand political fields, and on the other dominating scientific fields.

February 5, 2018
In Eastern Europe, postwar changes paved the way for the building of a socialistic university, something seen as one of many possible solutions to a rising need for educational reform. My argument undermines two main narratives about postwar universities in Poland and Eastern Europe: a story about captivity and a story about seduction. Either one can speak about terror, the decline of academia, and a loss of its autonomy, or about the ideological allurement that attracted uneducated masses to support the evil regime. This totalitarian interpretation offers a vision of an endangered university. Its traditions and values undermined by political forces, which demand the production of specialists, appealed for support for industrial development, expected implementation of positive discrimination in favor of youth of working-class origin, etc. Therefore, these processes are seen as the domination of academia and the captivity of professors. Similarly, the postwar generation of students is considered to have been seduced by the vision of a new society and the creation of the “new intelligentsia.”

I examine postwar modernization as an emancipatory project. Modernization attempts can be totalitarian and based on force. However, the case of postwar Poland seems much more complicated, even paradoxical. This modernization project was designed to reshape society and turn marginalized groups into citizens. I examine university reforms as an attempt to open higher education for working classes and trace its results, that is, upward mobility and educational trajectories in postwar Poland. Finally, I claim that the narrative about the political field’s domination of the research and science field is challenged by tracing the reproduction of prewar traditions and structures. If one considers state socialism as a modernizing system, with all contradictions and difficulties, then one might also gain a better understanding of the intended aims of the postwar reality.

My research does not only address how we think about a particular university or even universities in general in communist-ruled Poland within their historical and sociological contexts. It contributes to our broader sense of the place of universities in social change and how we understand intellectuals and academics in their own fields of power and competition.

February 13, 2018
TOGETHER, APART: 
SUSPECT LIVES IN WEST BANK REFUGEE CAMPS AND ISRAELI CITIES

Silvia Pasquetti

Through waves of displacement and state violence, Palestinians have unwillingly established close, “intimate” relationships with powerful and typically hostile agencies of control. Drawing on long-term fieldwork among the Palestinian urban poor living in Lydda (Lod), an Israeli city, and Palestinian refugees originally from Lydda, now living in Jalazon, a West Bank refugee camp, Together, Apart casts a comparative and cross-border analytical lens on how Palestinians negotiate these vertical relationships along the axes of legal status, place, and class. This research uses the paired comparison of poor Palestinians in Lydda and the Jalazon refugee camp to argue that how and by whom securitized control is exercised has enduring emotional and political effects on members of targeted groups. It shows how, while aggressive forms of militarism push refugee Palestinians to invest in organized solidarity and present a mobilized front, subterranean security interventions produce mutual distrust and avoidance of open political action among urban Palestinians. Further, whereas the presence of an international humanitarian agency in the refugee camp “interrupts” militarized control, the police’s logistical support to the security agencies in the city cements the security saturations of Palestinian urban life, strengthening their fragmenting effects.

These findings are counterintuitive. They complicate assumptions that increased formal rights, in this case citizenship rights, allow for increased political expression. They also reverse the typical opposition between citizenship and refugees and between cities and refugee camps as categories with fixed political content—i.e. citizenship and cities as politically empowering and refugees as “bare life.” Most importantly, these findings point to the importance of studying the security state in everyday life and tracing how security discourses and practices inhere in everyday relationships. By setting this paired comparison alongside other historical and contemporary cases of groups and populations targeted as “suspect,” the research interrogates the current “security moment” in its historical connections with illiberal and colonial modes of rule across different scales of the global order.

February 26, 2018
SWITCHING SCIENTIFIC PARADIGMS FOR A SOCIAL REVOLUTION:
FROM COLONIAL LIBERATION TO SOCIAL EMANCIPATION

Amín Pérez

This work offers a reappraisal of an intellectual revolution within the social sciences that has renewed our understanding of domination and social emancipation. In examining Pierre Bourdieu’s work on colonialism (1956-1964), this research uncovers the political foundations of his social theory.

I argue that the pathbreaking thought and method developed within Bourdieu’s work was founded by political views of transforming colonial domination. It was under the fire of the Algerian War of Independence from the French Empire that he came to transcend the Empire’s scientific thinking of the time (its Eurocentric views, its denial of the agency of the colonized, its gaze of irrationality, its divisions of groups between primitive and modern standpoints), but also to break with the prophetical revolutionary discourse intervening on the ways of decolonizing Algerian society.

To accomplish these goals Bourdieu worked with his former student and anticolonial activist, Abdelmalek Sayad. Together they conducted fieldwork analyzing colonization, concentration camps and the expropriation of lands, the impact of capitalism and the social conditions of revolutionary consciousness.

Combining institutional archives from Algeria and France as well as the primary sources of both sociologists’ personal papers, I elucidate how becoming a sociologist in the context of the war meant to understand the most brutal forms of domination that would continue despite decolonization, and to consider this understanding as an indispensable precondition for change.

More than a purely academic ambition, it was social circumstances and political convictions that brought Bourdieu to a scientific revolution during decolonization. It was the linking of political and scientific questions posed in his fieldwork that contributed to countering the prefabricated theoretical schemes that drew a simplistic portrait of social reality, and to crafting an anticolonial position that realistically pictured a postcolonial society.

This history continued in postcolonial France. The practices brought from the Algerian experience distinguished Bourdieu’s work in the French academic field. One cannot understand his work on education or culture without this colonial war moment where a new way of conceiving and practicing social science emerged and some of his concepts (e.g., habitus, field, reflexivity, symbolic violence) were born. At the same time, it is through the combination of both experiences that he crafted his theory of practice. Two experiences that are based on the same principle: The objective was to constitute a scientific knowledge able to provide means for a social revolution that would reshape the very structure of our social and political system by giving people the necessary resources to question their modes of domination – domination which we must acknowledge in order to participate in our own social emancipation.

To come back to the roots of this work seemed to me more important to uncover a little known experience that was decisive in crafting a new social theory, and to confront the current depoliticization of our social sciences.

March 5, 2018
THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET:  
“A NEW FRONTIER” FOR U.S. BUSINESS ELITES OR AN “ECONOMIC FRANKENSTEIN”?  

Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl

During the decade following the establishment of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) in 1958, American foreign direct investment in Western Europe soared. U.S. companies established subsidiaries in Europe in order to produce on the inside of the E.E.C.’s common external trade tariff and to profit from soaring growth rates and lower production costs. Following the growing balance of payments deficit after 1958, these capital flows became an object of contention between business leaders and the government. Kennedy’s tax proposals of 1961 and the Johnson administration’s balance of payments programs of 1965 and 1968 aimed at curbing this direct investment in Western Europe, in an effort to reduce the deficit without calling into question the soaring Cold War military expenditures, maintain a strong dollar, and overall assure the United States’ worldwide economic and political hegemony. These attempts to limit their profitable capital investments in Europe were harshly opposed by the leading U.S. business organizations.

As public and private archives reveal, the business organizations relied on a wide array of actions in order to prevent the 1961 proposals from being implemented and to significantly water down the mandatory foreign direct investment controls of 1968. Congressional hearings played an important role, but they were supplemented by classical Public Relations activities, direct meetings with government officials and informal exchanges during social events organized between business and government representatives. Increasingly both government and business organizations began to rely on professional economists to give more scientific legitimacy to their diverging positions in the debate on foreign direct investment’s effects on the balance of payments.

When in Europe criticism of the US multinationals started to increase after 1964, the State Department relied on an organization that was part of the much broader Atlantic Unity movement, the Atlantic Council of the United States, to forge transatlantic government-business networks focused on the question of U.S. direct investments in Europe.

Overall, the conflict over short-term interests of business leaders and the longer-term objective of the United States’ military and political worldwide dominance, highlighted the intense interactions and interpenetration between the government and business organizations during the 1960s.

March 12, 2018
The hypothesis that the natural resource curse is the preeminent obstacle to democracy is also the main idea behind this research that has been studied for many years. Regrettably, it still remains significant today. For many years, there have not been any critical variations between theoretical studies and the results of the evidence-based practices of different countries debated within academic circles. One of the key distinguishing features of these studies is having a different approach regarding management of natural resources along with specific elements. Thus, one of the regions that differs from another part of the world is referred to as the post-Soviet area. All of the included countries were part of the Soviet Union 27 years ago.

Another of the key distinguishing features of these studies is related to change in oil price. The sharp decline in oil prices in the second half of 2014 drew attention to petro-authoritarian regimes. Crackdowns on civil societies across oil-rich nations of the post-Soviet space, and especially the aggressive behavior of the Russian government, restored academic interest in the "oil hinders democracy" hypothesis of Ross (2001). However, some recent studies challenge the assumption and suggest that previous articles on the topic might suffer from endogeneity and do not control the heterogeneous initial institutional quality. To address these issues, we use the instrumental variable approach and employ the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) to test the impact of oil income on democracy in post-Soviet countries.

With the help of the SCM, we detect that the critical turning point in the trend of democracy score was 2004 and 2008 for Russia and Azerbaijan, respectively. However, for Kazakhstan, we cannot find a statistically significant turning point in democracy score. Moreover, we find that real government investment exacerbates democracy in all post-Soviet countries, but the adverse effect appears to be stronger in resource-rich nations. This hints that public investment always creates issues for democratic development when a state does not have transparent institutions, and this problem becomes more severe when oil resources are present.

Our empirical findings show that economic growth hampers democracy only in oil-rich nations of the post-Soviet space. This study shows that real government consumption hinders democracy exclusively in petro-authoritarianist regimes and this may suggest that increased oil income encourages governments to expand their power through unrestricted fiscal policy.

Overall, by employing instrumental variables to address the possible endogeneity issues and by controlling initial institutional and economic development, we confirm that the resource curse is still prevalent in resource-rich post-Soviet countries. Thus, our study confirms that despite the sharp decline in oil prices in the second half of 2014, oil still hinders democracy in resource-rich countries in the post-Soviet region. The conclusion is that oil and gas revenues have a paramount contribution to the establishment of authoritarian regimes in the countries involved in this study.

March 19, 2018
CULTURE AS PROCESS:
NOTES TOWARD A THEORY

Paul DiMaggio

The study of culture in sociology has experienced a renaissance of sophisticated work using a wide range of methods, but sharing certain theoretical intuitions, including the use of insights from social cognition and social network analysis. These efforts appear to be cumulating toward a new theoretical synthesis, which this project aims to advance. Yet these new developments have as yet had relatively little impact on mainstream sociology, as reflected in casual references in papers on other topics or in textbooks used to introduce undergraduates to the field. These mainstream sources tend to portray culture as an entity, in a manner inherited from anthropology in the 1940s (but rejected by anthropologists by the late 20th century). In this received view, each person is a “member” of a human population that shares a “culture,” and becomes disoriented if she or he leaves that “culture”; culture is a kind of latent variable, unobservable in itself but knowable through various indicators from which its character can be inferred; culture is both material and discursive, accessible to a culture’s members; it consists of elements that are logically coherent and integrated with social institutions and, as such, afford considerable stability to human groups and societies.

This paper promotes an alternative, a process model that treats culture as a process rather than an entity. This alternative draws on work in psychology that depicts human cognition as characterized by duality (with much culturally infused cognition occurring beneath the surface of conscious thought), credulity (with representations and models quickly and uncritically stored in memory), schematicity (with thought structured by schemata that both represent knowledge and process information) and identity (with the most prominent, chronically activated and emotionally charged schema being that of the self). A process model depicts actors as moving among multiple cultures easily. Culture enters into human life primarily through automatic cognition and only secondarily through discursive thought. Cultural representations are associated in relatively fluid networks, with coherence more the exception than the rule. And while culture often contributes to social stability, it is also subject to discontinuous change, events that reshuffle understandings and lead to radically different definitions of the situation.

A robust sociology of culture must be able to explain not only stability but also disjunctive change – e.g., the American public’s relatively rapid and widespread acceptance of gay marriage in the early 21st century; or the deinstitutionalization of certain political norms since the 2016 U.S. presidential election; or the collapse of intergroup amity in the former Yugoslavia. Three metaphors offer leverage toward developing a robust theory of cultural change. Viewing culture in epidemiological and ecological terms enables us to model cultural change as a mutual selection process whereby the environment of representations selectively primes and activates particular mental models at the group or individual level, while the distribution of schemas shapes the effectiveness, and eventually the prevalence, of different communicative frames and strategies. Viewing culture as a network – in understanding schemata, in analyzing public discourse, or in analysis of survey data – calls attention to the ways in which meaning emerges from the juxtaposition of symbols rather than inhering in them, and to ways in which changes at critical nodes and edges can rewire symbolic and schematic networks in ways that significantly alter interpretive frames. Finally, understanding culture as a complex system helps us to understand the paradoxical coexistence of substantial stability with occasional periods of disjunctive change.

March 26, 2018
Japanese and Euro-American cultural primatologists have come to question whether humans are the only primates capable of culture – that is, whether culture amounts to human nature. The explanation of geographical variation of behavior between chimpanzee communities in terms of social learning has given rise to a heated controversy, which chimpanzee ethnographer William McGrew dubbed the chimpanzee culture wars. My ethnographic study focused on two front lines in this conflict: 1) When Japanese primatologists first proposed that monkeys had culture, many Euro-American primatologists responded with concern, some with excitement to what the Dutch comparative psychologist Frans de Waal described as a “silent invasion” of Japanese anthropomorphisms. 2) Anthropologists and experimental psychologists defended the ontological divide between biologically determined apes and culturally flexible humans against field biologists who proposed to extend multiculturalism beyond the human.

In the face of rapid destruction of the natural habitats of the great apes, chimpanzee ethnography also amounts to a form of “salvage primatology”: an attempt to archive cultural diversity as it is about to vanish. Thus cultural primatology reanimates anthropology’s original 18th-century question of human nature in the 21st-century context of the Anthropocene: if it is not simply “culture,” then what has enabled modern humans to radically transform their environments and to outcompete other primate species and their cultures? At a time when posthumanities scholars assure us that we have neither been modern nor human, my conversations with cultural primatologists have reinvigorated a curiosity about how we have become both.
CONTEMPLATING SPECTACULAR BLACK DEATH ACROSS GENERATIONS:
LYNCHING, LETHAL POLICE VIOLENCE, AND THE BLACK FEMALE BODY

Shatema Threadcraft

Feminists have long concerned themselves with how societies think about the body, the relationship between approaches to the body and politics and the impact of both on the standing of women in society. Body politics are no less pressing for black feminists. Issues from the latent antiblack somatophobia evident in the Transportation Security Administration’s policy of searching black women’s unstraightened hair without cause to the impact of manspreading on black women’s daily lives - as researchers have found that how a subject positions his or her body in space effects confidence levels and response to stress - are all worthy of black feminist exploration. The most urgent contemporary issue regarding the relationship between the black body and politics, however, is the considerable recent attention given to how the body politic produces its dead. Black feminists must reckon with the fact that the body that has received the most attention in contemporary racial politics – the body around which the greatest amount of people can be rallied to the cause of racial justice – is a deceased one, and one rendered deceased in spectacular fashion. The spectacle of public, violent death, where technology facilitates the process of multiplying and sustaining the ability to witness the death event or its product so that now all could see the lethal violence, when before the technological developments the nation might only hear and perhaps deny, has been invaluable to the #blacklivesmatter campaign. The abovementioned reckoning is necessary as black women suffer from a spectacular violent death deficit.

My research on Race, Gender and Necropower examines the politics of black death, including how necropower has operated and been justified historically, with particular attention to the case of lynching, as well as how it operates and is justified today with lethal police violence. The project examines how necropower has been and is contested in black communities and how the politics of gender are implicated in the politics of black death. The research I have undertaken at the Institute has focused on two areas. First I have examined how racists and antiracists have used technological innovations and the public and counterpublic spheres to accredit and resist necropower. As a part of this research I have examined the necropolitical writings of Ida B. Wells and W.E.B. Du Bois. The second part of my research takes seriously and takes issue with Elizabeth Alexander’s claim that it is violence – the experience of violence, the threat of violence and, crucially, the alleged interchangeability of the black body to which violence is done – that has forged blacks as a people. My research reveals that it is a specific form of violence – that of spectacular lethal violence – that is most central within this people making project. This calls into question both the absolute interchangeability of the body at risk of violence and, I argue, the status of black women within the black people. Gender differences in how white power intersects with the black body, the differences that produce the spectacular death deficit, have consequences not only for black political mobilization – as my research reveals that nothing has mobilized blacks quite like spectacular death – but also significant consequences for the place of black women in black peoplehood.

April 9, 2018
RIGHTS OF PLACE:
A SPANISH AMERICAN VIEW OF PROPERTY AND TERRITORY

Paulina Ochoa Espejo

Who should have territorial rights? Most people think that the answer is, “States” because only states have title to territory, and only states have the legal right to jurisdiction, to control natural resources, and to control the borders of a given country. Yet in the last 20 years, many legal theorists have challenged the view that only states have a right to territory. Some of these scholars have argued that territory is an original right of individuals, while others have argued that the right can inhere in collectives other than the state, such as peoples, nations, tribes, or cultural groups. All these proposals challenge the conceptual stranglehold that the state currently has over territorial rights in the minds of most people. Yet they remain faithful to the view that territorial rights must be based on title to territory. Title, however, is a notion taken from the law of property. Hence these scholars all tend to see territorial rights in terms of the most intuitive property right: the individual right to private property. They tend to see the right to territory as in fact a bundle of rights or incidents that allow property or dominion over land. However, as changes in climate remind us, the environment is not an object separated from individuals that can be dominated and controlled; nor is it a fungible resource that can be exchanged in the market. Can we integrate these new views about the environment into legal and political theory’s thinking about territory, while keeping a foot in the history of legal and political praxis?

My general project Rights of Place: Territory, Property and Jurisdiction in the Americas, presents and defends a systematic answer to these questions. I argue that the territorial rights are best understood not as private property, but rather on the model of jurisdiction of grounded communities (or pueblos). In this talk I use current and historical evidence from Mexico to argue for a specific Spanish American view of property and territory. What is particular about this view of territorial rights is that it is not based on identity and dominion; but rather in residence and civic participation. The land does not belong to a group defined by their identity, but rather jurisdiction is established by those who live, work and build connections to a particular place. To present and defend this pueblos view, the project turns to a neglected tradition in the history of political thought, one which holds that the citizenry is primarily created by residence, and thus, constituted by its relation to the land. This tradition has its origins in the European Middle Ages and Pre-Colonial American thought and practice, but it can be traced through the legal and political thought of colonial Spanish America.

By mining 17th century discussions on the idea of land and jurisdiction in the colonial context, I propose a view of territorial rights grounded in the concept of el pueblo. “Pueblo” can be translated into English as “the people” or “the town,” and it has a special status in traditional Spanish and Latin American legal thinking. A pueblo is a corporation with legal personhood, which is composed of neighbors or vecinos. A “vecino” has traditionally enjoyed a type of territorially bound citizenship, based on performance, rather than filial ties or place of origin. I argue that a contemporary analysis of this form of membership helps us navigate the current tension between ideas of land that seek to protect natural resources for everyone in the world, and demands for self-determination. The talk offered a historical and systematic defense of this view, which allows us to highlight difficulties related to environmental degradation in ways that are impossible under the property model.

April 16, 2018
DISCIPLINING CREATIVITY:  
A CULTURAL HISTORY OF UNSTRUCTURED THOUGHT  

Bregje van Eekelen

Until WWII, brainstorm was the American name for a nervous disorder epitomized by an abundance of ideas, and elaborated to describe irrational behavior in medical, legal, and economic domains. After 1938 brainstorming transformed into a positive process to garner new ideas, especially in military and industrial contexts, and was gradually institutionalized to the point of becoming common sense. This lecture investigates how having an *uncontrolled flow of ideas* moved from an object of deviance and pathology into a method to collectively increase productivity.

I reconstruct how the brainstorm process, initiated in an advertisement firm in 1938, gained traction in the manufacturing industry, government and the military during and after WWII, where it was sold in the form of ideas (ranging from product names to Cold War scenarios), or in the form of expertise. During WWII, with labor and raw materials both in scarce supply, employees – mostly rank and file workers – were implored by labor-management committees throughout the U.S. to share their first-hand knowledge with the nation at war. I briefly discuss a set of wartime posters that articulate this particular history of ideas. By examining the reconfigurations of time and space, the incorporation of workers’ bodies and minds, and the campaign’s understandings of expertise and property, I draw attention to the historical particularities of how knowledge production, material production, and war were interrelated in this economy of ideas.

The academic field of creativity studies emerged after World War II, and the military was a vital site for the production of knowledge about creative thinking. Aware that no military rationality could guide them into the unknown, the Navy procured brainstorming expertise to stir the creativity of their personnel. Creativity emerged on the geopolitical radar, in terms of the acquisition of creative thinking skills, attempts to “think the unthinkable” (atomic futures), and the detection of creative citizens. Creative, divergent thinking garnered a renewed urgency with the Sputnik shock, which showcased that conformist practices in knowledge production would not put an American on the moon. In this Cold War context, the concept of creativity—as something to be defined, measured, and stimulated—became framed as a matter of national security and an object of geopolitical concern. The ensuing traffic in knowledge between academic and military contexts has been constitutive of present-day understandings of creative, undisciplined thought.

I conclude with a discussion of an important paradox that lies at the heart of these practices: while brainstorming developed as a value-generating practice squarely at the heart of military-industrial settings, it was pitted against predominant utilitarian rationalities of e.g. management, the military, and bureaucracies. I hypothesize that in order to overcome the boundaries imposed by these modern and emergent rationalities, creative thinking offered a form of counter-knowledge: an understanding that comes about by *not* following the rules of disciplined thought.

*April 23, 2018*
This lecture approaches the relationship between religion and capitalism in early modern France from the perspective of economic theology, understood as a belief in the economy, both material and spiritual, and as an economy of belief by which persons and objects were designated as sources of value. In response to the Protestant Reformation, the Catholic Catechism of the Council of Trent codified the productive character of the sacraments. The Eucharist figured as a sign, but one that brought the body and blood it signified into being. Reverence for its splendors surged among the thousands of men and women who enlisted in religious and lay confraternities. Their duties encompassed devotional as well as financial obligations and ranged from silent prayer to public processions. Faithful observance made one eligible to receive spiritual advantages, including plenary and partial indulgences granted by the pope and ratified by local bishops. In pursuit of these gains, confraternities devised liturgies predicated on a Christian variant of materialism, with the Eucharist as its venerable base. Professional theologians, for their part, defended transubstantiation in Thomistic terms, while justifying the doctrine as a means of spiritual enrichment that assured consolation in this life and eternal beatitude in the next. Popular sermons by pastors such as Louis Bourdaloue and François-Léon Réguis openly proclaimed a gospel of splendors, according to which plenitude overcame scarcity, and motive was understood in terms of charity rather than the calculation of brute self-interest. To this end, orators made explicit reference to a providential “economy” of grace, as well as to the “invisible hand” believed to guide its operations.

Catholic economic theology proceeded along general rather than restricted lines. By invoking the invisible hand, its practitioners did not mean to discredit economic activity in this life, but rather to gesture toward the convergence of material and spiritual profits on the same expansive plane. Confraternities maintained that perpetual vigilance over the consecrated host need not preclude attention to mundane affairs. As the Catechism made abundantly clear, theology was always already economistic—a means of organizing a diverse range of activities aimed at administering objects of value, from the sacraments and indulgences to metallic treasures cast in gold and silver. This Catholic ethic, in contrast to its Protestant counterpart, privileged the marvelous over the mundane, consumption over production, abundance over scarcity, and the pleasures of enjoyment over the rigors of delayed gratification.

April 30, 2018
The Politics of Decision:
The Modern Social Sciences from Decisionism to Rational Choice

Nicolas Guilhot

Starting at the end of World War II, “decision-making” emerged as a focal subject for political science. Not only did political scientists increasingly write about decisions, but the study of decision-making came to define the identity of the discipline, both in thematic and in methodological terms: the study of decision-making processes entailed the promise of turning the study of politics into a real science. The conflation of decision-making and scientific methodology became the distinctive feature of research programs that, notwithstanding their differences, eventually came to be known as “rational choice theory.”

The standard explanation for the rise of rational choice usually sees it as a disciplinary turf battle between political science and economics, with the former discipline importing rational choice methods from the latter. This explanation is not only unconvincing (economists initially had little interest in game theory, which was a departure from neoclassical orthodoxy) but it also obfuscates a longer – and more puzzling – history of the concept of decision within political science. In the 1920s and 1930s, political theorists such as Karl Mannheim or Carl Schmitt defined as political those decisions that had to be taken in spheres where the rationalization of social life had not yet proceeded, such as economic competition or power in international affairs. This earlier “decisionism” was thus premised on the assumption that politics existed “only as long as the realm of the irrational still exist[ed]” (Mannheim). Authoritative decisions were needed precisely when there was no normative or practical certainty to orient human action: a political decision was never a “rational” choice.

Resituated in this longer timeframe, the rise of rational choice theory can be seen as tectonic shift in our representation of political authority, rather than a mere methodological turn. The concept of “decision,” previously associated with the irrational core of politics became the building site for postwar notions of political “rationality.” This is all the more puzzling since rational choice theory developed in the fields most directly connected with interwar decisionism, in particular international relations theory and security studies. There, “decisions upon the exception” became instances of “rational choice.” Exploring this paradoxical overlap is the first step toward a history of “rationality,” understood as a modern construct and a departure from previous notions of “reason” inherited from the Enlightenment. This history suggests that postwar rationality has been largely patterned after previous concepts of decision. It also suggests that decisionism did not simply disappear after 1945 but was instead translated in the language of the social sciences and of rational choice. The development of game theory and cybernetic representations of social processes offered a new language for restating traditional notions of sovereign authority by extracting them from the mystique of political theology and decisionism. The rise of rational choice thus appears as a crucial episode in the secular acclimatization of some strands of authoritarian politics to a liberal political culture in which “rationality” operates as an important legitimation device.

May 7, 2018
Equality in French Politics:
An Unfinished Business

Anne-Claire Defossez

Gender equality in politics is far from being achieved in most countries around the world. France is a case in point, since it has a singular history regarding women’s presence in the political field. Indeed, it was one of the last European countries to recognize political rights for women, in 1945, as well as the first country to pass a law, in 2000 – known as parité – establishing that political parties had to nominate as many women as men for candidacy in most elections in order to correct the imbalance of women’s presence in elected offices. French women are therefore the only social group that has been successively subjected to exclusion and later to inclusion by law. Yet, although the law on parité has favored greater access to political office for women than before, especially in list elections, it has not solved the question of power - which remains largely in men’s hands since they still occupy the most powerful elected positions such as mayor in municipal elections. Neither did it generate a new figure of politician whose gender would be meaningless: gendered stereotypes remain strong in the distribution of municipal offices between women and men, and men would receive more powerful delegations such as finance or urban planning while women would inherit the less coveted ones, typically associated with allegedly feminine qualities like child care and social affairs.

Whereas there has been some progress for women's representation, largely due to the new constraining legal framework, two other frontiers remain: class and color. In all elected assemblies, political power is concentrated in the upper socio-professional strata, while the working-class has almost disappeared. And although the absence of diversity in politics is now acknowledged by public authorities and political parties, ethno-racial minorities are still poorly represented in many instances. These frontiers are even reinforced by electoral abstention: the very categories less likely to be part of any elected body are also those who are less inclined to vote. Thus the law on parité has improved the presence of women, but has not changed the socio-economic or ethno-racial profile of politicians.

This general picture should, however, be nuanced. Given their specific political history and their socio-demographic structure, left-wing municipalities often offer a distinct portrait. This is the case of Aubervilliers and Cergy where my research has been conducted. In both cities women have had a significant political presence before the law on parité. In Aubervilliers, this goes back to World War II because of their involvement in the Résistance and the ideology of the Communist party - then the main actor in the structuring of local politics - on women’s political rights, favoring their participation in municipal councils. In Cergy, by contrast, their high representation in local political offices is related to the creation of the entirely new setting of the ville nouvelle opening political space for newcomers, and to the Socialist orientation of the municipality epitomized by the election of a female mayor. As for class and color, trends are contrasted. With respect to class, paradoxically, these left-wing municipalities did not avoid the complete elimination of blue-collar workers in local politics, whether male or female, despite the large working-class component of their population. Regarding color, ethno-racial minorities have significantly made their way to local political offices, women having even gained more powerful positions than men.

These recent transformations in the political representation of women and minorities - whether or not they are determined by the law - are narrowly related to the deeper transformations of the social representation of gender and ethno-racial issues in France.

May 14, 2018
II

Theme Seminar
The Social Sciences in a Changing World

Over the past century and a half, social scientists have conducted research on a multiplicity of topics and societies, including the worlds of science and technology, but similar investigation into their own disciplines had been relatively limited until recent years. Since then, historians and sociologists in particular, have examined the politics and practices of the social sciences, their epistemologies and methods, their institutionalization and professionalization, their national development and colonial expansion, their heterogeneous globalization and local contestations, their public presence and role in society. Strikingly, this trend is concomitant with a reconfiguration of their landscape and a reshaping of their borders with neighboring fields. The history, sociology, and philosophy of social science have evolved in parallel and remain relatively separate communities, but their studies provide new challenges as the humanities come under increasing pressure, while cognitive and evolutionary sciences, as well as method-driven and big data approaches, stake out new claims to understand society. It is thus an interesting time to undertake a critical inquiry into the social sciences.

The theme of the School of Social Science for 2017-2018 explores multiple and diverse perspectives in the social sciences and the humanities, including history, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, economics, political theory, and political science. The constitution and evolution of scientific fields, controversies and their resolution, debates within and across disciplines, explicit and implicit construction of knowledge, comparison between countries or regions of the world, and relationships between the social sciences and society at large are some of the topics deemed of particular relevance. Through the conversations that occurred during the year, we hope to contribute to “a social science of social sciences.”
Readings:


Archive:

- Rani Anjum, *Beyond Positivism: Causation and Scientific Methods*, Beyond Positivism: Theory, Methods, and Values in Social Science Conference, Palais des congrès de Montréal, Montréal, 2017
Readings:

Archive:
Decolonizing the Social Sciences – November 8, 2017
(Curated by Miriam Kingsberg Kadia, Peter D. Thomas, and Andrew Zimmerman)

Readings:

Archive:
- Miriam Kingsberg Kadia, “Transnational Knowledge, American Hegemony: Social Scientists in U.S.-Occupied Japan,” (Draft)
- Peter D. Thomas, “Refiguring the Subaltern,” (Draft)
Neuroscience and the Social Sciences – December 6, 2017
(curated by Didier Fassin and Stanislas Leibler)
Session jointly organized by the Schools of Social Science and Natural Sciences

Lecture by Mariano Sigman, University of Buenos Aires
Readings:


Archive:

- Agata Zysiak, “Postwar Modernization and the University for the Working Classes in Poland,” (Draft)
Funding and the Social Sciences – February 7, 2018
(Curated by Bregje van Eekelen, Kristoffer Kropp, and Álvaro Morcillo-Laiz)

Readings:


Archive:

● Álvaro Morcillo-Laiz, “La gran dama: Science Patronage, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Mexican Social Sciences in the 1940s,” (Draft)


The Pre-history and History of Modernization Theory Between the 1920s and the 1960s – March 7, 2018

Lecture by Wolfgang Knöbl, Hamburg Institute for Social Science

Readings:

Archive:
- Wolfgang Knöbl, “Introduction,” in Wolfgang Knöbl, Shaping a New World: American Social Sciences and the Life and Times of Modernization Theory, (Draft)
- Wolfgang Knöbl, “The political beginnings of modernization theory in the 1950s – a leap in the dark and the questions that followed,” in Wolfgang Knöbl, Shaping a New World: American Social Sciences and the Life and Times of Modernization Theory, (Draft)
- Wolfgang Knöbl, “Modernization theory before its emergence,” in Wolfgang Knöbl, Shaping a New World: American Social Sciences and the Life and Times of Modernization Theory, (Draft)
- Wolfgang Knöbl, “The brief heyday of modernization theory: the 1950s and 1960s,” in Wolfgang Knöbl, Shaping a New World: American Social Sciences and the Life and Times of Modernization Theory, (Draft)
- Wolfgang Knöbl, “Looking back, looking ahead,” in Wolfgang Knöbl, Shaping a New World: American Social Sciences and the Life and Times of Modernization Theory, (Draft)
Readings:

Archive:
Readings:

Archive:
- Carel E. Smith, “Deduction, Exemplary Reasoning and the Rhetoric of Literality,” (Draft)
- Alice Crary, “Objectivity,” (Draft)
Book Workshop – May 16, 2018
(Curated by Didier Fassin and George Steinmetz)

Preparation of the collective volume tentatively titled:

A Reflexive Moment: The Social Sciences in a Changing World
edited by Didier Fassin and George Steinmetz
From the Banned Countries Film Series

In parallel with the seminar, and in collaboration with Librarian Marcia Tucker and the School of Historical Studies, we organized a Film Series, screening fictional films and documentaries from around the world to continue our discussion with a broader public through cinema.

October 18, 2017
* Post-screening discussion led by Professor Kevin Martin, Indiana University

Last Man in Aleppo, directed by Firas Fayyad

November 8, 2017
* Post-screening discussion led by Professor Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, University of Pennsylvania

Taxi, directed by Jafar Panahi

December 13, 2017
* Post-screening discussion led by Professor Steven Caton, Harvard University

The Mulberry House and Karama has No Walls, directed by Sara Ishaq

February 21, 2018
* Post-screening discussion with filmmaker Matthew Millan

Stronger than Bullets, directed by Matthew Millan

April 5, 2018
* Post-screening discussion led by Professor Lee Cassanelli, University of Pennsylvania

Stolen Seas, directed by Thymaya Payne

May 9, 2018
* Post-screening discussion led by Professor Alden H. Young, Drexel University

We Come As Friends, directed by Hubert Sauper